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AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES
Richard Primus*
The idea that Congress can legislate only on the basis of its enumerated pow-
ers is an orthodox proposition of constitutional law, one that is generally 
supposed to have been recognized as essential ever since the Founding. Con-
ventional understandings of several episodes in constitutional history rein-
force this proposition. But the reality of many of those events is more compli-
cated. Consider the 1791 debate over creating the Bank of the United States, 
in which Madison famously argued against the Bank on enumerated-powers 
grounds. The conventional memory of the Bank episode reinforces the sense 
that the orthodox view of enumerated powers has been fundamental, and 
agreed upon, from the beginning. But in 1791, Members of the First Congress 
disagreed about whether Congress needed to point to some specific enumer-
ated power in order to create the Bank. Moreover, Madison’s enumerated-
powers argument against the Bank seems to have involved two rethinkings of 
Congress’s enumerated powers, one about the importance of enumeration in 
general and one about the enumeration’s specific application to the Bank. At 
the general level, Madison in the Bank debate elevated the supposed im-
portance of the enumerated-powers framework: in 1787 he had been skepti-
cal that enumerating congressional powers could be valuable, but in the Bank 
debate he described the enumerated-powers framework as essential to the 
Constitution. At the particular level, Madison’s enumerated-powers argu-
ment against the Bank seems to have been an act of last-minute creativity in 
which he took constitutional objections that sounded naturally in the register 
of affirmative prohibitions, but which the Constitution’s text did not clearly 
support, and gave them a textual home by translating them into the register 
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of enumerated powers. Madison’s move may have set a paradigm for enu-
merated-powers arguments at later moments in constitutional history: sub-
sequent enumerated-powers arguments down to those against the Affordable 
Care Act might be best understood as translations of constitutional objec-
tions best expressed in terms of affirmative prohibitions, forced into the regis-
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Introduction
In American constitutional law, history matters in both official and un-
official ways. Officially, history can provide evidence of prior practice, of ear-
lier understandings of a text, or of the problems with operating the constitu-
tional system in a particular way. A fair amount of constitutional-
interpretation literature argues about how these and other uses of history 
should and should not matter in official constitutional decisionmaking. But 
the unofficial ways in which history matters are often no less important. Af-
ter all, few constitutional decisionmakers have clear theoretical views about 
how history should matter in constitutional law, but most are nonetheless 
influenced by their sense of the constitutional past. Intuitive views about 
why the Constitution was written and ratified, about the values of the 
Founders, about the nature and lessons of the Civil War, about Jim Crow 
and the New Deal and the Civil Rights Movement and so on, all contribute 
to Americans’ understandings of the Constitution. As a result, successful 
constitutional arguments must usually be reconcilable with the audience’s 
intuitive sense of the national constitutional story. 
The idea that historical intuitions matter may require some unpacking. 
As the term is used here, “historical intuitions” inhabit what some social 
theorists call the realm of “memory” rather than that of history conceived as 
an academic discipline: a partly historical, partly mythical space in which 
complexities are smoothed out and past events given particular value-laden 
meanings.1 Historical intuitions are not completely independent of facts, but 
neither are they strictly factual. They are a complex product of disciplinary 
history, societal storytelling, and political imagination. To be sure, most 
judges who look to historical sources for guidance in constitutional cases are 
probably not consciously trying to give force to the intuitions of memory. 
Their normal aspiration is to use history in the ways that history is officially 
supposed to matter. But in practice, and unofficially, the intuitions of histor-
ical memory do a fair amount of work in the enterprise of constitutional per-
suasion. A decisionmaker trying to make sense of a historical episode is 
1. See generally Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (1989).
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more likely to read it to mean something he or she intuitively expects it to 
mean rather than anything else. 
Because historical intuitions are the joint products of storytelling, imag-
ination, and actual historical narrative, there are many different ways to 
shape or change a given audience’s historical intuitions. Some of the most 
effective operate by means that would not be appropriate in academic schol-
arship. The works of Ken Burns2 and Lin-Manuel Miranda3 come to mind, 
not to mention those of Margaret Mitchell4 and D.W. Griffith.5 But profes-
sional academics also have a role to play, and a big part of that role consists 
of pushing back against memory’s tendency toward simplification. Often, 
constitutional intuitions rest on overly neat pictures of the past. Bringing 
historical complexity into the foreground can then be a salutary corrective—
one that aims to let constitutional decisionmakers think critically about 
propositions they have too easily taken for granted. 
In that spirit, this Article is intended to challenge a set of historical intui-
tions that shape lawyerly thinking about a central idea in American federal-
ism. That idea, which every law student learns, is that the federal govern-
ment is limited by its enumerated powers.6
To be more precise, this Article is intended to put pressure on three re-
lated propositions, all of which are reinforced by a powerful set of historical 
intuitions. The first proposition, which we can call the enumeration princi-
ple, states that Congress can legislate only on the basis of powers enumerat-
ed—that is, affirmatively written—in the Constitution.7 The second proposi-
tion, which we can call the internal-limits canon,8 states that the sum total of 
what Congress’s enumerated powers entitle it to do is less than Congress 
would be authorized to do if it enjoyed general legislative jurisdiction.9 The 
2. See The Civil War (Florentine Films 1990).
3. See Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical (2015).
4. See Margaret Mitchell, Gone with the Wind (1936).
5. See The Birth of a Nation (David W. Griffith Corp. 1915).
6. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 534 (2012) (opinion of Rob-
erts, C.J.) (“The Federal Government ‘is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated pow-
ers.’ . . . The enumeration of powers is also a limitation of powers, because ‘[t]he enumeration 
presupposes something not enumerated.’ ” (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824))).
7. Id. at 535 (“If no enumerated power authorizes Congress to pass a certain law, that 
law may not be enacted . . . .”).
8. “Internal limits” of legislative powers are the limits of those powers taken on their 
own terms, without reference to affirmative prohibitions that might block the exercise of those 
powers. See infra Section I.A.
9. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 534 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“The enumeration of powers is also 
a limitation of powers, because ‘[t]he enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.’ ”
(quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824))). But see Richard Primus, The 
Gibbons Fallacy, 19 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 567 (2017) (explaining why the dictum quoted from 
Gibbons was not meant to indicate that the sum total of congressional power must be less than 
it would be with a grant of general jurisdiction).
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third proposition is that the limitation of Congress to its constitutionally 
enumerated powers is no trivial or peripheral matter; it is a central and 
foundational feature of the system.10 Or as Madison put the point in 1791, it 
is the government’s “essential characteristic.”11
I have argued elsewhere that at least the last two of those propositions 
are mistaken.12 Depending on how one distinguishes between “enumerated” 
and “nonenumerated” powers, it could be true that Congress can exercise 
enumerated powers only. But the internal-limits canon does not follow and 
is not entitled to the authority it presently commands. To be sure, Congress 
is constitutionally prohibited from doing many things, and properly so. But 
neither the text of the Constitution nor the best understanding of federalism 
requires Congress to be limited by the enumeration of its powers, rather than 
by affirmative prohibitions like those in the First Amendment. And if the 
enumeration need not limit Congress at all, a limiting enumeration is obvi-
ously not a crucially important feature of the constitutional system. The cru-
cially important limits on Congress are, in reality, not embodied in an enu-
meration of powers but built into the process of federal lawmaking or 
affirmatively specified in sources like the rights-protecting Amendments.13
My argument for that position is complex, and I will not try to summa-
rize it here. Readers who are interested are invited to consult what I have 
written elsewhere.14 For present purposes, what matters is that most well-
socialized constitutional lawyers have a certain set of intuitions about the 
historical status of enumerated-powers ideas. According to the general un-
derstanding, the idea of a limiting enumeration has been a bedrock principle 
of constitutional law all the way back to the Founding.15 That sense of histor-
ical pedigree reinforces the sense that these ideas are authoritative and any 
10. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (“We start with first prin-
ciples. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.”).
11. 2 Annals of Cong. 1898 (1791).
12. See Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 Yale L.J. 576 (2014) [hereinaf-
ter Primus, The Limits of Enumeration] (explaining why neither text nor structure nor history 
requires the internal-limits canon); Richard Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, 115 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1 (2016) [hereinafter Primus, Why Enumeration Matters] (exploring the function of the 
limiting-enumeration idea in light of the reality that the internal-limits canon does virtually no 
practical work in constitutional law).
13. To rephrase that sentence with a helpful set of terms, the actually important limits 
on Congress are process limits and external limits, not internal limits. See infra Sections I.A, 
I.B.
14. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (“We start with first principles. The Constitution 
creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers. As James Madison wrote: ‘The powers 
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. . . .’ 
This constitutionally mandated division of authority ‘was adopted by the Framers to ensure 
protection of our fundamental liberties.’ ” (citations omitted) (quoting The Federalist No.
45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), and Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 
458 (1991)) (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8)).
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deviation from them unacceptable.16 So to persuade constitutional lawyers to 
take seriously the idea that Congress need not be limited by its enumerated 
powers, it is helpful—indeed, essential—to challenge those historical intui-
tions.
The challenge I seek to mount does not deny that the enumeration prin-
ciple and the internal-limits canon have long histories. They do. All the way 
back the Founding, there have been prominent voices arguing, insisting, or 
just assuming that a limiting enumeration of congressional powers is a cen-
tral feature of the system.17 But the long pedigree of that way of thinking co-
exists with another reality. Early in the history of the Republic, the enumera-
tion principle and the internal-limits canon were not universally shared 
premises. They were contested interpretations of the Constitution. At the 
Convention,18 during the ratification process,19 and into the 1790s,20 any 
number of well-informed Americans denied the enumeration principle, the 
internal-limits canon, or both. And even among those who were willing to 
endorse those propositions, the idea of a limiting enumeration was not nec-
essarily all that important.21
To bring those features of early constitutional thought to the fore, this 
Article digs deeply into one of the early Republic’s famous constitutional 
controversies: the debate over chartering the first Bank of the United States. 
Many law students first confront questions about Congress’s powers by ref-
erence to that controversy, whether through McCulloch v. Maryland22 or by 
16. Cf. The Federalist No. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(speaking of “that veneration which time bestows on everything”). For complicated reasons, 
American constitutional lawyers often think not just that principles endorsed at the Founding 
must be authoritative today (absent contravening formal amendment) but also that principles 
now fundamental in constitutional law (and not the result of formal amendment) must have 
been there from the beginning. Neither proposition is true.
17. See, e.g., id. Nos. 41, 45 (James Madison), No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); James Wil-
son: Speech at a Public Meeting in Philadelphia 6 October, in 13 The Documentary History 
of the Ratification of the Constitution 337 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1995) [hereinafter DHRC].
18. See, e.g., 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 48 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1911) [hereinafter Records] (statement of John Rutledge, asserting that Congress would 
have the power to suppress insurrections regardless of whether any enumerated power so spec-
ified); id. at 309 (statement of Nathaniel Gorham, asserting that Congress would have the pow-
er to create paper money even if it lacked an enumerated power to do so).
19. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 10 The 
Papers of James Madison 335, 336 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977) (calling the enumera-
tion principle “a gratis dictum, opposed by strong inferences from the body of the instrument 
[(i.e., the proposed Constitution)]”).
20. See infra Section III.C.
21. See infra Part I (describing Madison’s attitude toward enumeration during the 
1780s).
22. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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direct engagement with the 1791 debate.23 That debate is usually remem-
bered through the arguments of four famous Founders.24 In the House of 
Representatives, James Madison argued that incorporating a bank lay be-
yond the enumerated powers of Congress.25 After Congress passed the Bank 
bill over Madison’s objections, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and At-
torney General Edmund Randolph urged President Washington to veto the 
bill on enumerated-powers grounds.26 On the other side, Treasury Secretary 
Alexander Hamilton argued that Congress did have the power to incorpo-
rate a bank.27 Each argument in that canonical set proceeded from the prem-
ise that Congress could exercise only its constitutionally enumerated pow-
ers—just like Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch, three decades 
later. So it is no wonder that the Bank controversy is remembered as reflect-
ing the fact—if it were a fact—that from the dawn of the Republic, everyone 
has taken the enumeration principle as an established premise in constitu-
tional law.
But the standard presentation misleads. When the First Congress debat-
ed the Bank, not everyone shared the view that Congress could legislate only 
on the basis of specifically enumerated powers. Some members of Congress 
maintained that Congress could act so long as nothing in the Constitution
prohibited a given action,28 or on the basis of authority inherent in being the 
23. Consider the constitutional law casebooks written by, on one hand, Randy Barnett 
and Josh Blackman, and on the other, Paul Brest, Sanford Levinson, Jack Balkin, Akhil Amar, 
and Reva Siegel. From widely diverging jurisprudential perspectives, these books seek to give 
constitutional history an especially salient place in the introductory study of constitutional law. 
Both books give prominent space in their opening chapters to the 1791 congressional debate 
over the Bank and present that debate as a paradigm for reasoning about the powers of Con-
gress. See Randy E. Barnett & Josh Blackman, Constitutional Law: Cases in Context
66–79 (3d ed. 2018); Paul Brest, Sanford Levinson, Jack M. Balkin, Akhil Reed Amar & 
Reva B. Siegel, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking 29–36 (6th ed. 2015).
24. Barnett/Blackman and Brest/Levinson both present this set of documents. See Bar-
nett & Blackman, supra note 23, at 66–79; Brest et al., supra note 23, at 31–39. In so doing, 
they follow in a longer tradition of writing about the conflict over the Bank in 1791. See, e.g.,
Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America: From the Revolution to the Civil 
War 115–19 (1957) (focusing on this set of famous players).
25. 2 Annals of Cong. 1894–1902, 1956–60 (1791).
26. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a Na-
tional Bank, in 19 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 275 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974); Edmund 
Randolph, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States (Feb. 12, 1791), 
reprinted in Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill: The 
Attorney General’s First Constitutional Law Opinions, 44 Duke L.J. 110, 121–30 (1994) [here-
inafter Randolph’s Opinion].
27. Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act 
to Establish a Bank, in 8 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 97 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 
1965).
28. See infra Section III.C.2 (describing, e.g., the arguments of Fisher Ames, Representa-
tive from Massachusetts).
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nation’s legislature,29 or because Congress must be able to do things that the 
states could not do themselves,30 regardless of whether any particular text in 
the Constitution authorized Congress to enact a specific sort of law. Similar-
ly, some members of Congress accepted the enumeration principle but read 
the Constitution to enumerate powers in a way that in practice would au-
thorize Congress to pass any legislation that a grant of general jurisdiction 
would.31
For modern lawyers, this diversity of Founding-era opinion is perhaps 
masked most powerfully by Hamilton’s argument in support of the Bank bill. 
In his memorandum to the President, Hamilton argued that Article I, 
properly interpreted, authorized Congress to incorporate the Bank.32 Hamil-
ton did not dispute Madison’s premise that Congress could act only on the 
basis of a specifically enumerated power. Modern readers are accustomed to 
thinking of Hamilton as “the most nationalistic of all nationalists in his in-
terpretation of the clauses of our federal Constitution,”33 so it may not occur 
to us that there might have been others with broader visions of congressional 
power than the one Hamilton articulated to Washington.34 But there were. 
And in 1791, their side carried the day.35
Close attention to the Bank debate also reveals something about the 
third conventional proposition—the one that teaches that the limiting enu-
meration is a fundamental feature of the Constitution. Madison staked out 
that position when arguing against the Bank in the House of Representatives; 
it was on this occasion that he called the limiting enumeration the “essential 
characteristic” of the government that the Constitution had created.36 Mod-
ern lawyers who read Madison’s argument might assume that Madison was 
merely reciting a commonplace observation. But even for Madison himself, 
that view was novel in 1791. In 1787, when the Constitution was written, 
29. See infra Section III.C.2 (describing, e.g., the arguments of John Vining, Representa-
tive from Delaware, and Fisher Ames, Representative from Massachusetts).
30. See infra Section III.C.3. (describing, e.g., the arguments of William Loughton 
Smith, Representative from South Carolina).
31. See infra III.C.1 (describing the arguments of Elias Boudinot and John Laurance).
32. See Hamilton, supra note 27.
33. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 915 n.9 (1997) (quoting Clinton Rossiter,
Alexander Hamilton and the Constitution 199 (1964)).
34. Whether Hamilton was moderating his own views so as to persuade Washington on 
the specific point at hand is a question on which I offer no view.
35. That does not demonstrate that the majority of Congress rejected the enumeration 
principle. The representatives who voted to incorporate the Bank were probably a coalition 
comprising some who accepted the enumeration principle and believed that Congress’s enu-
merated powers authorized the measure, some who believed that Congress could incorporate 
the Bank without respect to the Constitution’s enumeration of congressional powers, some 
who believed both of the two foregoing propositions, and some who had no clear view on the 
constitutional issue. It is not possible to tell from the surviving records how many members of 
Congress fell into each category.
36. 2 Annals of Cong. 1898 (1791).
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Madison did not think a limiting enumeration essential, and there were at 
least two different reasons for his holding that view. First, Madison in 1787 
was a resolute nationalizer and not especially concerned with limiting the 
general government’s sphere relative to that of the states.37 And second, even 
if Madison had wanted to find devices for limiting the scope of federal pow-
er, he did not think that enumerations of powers were practically effective 
tools for limiting legislatures.38 His contrary views in the Bank debate repre-
sented an important new development.
The novelty of Madison’s fervent investment in enumerated powers in 
1791 helps explain an important but often overlooked feature of the Bank 
debate: many Members of the First Congress who disagreed with Madison 
about the constitutionality of the Bank bill did not merely think that Madi-
son had a different view of the Constitution from their own. They doubted 
that he really believed what he was arguing.39 In their view, Madison’s insist-
ence that the enumeration principle was a centrally important element of the 
new Constitution transparently contradicted positions he had taken earlier 
in the First Congress, when other issues of constitutional power were before 
the House. So in beating the drum for the limiting enumeration this time 
around, these members of Congress thought, Madison was making an argu-
ment of convenience, hoping to use a constitutional smokescreen to defeat a 
bill he didn’t like. And it is not hard to see why they thought so. If one puts 
Madison’s enumerated-powers argument in some of the contexts in which 
his critics saw it—that is, if one evaluates Madison’s argument against the 
Bank in light of his earlier arguments about the removal power40 and the 
permanent location of the seat of government41—then it is easy to see why 
some members of Congress thought that Madison’s enumerated-powers ar-
gument was merely a ruse.
These critics were probably too dismissive. Madison had authentic, pub-
lic-regarding reasons for opposing the Bank bill, including some that are 
sensibly considered constitutional reasons.42 When he argued against the 
Bank, he could perfectly well have believed that he was correctly applying the 
Constitution’s provisions relating to the powers of Congress. But if Madison 
held that view in good faith when he rose in the House to speak against the 
Bank bill, he had come to his position at something like the eleventh hour. 
For most of the time when the Bank proposal lay before Congress, Madison 
seems to have had no sense that creating a bank would be an enumerated-
powers problem. A bad idea, yes. Even a constitutionally concerning one. 
But not a problem having to do with the limits of the congressional powers 
37. See infra Section I.C.
38. See infra Sections I.B–D.
39. See infra Section III.D.2.
40. See infra Section III.D.
41. See infra Part IV.
42. See infra Section II.B.1.
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enumerated in the text of the Constitution. That argument against the Bank 
was a last-minute development.43
The case for Madison’s having developed his enumerated-powers argu-
ment against the Bank only at the last minute is inferential. Nowhere in this 
paper will I report finding a letter from Madison to Jefferson, dated February 
1, 1791, and reading “Dear Tom: As you know, I’ve been bothered by the 
Bank bill but unable to articulate an objection connected to the text of the 
Constitution. I’m happy to say that I’ve now figured out that granting corpo-
rate charters is not within the enumerated powers of Congress.” But there 
also do not seem to be any letters, speeches, essays, diary entries, or any oth-
er sort of documents testifying to Madison’s having given any indication that 
he thought the Bank raised an enumerated-powers problem before the last 
days of January 1791.44 Indeed, as far as I can tell, nobody thought the Bank 
raised that kind of problem at any time between Hamilton’s submitting his 
Report on a National Bank to Congress and shortly before Madison made 
his famous speeches in the House.45 In that seven-week period, Madison and 
other players in the drama wrote notes, letters, memoranda, and so on about 
the proposal to incorporate the Bank. That set of sources contains arguments 
about any number of relevant issues: banking policy, the dangers of debt, 
paper money, the role of monopoly privilege, who stood to benefit, and 
many more. But as far as I can tell, there is no indication in those sources—
none—that anyone, Madison or otherwise, was skeptical of the Bank for 
enumerated-powers reasons until near the very end. 
That Madison came late to his enumerated-powers objection does not 
mean that he was wrong. Developing innovative arguments is what creative 
constitutional thinkers do. What’s more, Madison’s movement toward a re-
strictive view of Congress’s powers may have been part of a general trend in 
his 1790s thinking, rather than an ad hoc rationalization for opposing the 
Bank.46 As noted earlier, Madison was not invested in the idea of a limiting 
43. See infra Part II.
44. To the best of my knowledge, the first document suggesting that Madison was con-
templating a challenge to Congress’s authority to charter the Bank is a letter dated January 30, 
1791—many weeks into Congress’s consideration of the issue, and just three days before Madi-
son made his first famous enumerated-powers speech on the subject. See infra Part II.
45. The words “as far as I can tell” in the sentence above are important. One cannot di-
rectly prove a negative proposition. To put the point precisely, I have been unable to falsify the 
null hypothesis that nobody believed the Bank to raise an enumerated-powers problem at the 
relevant time. Part II provides more complete description of that failure. If readers are aware of 
relevant documents that I have missed, I would be grateful for their calling those documents to 
my attention.
46. See Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 133–61 (1993); 
Noah Feldman, The Three Lives of James Madison chs. 8–9 (2017) (describing Madison as 
having fundamentally shifted from a nationalist stance to a skepticism of national power dur-
ing the 1790s). For different views, see Gordon S. Wood, Revolutionary Characters: 
What Made the Founders Different 141–72 (2006) (arguing that scholars have overstated 
changes in Madison’s perspective over time); Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian Moment, 55 U. 
December 2018] Enumerated Powers and the Bank of the United States 425
enumeration in 1787, but he may have come to that idea in good faith by 
1791. Even if Madison’s movement on these issues is best understood as the 
good-faith development of his ideas, though, it remains the case that his 
enumerated-powers argument against the Bank was an eleventh-hour inno-
vation. It was not the straightforward implementation of a previously settled 
theory—neither Madison’s own, nor one that was a matter of consensus 
among the Founding generation. 
In Part I of this Article, I examine Madison’s ideas about enumerated 
powers in the years before the Bank debate. Constitutional lawyers normally 
picture Madison as an important proponent of the enumeration principle 
from the very beginning.47 But in the 1780s, when the Constitution was writ-
ten and ratified, Madison did not see the enumeration of congressional pow-
ers as an important mechanism for limiting federal power. To be sure, Madi-
son articulated both the enumeration principle and the internal-limits 
canon, in the Federalist Papers and elsewhere. But not everything that Madi-
son said and wrote in 1787–1788 conveyed a settled and authentic view. If 
Madison’s discussions of enumerated powers in 1787–1788 are considered as 
a body, and if one remembers that in the Federalist Papers Madison was both 
writing pseudonymously and trying to make a sale, an alternative picture is 
at least as plausible. In that alternative picture, Madison in those years was 
not particularly invested in the idea of using an enumeration of powers as a 
means of limiting Congress.
In Part II, I examine the documentary record for the time leading up to 
Madison’s enumerated-powers argument against the Bank bill in 1791. 
Based on a survey of that record, I suggest that neither Madison nor anyone 
else conceived of the Bank bill as raising a question about Congress’s enu-
merated powers until the last stage of the legislative process. To be clear, it is 
not my contention that Madison invented the enumeration principle itself, 
or the internal-limits canon, in order to mount an attack on the Bank bill. 
What he came to late was the idea that he could use that apparatus to argue 
against the Bank. And when he did use the enumerated-powers idea to op-
pose the Bank, he credited the enumeration principle and the internal-limits 
canon with a much more important role in the constitutional system than he 
previously had.
In Part III, I analyze the debate in the House of Representatives. I begin 
with Madison, offering to explain how he might have translated his concerns 
about the Bank into an enumerated-powers register and then reviewing the 
enumerated-powers argument he made. Next I turn to the Bank’s support-
Chi. L. Rev. 473, 504 (1988) (arguing that some of Madison’s ideas remained constant while 
others underwent changes ranging from “modest shifts of emphasis” to the acceptance of “rad-
ically new positions”).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (“We start with first prin-
ciples. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers. As James Madi-
son wrote: ‘The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are 
few and defined . . . .’ ” (citations omitted) (quoting The Federalist, supra note 16, No. 45
(James Madison)) (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8)).
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ers. Some of them accepted the enumerated-powers framework and disputed 
Madison’s application of it.48 But others rejected the enumerated-powers 
framework entirely.49 Toward the end of Part III, I foreground one strain of 
the debate—the parallels that representatives drew between the Bank debate 
and Congress’s debate two years earlier on the president’s power to remove 
appointed officials—in order to highlight gaps between the First Congress’s 
assumptions about the enumerated-powers idea and the assumptions that 
modern lawyers make.50 In sum, the debate in Congress reveals both that the 
enumerated-powers premise was anything but universal and that even the 
members of Congress who agreed that the federal government could exercise 
only enumerated powers did not understand that idea in the way that mod-
ern constitutional law does. 
In Part IV, I bring in one other piece of context for understanding the 
Bank debate—one that significantly informed many participants’ under-
standings of the affair but that has since been largely forgotten. It concerns 
the relationship between the Bank bill and one of Madison’s leading 
achievements during the First Congress: the decision to locate the nation’s 
seat of government along the Potomac River. Introducing this context 
should help readers evaluate the contention that Madison’s enumerated-
powers argument against the Bank was, and was understood to be, an act of 
real-time creativity.
I. Madison on Enumerated Powers, 1785–1788
A. Internal and External Limits
The Bank debate is usually remembered as a story about one particular 
kind of strategy for limiting Congress. That strategy involves limiting a legis-
lature by enumerating its powers, or what modern constitutional theory 
sometimes calls the strategy of internal limits.51 But to understand the Bank 
debate more completely, it is necessary to think about the relationship be-
tween the enumeration of a legislature’s powers and a different strategy for 
limiting legislation. That second strategy involves affirmatively prohibiting 
certain kinds of laws, or what modern constitutional theory calls the strategy 
of external limits.52
Internal limits on legislative power inhere in the terms on which power 
is given to legislatures in the first place. Suppose a legislature has just three 
powers: the power to tax property, the power to make traffic laws, and the 
48. See infra Section III.C.1.
49. See infra Section III.C.2–4.
50. See infra Section III.D.
51. See, e.g., 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 794–95 (3d ed. 
2000).
52. See, e.g., id.
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power to write a fire safety code. Each of those powers is limited by its own 
terms. Such a legislature would not be authorized to do things falling outside 
the powers specifically granted—say, enact a health-inspection code for res-
taurants, or tax incomes as opposed to property. These limits are called “in-
ternal” because they inhere in—that is, they are internal to—the grants of 
power themselves. Each grant of power is a power to do the thing specified 
and no more.
External limits block lawmaking from the other direction. Rather than 
inhering in a grant of power, an external limit is a prohibition: a rule that 
blocks an action that the government would otherwise have the power to do. 
Suppose that the jurisdiction with the hypothetical legislature described 
above also had a rule stating that no financial burdens could be imposed on 
houses of worship. Absent that rule, the legislature’s power to tax real prop-
erty would include the power to tax the real property owned by churches. 
The rule exempting houses of worship limits the legislature’s power not on 
the basis of anything inherent in the nature of taxation but on the basis of an 
authority outside of—that is, external to—the initial authorization. In Amer-
ican constitutional law, the First Amendment embodies several external lim-
its on government power, as does the rule against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. These rules do not inhere in the powers granted to the government. 
They stand outside those powers and push back against them.
The central question in the Bank debate could in principle be ap-
proached either through the lens of internal limits or through the lens of ex-
ternal ones. In 1787–1788, some people (including Madison) wanted Con-
gress to have the power to charter corporations.53 Others disagreed. And at 
different points in the process, those who opposed a congressional power to 
charter corporations used both internal- and external-limit strategies. 
According to Madison’s notes from the Constitutional Convention, 
Madison had proposed giving Congress an express power to grant charters 
of incorporation in cases where state legislation would be inadequate for the 
task.54 The Convention rejected the proposal, with the delegates voting no 
apparently comprising a coalition between some who did not want Congress 
to have such a power and others who did want Congress to have such a pow-
er but feared that naming that power in the Constitution would provoke op-
position in the ratification process.55 The delegates who voted no for the 
former reason were pursuing an internal-limit strategy: they did not want 
Congress to issue charters of incorporation, so they voted against a clause 
53. See, e.g., 2 Records, supra note 18, at 615–16.
54. Id. Madison’s journal is not a fully reliable source. He was an interested party rather 
than a dispassionate observer, and he tended to write entries in the journal at the end of a day’s 
proceeding rather than as the proceedings occurred. He also seems to have made revisions to
the journal years after the Convention ended. See generally Mary Sarah Bilder, Madison’s 
Hand: Revising the Constitutional Convention (2015). But Madison’s journal is certain-
ly some indication of what occurred, and I am unaware of particular reasons for doubting the 
accuracy of his report on this specific matter.
55. See id. at 616.
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that would say Congress had the power to issue such charters.56 After the
Convention, people who wanted to prevent Congress from chartering corpo-
rations pursued an external-limit strategy. During and after the ratification 
process, several states sent Congress proposed amendments that would have 
added language to the Constitution expressly prohibiting Congress from 
chartering corporations, or at least corporations with monopolistic privileges 
(like the Bank of the United States).57 But no such constitutional amendment 
was added. Madison did not include such a proposed amendment among the 
package of amendments that he proposed in Congress in 1789, and when 
other members of Congress did propose such amendments, Congress voted 
the proposals down.58
Two years later, when Congress debated the Bank bill, Madison famous-
ly propounded an internal-limits view in opposition. To charter a corpora-
tion would exceed the limits of Congress’s enumerated powers, he argued.59
And to exceed the limits of Congress’s enumerated powers, he continued, 
would be to violate a fundamental and centrally important feature of the 
constitutional design.60 But in making those arguments, Madison was not 
only arguing against the exercise of a power that he had tried, at the Conven-
tion, to confer on Congress expressly. As I illustrate in the balance of this 
Part, he was also investing the idea of a limiting enumeration with vastly 
greater importance than he afforded it a short while before.
B. Against Internal Limits: The Letter to Wallace
Even before he began preparing for the Constitutional Convention at 
Philadelphia, Madison had a view about enumerated powers as limits on leg-
islatures. He was skeptical. If one wanted to limit a legislature, Madison 
thought, enumerating its powers was not a good way to do it.
One person to whom Madison communicated that view was a college 
friend named Caleb Wallace.61 Wallace lived in the western region of Virgin-
ia that would eventually become the separate state of Kentucky.62 In 1785, 
56. See id. at 515–16.
57. Examples include Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and New York. 
See 1 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution 323, 326, 330, 337 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. reprt. 
2d ed. 1937) (1836) [hereinafter Elliot].
58. See 1 Annals of Cong. 778 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); 1 Documentary History of 
the First Federal Congress of the United States of America 158–59 (Linda Grant De 
Pauw ed., 1972) [hereinafter 1 DHFFC].
59. See infra Section III.A.2.
60. See infra Section III.A.2.
61. Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), in 2 The Writings of 
James Madison 166 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
62. See Jack N. Rakove, Judicial Power in the Constitutional Theory of James Madison, 43 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1513, 1516 (2002).
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Wallace was thinking about how Kentucky should be governed once it 
achieved statehood.63 So he wrote to his old friend Madison, asking about 
various issues that would arise in designing a new state government.
As part of his response, Madison offered advice about how to limit legis-
latures. Clearly it was undesirable for the legislature to be omnipotent; there
must be limits on what even a properly structured and democratically elect-
ed body could pass into law.64 The question was how to establish those lim-
its. To use the terms of modern constitutional theory, Madison canvassed 
three methods: internal limits and external limits, as described above, and 
also process limits. (A process limit—like a supermajority voting rule, or a 
requirement that a bill pass two houses rather than just one—limits legisla-
tion not by putting some kinds of lawmaking out of reach on substantive 
grounds but by raising the cost of legislating.) Of the three, he endorsed pro-
cess limits and external limits. Internal limits might seem like a good idea, he 
wrote, but in the end it was not a strategy he could recommend.
Madison began his advice with process limits. He especially recom-
mended a bicameral legislature, with a “Senate constituted on such princi-
ples as will give wisdom and steadiness to legislation.”65 Indeed, he consid-
ered the virtue of such a process limit so great that even a bad Senate was 
better than no Senate. Of the Virginia Senate at the time, Madison wrote that 
“a worse could hardly have been substituted.”66 Still, he continued, “bad as it 
is, it is often a useful bit in the mouth of the house of Delegates.”67 Prior 
scholarship has correctly noted that the Philadelphia Convention in general, 
and Madison in particular, focused first and foremost on process limits when 
designing the Constitution, believing them to be the most important kind.68
Madison’s chosen starting point in his letter to Wallace showed the same 
orientation two years earlier.
Madison then discussed a method for limiting legislation that might 
seem like a good idea but wasn’t: writing a constitution specifying affirma-
tively what the legislature was authorized to do. “If it were possible,” he 
wrote, “it would be well to define the extent of the Legislative power but the 
nature of it seems in many respects to be indefinite.”69 In other words, Madi-
son saw the appeal, in principle, of affirmatively specifying a legislature’s 
powers, thus authorizing that legislature to enact the kinds of laws specifical-
ly authorized and not others. But he also saw that in practice such a project 
might be unworkable, because it would be very difficult to capture with ver-
bal definitions all the things that a legislature would need to do. As a result, 
63. Id.
64. See Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace, supra note 61.
65. Id. at 167.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1485, 1515–20 
(1994); see also e.g., The Federalist, supra note 16, Nos. 10, 46, 51 (James Madison).
69. Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace, supra note 61, at 168.
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trying to reduce a legislature’s authority to a set of defined and specific pow-
ers might be a misguided project, albeit a well-intentioned one.
Instead, Madison recommended that Kentucky specify in its constitu-
tion what the legislature could not do. Just after saying that the nature of leg-
islative power does not lend itself to being captured by a set of specific au-
thorizations, Madison wrote that “[i]t is very practicable however to 
enumerate the essential exceptions.”70 As examples, he noted that “[t]he 
Constitution may expressly restrain [the legislature] from meddling with re-
ligion—from abolishing Juries—from taking away the Habeas corpus—from 
forcing a citizen to give evidence against himself—from controuling the 
press—from enacting retrospective laws at least in criminal cases, . . . [and] 
from taking private property for public use without paying its full Value,” as 
well as “from licensing the importation of Slaves” and “from infringing the 
confederation”—that is, from failing in its obligation toward the United 
States as a whole.71
In short, Madison counseled Wallace against relying on an enumeration 
of powers as a way of limiting a legislature. Making the legislative process 
more difficult to navigate and specifying affirmative prohibitions would be a 
better approach. To return to the modern terms introduced earlier, Madison 
recommended process limits and external limits on legislative powers rather 
than internal limits.72 That recommendation is noteworthy, of course, be-
cause the idea that a constitution limits a legislature by enumerating its pow-
ers is the strategy of internal limits. Two years before the Constitutional 
Convention, Madison was warning against pursuing that strategy in a consti-
tution.73
Does Madison’s expression of that attitude in a letter about the Ken-
tucky legislature mean anything for what his attitudes would be toward the 
national legislature that the Constitution would soon create? Readers to 
whom the dominant ideas of modern constitutional law are second nature 
may have doubts. After all, it is orthodox that Congress differs from state 
legislatures precisely by being a legislature with a set of specific mandates, 
rather than a legislature of general jurisdiction. But invoking that idea can-
not be sufficient to prove that Madison in the 1780s would have thought his 
reasons for preferring external limits to internal ones where Kentucky was 
concerned were inapplicable to Congress. It would assume the thing to be 
proved, namely that Madison at the Founding conceived of Congress as lim-
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 51, at 794–95.
73. One might wonder whether an excursus on the subject in one 1785 letter is a reliable 
indicator of Madison’s ideas over a longer period of time. The question cannot be answered for 
certain. I am unaware, however, of other writings from the years shortly before the Convention 
in which Madison took a different view of this question.
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ited to a set of enumerated powers in a way that made it fundamentally dif-
ferent from a state legislature. 
Moreover, it is not clear what structural or functional difference between 
Congress and state legislatures touches the reason for Madison’s skepticism 
as he articulated it to Wallace. That skepticism was founded on an idea about 
the impossibility of anticipating and articulating, in linguistic formulas, all 
the things that a legislature would need to do. That concern would seem to 
apply to Congress as well as to state legislatures. Congress might not do the 
full range of things that state legislatures would do, but it would need to do 
many things, and there was no obvious closed list of what those things 
should be. Language is not more susceptible to clarity and precision when 
applied to a national legislature than when applied to a local one. And in-
deed, during the ratification process Madison warned the public that the 
Constitution’s written demarcation of the general government’s powers 
could not be expected to establish clear and certain limits.74
C. At the Convention
The records of the Constitutional Convention do not reveal much about 
Madison’s attitudes regarding the wisdom of enumerating Congress’s pow-
ers. Indeed, and especially by comparison with the degree of attention paid 
to process limits, the Convention as a whole does not seem to have thought 
searchingly about either the question of whether Congress’s powers should 
be enumerated or the particular enumeration of powers that was ultimately 
proposed and adopted.75 But when Madison did address the possibility of 
enumerating congressional powers, he voiced skepticism. According to his 
own journal, when the possibility of enumerating the powers of Congress 
arose, Madison told his fellow delegates that he had “doubts concerning 
[the] practicability” of such an undertaking and indeed that during the Con-
vention’s discussions “his doubts had become stronger.”76 In another surviv-
ing account of Madison’s remark, the skepticism seems to run even deeper: 
according to William Pierce’s notes, Madison “said he had brought with him 
a strong prepossession for the defining of the limits and powers of the feder-
al Legislature, but he brought with him some doubts about the practicability 
74. See The Federalist, supra note 16, No. 37 (James Madison) (“Here, then, are three 
sources of vague and incorrect definitions: indistinctness of the object, imperfection of the or-
gan of conception, inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas. Any one of these must produce a cer-
tain degree of obscurity. The convention, in delineating the boundary between the federal and 
State jurisdictions, must have experienced the full effect of them all.”).
75. See Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 12, at 616 (“Prior to the ap-
pointment of the Committee of Detail, there was no deep engagement with questions about 
whether this or that power should be included among the powers of Congress, and the draft 
enumeration that the Committee presented on August 6 was largely accepted by the full Con-
vention, albeit with emendations.”).
76. 1 Records, supra note 18, at 53. These are Madison’s remarks as recorded in his 
own journal, which, as noted above, may not be a fully reliable source.
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of doing it: —at present he was convinced it could not be done.”77 There is 
no record of Madison’s having changed his mind during the Convention’s 
subsequent proceedings, nor even of his having reconsidered the question. 
According to his own journal, Madison addressed the matter only on that 
single occasion, and the surviving notes of other delegates do not record his 
having engaged the question at other times. 
In addition to being skeptical about the prospect of enumerating Con-
gress’s powers, Madison at the Convention does not seem to have been in-
vested in the project for which enumeration is usually considered a mecha-
nism—that is, for confining the scope of federal legislation so as to leave 
other fields of governance to the states. To choose one illustration, consider 
Madison’s lengthy response when Connecticut’s William Samuel Johnson 
asked how, exactly, a Constitution embodying the Virginia Plan would 
maintain a significant role for the state governments. The stakes of that con-
versation were significant. In Johnson’s view, the rival New Jersey plan had 
such a mechanism: equal representation for each state in the Senate.78 So un-
less Madison could explain how the Virginia Plan would achieve the same 
goal, Johnson would be drawn to support the New Jersey Plan. Madison 
wanted to defeat the New Jersey Plan, of course, and he considered the idea 
of equal representation for each state in the Senate repugnant. If he had a 
ready answer to the question of how a Virginia-Plan Constitution would 
prevent Congress from swallowing up the states, this would have been a 
good moment to produce it. 
Madison did nothing of the kind. Instead, he responded that the danger 
to the balance of power was more likely to come from the states than the fed-
eral government, that even if the general government had plenary legislative 
power it would have no reason to disable the states from acting for the public 
good, and that the real objection to abolishing the state governments was 
merely that the general government could not as a practical matter be com-
petent to do all the things that the government of a vast and varied country 
required.79 If the general government turned out to be competent to do all of 
that necessary governing, Madison argued, the people would be no less free 
for letting it do so.80 So even if the Virginia Plan might have a tendency to let 
Congress absorb the states, Madison concluded, that would not be a major 
problem with the Plan.81
Needless to say, these are not the remarks of a person who is bent on 
finding a legal mechanism to limit the scope of congressional legislation, let 
alone those of someone who believes that such a mechanism is at hand and 
should be used. To be sure, Madison was interested in preventing any deci-
77. Id. at 60.
78. Id. at 355.
79. Id. at 356–57.
80. Id. at 357.
81. Id. at 355–58.
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sionmaking institution from wielding too much of the general government’s 
power. The federal legislature, executive, and judiciary needed to be config-
ured so as to check and balance one another. But on the question of the 
scope of that government’s legislative domain relative to that of the states, 
Madison was, in 1787, a resolute nationalizer.82 So for two different reasons, 
he would not have thought that the Constitution should include, as one of its 
most important features, an enumeration of congressional powers aimed at 
limiting the general government and preserving space for the states. One 
reason was practical: he did not think that enumerating powers was a good 
way to limit legislatures. The other reason was a matter of what the Constitu-
tion was supposed to accomplish. To Madison in 1787, the critical objective 
was to empower the general government. He was not much worried about 
how to limit its purview.
D. The Constitution in Congress
Once the Convention finished its work, Madison’s project changed from 
trying to improve the Constitution to trying to defend it against skeptics. His 
first forum for such a defense came just nine days after the Convention rose, 
when Congress discussed the Constitution before voting to transmit copies 
to the state legislatures along with a letter asking the states to hold ratifying 
conventions.83 Our knowledge of what happened in Congress’s conversa-
tions depends, as for the Convention itself, on the surviving notes taken by 
individual participants. From those records, it appears that Madison twice 
made arguments about enumerated legislative powers. One of his arguments 
suggested a more robust view of the importance of limiting Congress by 
enumerating its powers. But on full consideration, and remembering espe-
cially what Madison’s tactical imperatives were, it seems most plausible that 
Madison’s views on enumeration had not changed very much in the week 
and a half since the Convention ended.
Madison’s first discussion of enumerated powers during Congress’s dis-
cussion of the proposed Constitution was about the powers of the Conven-
tion, not those of the proposed Congress. The issue under discussion was 
whether the Convention exceeded its delegated authority in proposing an 
entirely new Constitution.84 Madison acknowledged that the Convention 
may have exceeded its formal mandate. But he urged Congress not to see 
that fact as invalidating what the Convention had produced. To make that 
argument, he pointed out that Congress too had done things that exceeded 
82. One of Madison’s greatest disappointments at the Convention came when the dele-
gates rejected the part of the Virginia plan that would have authorized Congress to nullify state 
laws as unconstitutional. Indeed, Madison’s own preference was for an even more extensive 
federal veto power, by which the Senate alone could veto any state law at all, whether for con-
stitutional reasons or otherwise. See generally Feldman, supra note 46, at ch. 5.
83. The Confederation Congress and the Constitution: 26–28 September, in 13 DHRC,
supra note 17.
84. Id. at 233.
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its own delegated powers under the Articles of Confederation. In particular, 
he mentioned Congress’s legislation providing for the sale of land in the 
western territory and also for the organization of government there.85 Madi-
son might also have had in mind Congress’s creation of the Bank of North 
America in 1781. One week after Congress formally incorporated that insti-
tution, Madison wrote to his friend Edmund Pendleton that most members 
of Congress agreed that under the Articles Congress lacked power to take 
that action but nonetheless thought it important to incorporate the Bank, so 
they forged ahead.86
Why did Madison point out that Congress too had exceeded its enumer-
ated powers? In one way or another, he seems to have been urging his con-
gressional colleagues not to throw stones at the Convention for a sin that 
they had committed themselves. But he might have meant his point in a local 
way or a more general one. In the local version, Madison might have been 
acknowledging that an institution that exceeds its enumerated powers be-
haves badly but also saying that Congress should be prepared to forgive this 
sin, because Congress had sometimes done the same thing. In the more gen-
eral version, Madison might have been saying not just that Congress hap-
pened to have committed the same sin the Convention had but that the os-
tensible sin is actually just normal behavior. On the latter version, Madison 
would have been arguing that faulting the Convention for exceeding its 
enumerated powers would be holding that body to an unrealistic standard, 
because—as Congress’s own example suggested—enumerating the powers of 
a decisionmaking body is not a reliable mechanism for limiting what that 
body actually does. It hadn’t worked for Congress, and people shouldn’t ex-
pect or demand that it work for the Convention.87 It is hard to know, of 
course, whether Madison meant this point in the more local way or the more 
general one. But it bears noting that the more general version accords with 
Madison’s view of internal limits as expressed in the letter to Wallace and at 
the Convention: enumerating powers is not a practically reliable mechanism 
of limitation. 
That said, Madison also said something that day that seemed to envision 
a more robust limiting role for the Constitution’s enumeration of congres-
sional powers. One question that arose in Congress was whether the pro-
posed Constitution was deficient because it contained no Bill of Rights.88
85. Id. at 236.
86. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Jan. 8, 1782), in 4 The Papers 
of James Madison 22–23 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1965). One 
wonders whether these experiences informed the skepticism about enumeration as a device for 
limiting legislatures that Madison articulated to Wallace.
87. One could of course argue that the relevant dynamics in Congress were different 
from those respecting the Convention. But Madison drew the parallel nonetheless.
88. On some of the ways in which this question might not have meant what it means to 
modern lawyers, see Gerard N. Magliocca, The Heart of the Constitution: How the 
Bill of Rights Became the Bill of Rights 5–7, 23–49 (2018).
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Together with his fellow Convention-veteran Nathaniel Gorham of Massa-
chusetts, Madison defended the Constitution on a ground familiar to mod-
ern constitutional lawyers: that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary because the 
new government, unlike the state governments, would be a government of 
enumerated powers rather than a government of general jurisdiction.89
Making that argument on that day should have come at some cost to 
Madison’s credibility. Earlier on the same day, he had made the somewhat 
contradictory observation that the existing Congress had not in practice 
been limited to exercising the powers delegated to it under the Articles of 
Confederation. One argument claimed that an enumeration could be relied 
on to limit a legislature, and the other argument pointed out that in practice 
enumerations cannot be relied upon in that way. And if Madison was con-
tradicting himself, we might inquire whether he had no stable view of the 
question, or whether he might in some other way have been unaware of the 
contradiction—or whether he simply argued two irreconcilable positions on 
the same day, switching from one to the other as necessary to defend the 
proposed Constitution. 
If we seek to identify one of his two arguments that day as Madison’s ac-
tual view, though, there is a good case for picking the argument that legisla-
tures are not reliably limited by enumerations of powers. That was his view 
in 1785 and also in the summer of 1787. In the absence of some reason to 
think he had undergone a conversion, it makes sense to think that he still 
thought in the autumn of 1787 what he had thought a short time before. 
To reach that conclusion, one would have to think that Madison was 
making an argument he didn’t believe when, in the same conversation, he 
claimed that the enumeration obviated a Bill of Rights. That possibility 
seems completely plausible. For one thing, the claim that the enumeration 
obviated a Bill of Rights was terribly weak on its merits, as would soon be 
widely recognized.90 For another, Madison’s partner in advancing that claim 
in Congress that day was Gorham, who indicated during the Convention 
that he thought Congress would be able to exercise powers not enumerated, 
so long as the acts in question were not affirmatively prohibited.91 If Madi-
son’s partner was arguing disingenuously in order to get the Constitution 
89. The Confederation Congress and the Constitution: 26–28 September, supra note 83, at 
237.
90. See Mark A. Graber, Enumeration and Other Constitutional Strategies for Protecting 
Rights: The View from 1787/1791, 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 357, 377–78 (2007); Primus, The Limits 
of Enumeration, supra note 12, at 614–19; see also infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
91. For example, Gorham argued at the Convention in favor of deleting a proposed 
clause authorizing Congress to emit bills on credit and, simultaneously, against inserting a 
clause prohibiting Congress from doing the same thing, on the theory that emitting bills of 
credit should not be prohibited but also should not be encouraged, and putting the words in 
the Constitution might give Congress ideas. 2 Records, supra note 18, at 309. On this view, 
the point of declining to enumerate a power was to try to reduce the use of the power, not to 
make the power legally unavailable.
436 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:415
through Congress and on to the states, it is certainly plausible that Madison 
was too. 
But there are also other reasons to think that Madison did not really be-
lieve that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary in light of Constitution’s enumera-
tion of congressional powers. For one, Madison declined to defend that view 
once it was challenged by others. The chief challenger in Congress was Vir-
ginia’s Richard Henry Lee.92 Gorham and Madison’s idea, Lee noted, relied 
on the premise that Congress under the new Constitution would only be au-
thorized to exercise those powers that were expressly given.93 But what was 
the basis for that premise? Nothing in the proposed Constitution specified 
that Congress would only be able to do those things that were particularly 
authorized. Worse still, the proposed Constitution’s failure to state that 
Congress would be limited to the powers enumerated seemed particularly 
meaningful because it stood in contrast to the Articles of Confederation.94
The text of the Articles, Lee argued, restricted Congress to only those powers 
that were “expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assem-
bled.”95 The proposed Constitution had no parallel language. Surely the con-
trast was significant. If the drafters of the Articles had specified that Con-
gress could exercise no powers but those expressly delegated to it, and the 
drafters of the Constitution had not, it made sense to think that the Consti-
tution contemplated Congress’s exercising powers beyond those expressly 
delegated. To be sure, the text of the Constitution did not say “Congress may 
exercise more powers than are identified here.” But at the very least the sali-
ent omission of any statement limiting Congress to those powers expressly 
delegated to it left the door open to the exercise of additional powers. Given 
that state of affairs, Lee argued, a Bill of Rights was essential in order to pre-
vent Congress from exercising powers inappropriately.96
92. See The Confederation Congress and the Constitution: 26–28 September, supra note 
83, at 236–40.
93. Id. at 237–40.
94. Id. at 237.
95. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. II; accord The Confederation Congress 
and the Constitution: 26–28 September, supra note 83, at 237. Lee was here offering a reading of 
the Articles that might not seem literal to a twenty-first-century reader but that was conven-
tionally accepted in the 1780s. Strictly speaking, the relevant text in the Articles did not say 
what powers Congress could exercise. Instead, that text—Article II—ran as follows: “Each state 
retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, 
which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress as-
sembled.” Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. II. Against the background assumption 
that powers belonged either to Congress or to the states but not both concurrently, Lee took 
that statement as tantamount to saying that Congress could exercise only those powers ex-
pressly delegated. This seems to have been the consensus reading: I am unaware of readers 
among the Founding generation who read Article II differently.
96. The Confederation Congress and the Constitution: 26–28 September, supra note 83, at 
237.
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After Lee made this argument, Madison seems to have backed down. He 
offered no defense of his contention that the enumeration of congressional 
powers made a Bill of Rights unnecessary. Indeed, after Lee disputed the 
point directly, Madison seems to have backed away from that argument as a 
general matter for the remainder of the ratification process.97 And Madison’s 
backing away from that argument after having been once called out on its 
weaknesses should not be particularly surprising. It’s a famous argument, 
and it seems to have persuasive power for modern audiences, who often as-
sociate it with its canonical expression in Hamilton’s Federalist 84.98 But in 
the 1780s most people quickly recognized that argument as implausible—a
talking point that defenders of the Constitution had dreamed up after the 
Convention was over as a way of covering for their failure to anticipate the 
public’s appetite for a Bill of Rights. Pretty much nobody bought it, and for 
97. In the Federalist Papers, Madison described the enumeration as limiting Congress, 
see The Federalist, supra note 16, No. 45 (James Madison), but no Federalist Paper attribut-
ed to Madison argued that the enumeration made a Bill of Rights unnecessary. As far as I can 
tell, the only occasion during the ratification process when Madison made that argument after 
Lee confronted him with its weaknesses in September 1787 came one day before the very end 
of the Virginia convention, when the Constitution’s opponents were proposing to have Virgin-
ia ratify the Constitution conditionally, on the condition that a specified set of amendments be 
adopted. See 3 Elliot, supra note 57, at 621–22, 626–27. Madison believed, and perhaps cor-
rectly, that conditional ratification was a strategy for preventing ratification: given the choice 
to ratify conditionally, delegates might take that middle road rather than simply voting yes, 
and if Virginia ratified only conditionally, the project might fail. If Virginia ratified condition-
ally, other states might make similar demands, and there might be little hope of satisfying eve-
ryone. So Madison believed it essential to secure ratification without conditions, and, facing a 
demand for conditional ratification at his state convention’s last moment, he broke out every 
anti-amendment argument he had, including even the one he had stayed away from for the 
previous nine months. (To be sure, my claim that Madison did not make this argument on 
other occasions is limited by the impossibility of proving a negative. I would be grateful to 
readers who point me to sources showing that Madison did at some point make this argument 
during the ratification debates, if such sources exist.) To my knowledge, Madison’s next articu-
lation of something like this argument came in his letter to Jefferson of October 17, 1788. See
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 The Writings of James 
Madison 269, 271 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904). In his letter to Jefferson, Madison wrote that he 
had “always been in favor of a bill of rights; provided it be so framed as not to imply powers 
not meant to be included in the enumeration” of congressional powers. Id. There is reasonable 
ground for suspecting that Madison was here engaged in revisionism. See Magliocca, supra
note 88, at 34 (“Only a politician as adroit as Madison could have written this with a straight 
face, as he has said nothing in favor of a bill of rights until then.”). By the time of this letter to 
Jefferson, the Constitution had been ratified, and Madison was turning his attention to run-
ning for office in Virginia, where his election to Congress was anything but guaranteed and 
support for a Bill of Rights was strong. See Feldman, supra note 46, at 247–51.
98. The Federalist, supra note 16, No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). This argument is, for 
example, the official account of the National Constitution Center’s Interactive Constitution. 
See Gary Lawson & Robert Schapiro, The Tenth Amendment, Nat’l Const. Ctr.,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-x
[https://perma.cc/DE5Y-RKZX]; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 
535 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“Indeed, the Constitution did not initially include a Bill 
of Rights at least partly because the Framers felt the enumeration of powers sufficed to restrain 
the Government.”).
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good reason.99 After all, Lee was right that the Constitution had no text lim-
iting Congress to the powers expressly delegated. Readers of Article I could 
also see that a Congress vested with the powers enumerated there—
including the power to tax and the power to raise armies—would have no 
trouble behaving oppressively if it had a mind to do so.100 Calls for a Bill of 
Rights continued unabated, and Madison himself drafted one for the First 
Congress to approve just as soon as he could.101 In that context, the fact that 
Madison never repeated the Federalist 84 argument102 during the ratification 
debates suggests that, as between the two arguments he made in Congress in 
September 1787, his articulation of the Federalist 84 argument was more 
likely the aberration and his observation that enumerations do not in prac-
tice confine legislatures more likely the accurate reflection of his view at the 
time. Once, early in the process, he tried to say something else; he was called 
out; he knew that what he’d said was weak, and he didn’t say it again. And it 
wasn’t hard for him to drop that argument, because it didn’t accord with his 
actual view anyway.103 His actual view—as it had been during the Conven-
tion, and as it had been two years before—was that one should not expect 
enumerations of power to constrain in practice.
E. Publius and Ratification
The ratification debates called for Madison to soft-pedal his nationalism. 
The task at hand was to sell the Constitution to a broad audience, and Madi-
son did not need to worry about convincing people who were strongly in fa-
vor of a powerful national government. He had them already. What he had 
to worry about was reassuring people who were concerned that the new sys-
tem would give the general government too much power. To the extent that 
99. See Graber, supra note 90, at 377–78 (2007); Primus, The Limits of Enumeration,
supra note 12, at 614–19.
100. See, e.g., 3 Elliot, supra note 57, at 415–16 (relaying the June 14, 1788 speech of 
George Mason at the Virginia Ratifying Convention).
101. To be clear, though: to say that Madison drafted a Bill of Rights in the First Congress
is not to say that Madison thought of the twelve amendments approved by that Congress and 
sent to the states for ratification as “a Bill of Rights.” On the contrary, referring to the first set 
of ratified amendments as “the Bill of Rights” seems to be a considerably later historical devel-
opment. See Magliocca, supra note 88, at 38–40. In Madison’s own mind, the “Bill of Rights” 
that he drafted in the First Congress was a general statement about the basis for the new gov-
ernment’s authority—a statement that Congress declined to approve as a proposed Article V 
Amendment. See id. at 40.
102. Obviously, it is anachronistic to call this argument “the Federalist 84 argument” as 
of the time Madison argued in Congress in 1787. Federalist 84 would not be written until the 
following year. But for the modern audience, it is a reasonable shorthand.
103. I seriously doubt Hamilton believed it either, of course. It seems more likely that he 
threw that argument into Federalist 84, near the end of the series, in a kitchen-sink tour of ar-
guments in which he included anything that he thought might persuade his audience, whether 
he believed it or not.
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we are interested in identifying Madison’s own ideas, rather than in what a 
reasonable observer might have made of the proposed Constitution, it is 
therefore prudent to take statements about limited congressional power that 
Madison made during the ratification process at a bit of a discount.
During the ratification process, Madison articulated both the view that 
the textual enumeration of congressional powers would limit Congress and 
the view that textual enumerations of powers are not, in practice, good at
settling questions about who has the power to do what. In private corre-
spondence with Jefferson, Madison took the latter view.104 Similarly, Madi-
son in the Federalist Papers devoted an essay to explaining that the Constitu-
tion did not, and in the nature of things could not, draw a clear line between 
Congress’s jurisdiction and that of the states.105 Nonetheless, Madison in the 
Federalist Papers also presented the new general government as limited to 
something less than plenary legislative power and pointed to the enumera-
tion of specific powers in support of that characterization. In the voice of 
Publius, Madison described the government’s jurisdiction as extending “to 
certain enumerated objects only,”106 argued that the very fact of an enumera-
tion of congressional powers showed that Congress would not have general 
legislative authority,107 and characterized the powers of Congress as “few and 
defined.”108 And according to the available documentation, Madison seems 
to have insisted at Virginia’s ratifying convention that the new government 
would not be able to exercise more powers than those enumerated in the 
new Constitution—especially in the Convention’s final stage, when he com-
batted a push for Virginia to ratify only on the condition that a specific set of 
amendments be added to the Constitution.109
The public statements of any Founder about contested issues during the 
ratification process are potentially unreliable guides to what that person real-
ly thought, both because people do not always have stable views and because 
people sometimes say what they think their audiences want to hear rather 
than what they actually believe. (Elbridge Gerry, who would later serve as 
Madison’s vice president, would say during the Bank debate that nobody 
104. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 12 The Papers 
of Thomas Jefferson 270, 275 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955) (speaking of “the impossibility of 
dividing powers of legislation, in such a manner, as to be free from different constructions by 
different interests, or even from ambiguity in the judgment of the impartial” (footnote omit-
ted)). As with the letter to Wallace, the immediate subject of Madison’s discussion is enumera-
tions of powers in state constitutions, so there is room for someone to argue that Congress is 
different. But as I noted earlier, the substance of Madison’s argument seems applicable to Con-
gress as well, because the argument is founded in a view about the nature of language and the 
nature of legislation, not about anything specific to the legislatures of states.
105. The Federalist, supra note 16, No. 37 (James Madison).
106. Id. No. 39 (James Madison).
107. Id. No. 41 (James Madison).
108. Id. No. 45 (James Madison).
109. 3 Elliot, supra note 57, at 95 (June 6); id. at 620, 626–27 (June 24); see also id. at 
629–31 (discussing whether to insist on the adoption of proposed amendments as a condition 
of ratification).
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should take seriously the representations made during the ratification de-
bates by Publius, or by anyone else either—people said what they thought 
they had to say.110) On the theory that a politician’s private correspondence 
with friends is more likely to be authentic than his public statements when 
trying to win over skeptical voters, the fact that Madison’s private communi-
cation to Jefferson took the same view that Madison had held previously—
that is, that enumerations of legislative powers are not in practice good de-
vices for confining legislatures to the exercise of particular powers—suggests 
that Madison was at least partly posturing on the occasions when he suggest-
ed otherwise publicly. 
But whatever the relationship between Madison’s statements during the 
ratification process and his actual views at that time, it seems safe to think 
that Madison believed the enumeration to be at most as important and as 
limiting as he said in public. After all, Madison was a strong proponent of 
national power at the Convention. During the ratification process he was 
trying to sway people more skeptical of national power than he. If he shaded 
his views, it would have been toward exaggerating the limits that the pro-
posed Constitution would place on Congress. In that light, his willingness to 
say in Federalist 37 that the enumeration could not be understood to create 
hard limits on the general government is telling. It suggests, not surprisingly, 
that Madison retained his earlier skepticism about enumerations of powers 
as devices for limiting legislatures. And to the extent that he was skeptical, it 
would have made little sense for him to regard the enumeration of congres-
sional powers as the essential characteristic of the new government. After all, 
it makes little sense to rest a constitutional system on an ineffective device.
II. The Bank Debate Without the Enumeration Question, 1790–1791
After the Constitution was ratified, Madison served in the House of 
Representatives as a congressman from Virginia. In that capacity, in Febru-
ary of 1791, Madison made a major enumerated-powers argument in oppo-
sition to the bill to incorporate the Bank of the United States.111 In important 
ways, his argument is a paradigm for later enumerated-powers arguments. 
And the story of the debate of which Madison’s argument was a central part 
is often (and easily) told through the writings of four famous participants. In 
the House, Madison argued that the Bank was unconstitutional because it 
exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers. In President Washington’s cabinet, 
Jefferson and Randolph concurred with Madison, and Hamilton argued the 
other side. To read those documents is to confront the Bank Bill as squarely 
posing an issue about the extent of Congress’s enumerated powers. And that 
is how constitutional lawyers generally think of the Bank debate.
110. 2 Annals of Cong. 1950, 1953 (1791).
111. Id. at 1896–902, 1956–59.
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In this Part, however, I present the Bank controversy differently by start-
ing the story at an earlier point—with Hamilton’s report to Congress in De-
cember 1790 recommending the creation of the Bank. I frame the narrative 
this way to make a point that cannot be seen if one starts with Madison in 
the House. It is this: until the last stage of the legislative process, the Bank bill 
was not the subject of any enumerated-powers controversy. It had critics and 
opponents, Madison among them. Depending on what it means to charac-
terize a problem as a “constitutional” problem, some of Madison’s bases for 
opposition could even be regarded as constitutional.112 But nobody, Madison 
included, seems to have thought that Congress might lack the authority to 
create the Bank by legislation. That idea surfaced only when the bill stood on 
the brink of passage.
A. Hamilton’s Report
Hamilton delivered his Bank proposal to Congress on December 14, 
1790. As printed in the Appendix to the Annals of Congress, the Treasury 
Secretary’s report was more than fourteen thousand words long.113 In con-
siderable depth, Hamilton discussed the merits of creating a Bank of the 
United States. The report devoted considerable space to anticipating argu-
ments against the Bank and explaining why, in Hamilton’s view, those ar-
guments should not prevail.114 But at no point did Hamilton mention the 
possibility of an enumerated-powers issue—not even to say, “Some people 
might think that chartering a Bank is beyond the power of Congress, but 
that’s a fringe view, and here’s why.” The Report contains no indication 
whatsoever that Hamilton could perceive or anticipate an enumerated-
powers objection. 
Hamilton was reasonably conversant with the Constitution. He knew 
the proposition—not universally accepted, but certainly mainstream—that 
Congress was limited to its enumerated powers. If the idea that those enu-
merated powers were not sufficient to authorize the incorporation of the 
Bank had been within the ambit of conventional constitutional thinking, 
Hamilton should have been able to see Madison’s objection coming. Given 
that Hamilton apparently did not anticipate Madison’s argument, we should 
consider the possibility that Madison’s argument was not an accessible 
mainstream concern. It may instead have required some creativity, pushing 
the boundaries of what capable constitutional thinkers at the time thought of 
as arguable positions.
To be sure, the fact that Hamilton anticipated no enumerated-powers 
objection does not prove that there was no such objection to make. Hamil-
ton was in favor of the Bank, and people often overlook the potential obsta-
112. See Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1079 (2013) 
(canvassing possible meanings of “constitutional”).
113. See Alexander Hamilton, Treasury Dep’t, Report on a National Bank, re-
printed in 2 Annals of Cong. app. at 2031–59 (1790).
114. See, e.g., id. at 2035–42.
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cles to projects they support. But as noted above, Hamilton’s report paid a 
lot of attention to analyzing and overcoming potential arguments against the 
Bank. Moreover, Hamilton was not just any advocate, and the objection that 
Madison ultimately propounded was—in Madison’s presentation, anyway—
founded on a central and fundamental feature of the Constitution. So the 
question is not just whether government officials sometimes overlook prob-
lems with their pet projects. It is whether the author of fifty-one Federalist 
Papers was likely to overlook an issue going to the heart of the new Constitu-
tion on a topic to which he devoted fourteen thousand words. 
The point can be sharpened further, because Hamilton’s report did take 
account of the Constitution in other ways. One of the topics Hamilton cov-
ered was the possibility of the government’s creating paper money. In that 
discussion, Hamilton noted that the Constitution prohibited the states from 
creating paper money. He then argued that although the Constitution did 
not impose the same prohibition on the federal government, it would be wise 
for the federal government not to create paper money either.115 So Hamilton 
had not put the Constitution out of mind while writing his report. Where he 
thought the Constitution relevant to an issue he was discussing, he said so. 
The fact that he catalogued and discussed many possible objections to the 
Bank and never wrote a word about a possible enumerated-powers challenge 
to Congress’s authority to create the Bank accordingly suggests that Madi-
son’s speeches in the House did not pursue an obviously available line of ar-
gument. In 1791, to make a constitutional move that Hamilton could not see 
coming was, at least presumptively, to engage in creative lawyering.116
B. Madison’s Opposition
1. Madison’s Concerns
Some of Madison’s reasons for opposing Hamilton’s Bank proposal were 
prosaic. For example, if the Bank were incorporated as proposed, its system 
for offering shares to the public was such that Madison’s Virginian constitu-
ents were unlikely to come away with much.117 But more general and fun-
damental matters were also at stake. The Bank would be an institution con-
trolled by a financial elite. Madison had no problem with elites holding 
power, but the elite he trusted was a landed-gentry elite, not a financial-
115. Id. at 2043–44.
116. To repeat a point in the interest of clarity: Madison’s creativity lay not in the idea 
that Congress could legislate only on the basis of enumerated powers but in the idea that those 
powers might not be sufficient for authorizing the Bank bill. The general idea that Congress 
could legislate only on the basis of enumerated powers was a known part of constitutional ar-
gument, albeit a contested one. Hamilton would not have been surprised at that general idea. 
What Hamilton did not foresee was that that idea would be pressed into service in an argu-
ment against the Bank.
117. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 46, at 315.
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markets elite.118 In the tradition of a country-party ideology that had recently 
animated Antifederalists and that would soon be important to the Demo-
cratic-Republican Party, Madison worried that relationships of financial 
credit and debt could undermine the political and economic independence 
of citizens and thereby erode an important basis of republicanism.119 A na-
tional bank could thus be particularly threatening, because it would be a ve-
hicle through which a financial elite—much of it located in England—could 
hold the debt, and thereby compromise the independence, of the Republic 
itself. 
Madison also worried that recognizing a federal power to create corpo-
rations would have unwelcome repercussions in the national political pro-
cess. By 1791, he was coming to think that the extended republic he had 
praised in Federalist 10 was turning out to give a structural advantage to the 
financial class, which seemed better able to mobilize politically on a national 
scale than the more locally oriented planter-gentry were.120 If Congress had 
the power to grant charters of incorporation, then the financial class would 
be able to use its advantage in national politics to secure a great deal of what 
it wanted—that is, power-wielding corporations controlled by financial 
elites. But if only the state governments could create corporations, those fi-
nancial elites would be forced to pursue their interests in state-level politics, 
and in state politics the gentry could not be so easily overwhelmed.121
In a partially related but less well-remembered concern, Madison also 
may have worried about the relationship between the Bank proposal and the 
plan for establishing a national capital on the Potomac River.122 The Poto-
mac plan was deeply important to Madison, partly as a way to increase Vir-
ginia’s buy-in to the new Constitution and partly because, in line with his 
distrust of financial elites, he saw the possibility of a seat of government in or 
near a financial center like Philadelphia or New York City as inviting the fi-
nancial class’s domination of the government. Much better to put the seat of 
government somewhere away from the existing cities, and somewhere suffi-
ciently central that it might be accessible by many different kinds of people. 
If that somewhere adjoined Virginia, well, all the better. And for a very prac-
118. See Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 46, at ch. 3; Feldman, supra note 46, at 315–
18; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism and Self-Restraint: The Gentry, the Saints, 
and the Federal Republic in Nineteenth Century America (forthcoming) (manuscript 
ch. 3, at 3).
119. See Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 46, at ch. 3; Hills, supra note 118 (manuscript 
ch. 3, at 3).
120. Hills, supra note 118 (manuscript ch. 3, at 7); see also James Madison, For the Na-
tional Gazette, in 14 The Papers of James Madison 137 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983) 
(reprinting Madison’s note on consolidation of December 3, 1791); James Madison, Notes for 
the National Gazette Essays, in 14 The Papers of James Madison, supra at 157, 161–63 (con-
cerning the “Influence of public opinion on Government”). Like the fear of debt, this concern 
about the power of financial networks at large scale was a staple theme in country-party 
thought. Hills, supra note 118 (manuscript ch. 3, at 7).
121. Id. at 9–10.
122. See infra Part IV.
444 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:415
tical reason, the Bank proposal seemed like a threat to Congress’s agreement 
to put the capital where Madison wanted it. Everyone knew that a national 
bank would be located in Philadelphia, where Congress was in temporary 
quarters. Every increase in the government’s Philadelphia footprint while 
Congress was “temporarily” there might make it harder to pick up and move 
the whole operation as scheduled in 1800. Voting to approve a grand plan 
for the distant future is one thing, but actually bringing that plan to fruition 
is another, and Madison was practical enough to know it.123
In an important sense, Madison may have regarded several of these rea-
sons for opposing the Bank bill as constitutional concerns. Institutional ar-
rangements that could enhance or undermine the independence of citizens 
or of the government in general, allocations of legislative power that would 
channel political competition in different ways, a (geographic) separation of 
powers between the capital markets and the seat of government—all these 
things are matters of constitutional design, and potentially important 
ones.124 But the text of the written Constitution did not vindicate Madison’s 
concerns. No language in the Constitution expressly spoke to the possibility 
of a national bank, or to federally chartered corporations, or to the relation-
ship among the government, the gentry, and the financial class, or to the 
merits of putting the seat of government in this or that location. In some 
cases, as with the seat of government, the Constitution named the issue and 
openly deferred its resolution to Congress at some later date.125 In other cas-
es, as with the question of a federal power to charter corporations, the Con-
stitution said nothing, not because nobody in 1787 had recognized the pos-
sibility of a constitutional issue but as the result of a set of standoffs in which 
no constituency managed to make the Constitution reflect its preference.126
The text of the Constitution accordingly reflected no agreement on the issue, 
except in the sense that it reflected an agreement to adopt a Constitution that 
would not speak directly to the question. 
One could articulate this state of affairs in either of two ways. One, 
which takes as axiomatic that “constitutional issues” in American law are 
those and only those addressed by the text of the Constitution, would say 
that Madison’s objections were not constitutional objections.127 The other 
framework, which classifies fundamental matters of government structure 
and national-polity ethos as “constitutional” whether or not the written 
Constitution names or settles the relevant issues, would be willing to see 
Madison’s concerns as constitutional.128 (Not necessarily as justified, of 
123. The matters described in this paragraph are fleshed out and documented infra in 
Part IV.
124. See Primus, supra note 112.
125. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
126. See supra Part I.
127. See Primus, supra note 112, at 1088–1104.
128. See id. at 1127–39.
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course: that would require a further judgment. To describe a concern as con-
stitutional in this way is to say something about its subject matter, not to say 
which way it should be resolved.) But within this second framework, the fact 
that a concern is constitutional does not mean that the written Constitution 
speaks to its resolution.
2. Madison’s Preparation
As of January 1791, Madison did not seem to have thought that his ob-
jections to the Bank were rooted in the written Constitution’s text. The case 
for this possibility is inferential: I am not aware of a letter from Madison to 
Jefferson saying “Dear Tom: The Bank bill is lousy, but nothing in the Con-
stitution prohibits it, so I’ll have to meet it on other grounds.” Instead, the 
claim that Madison was not thinking in terms of objections based on the 
written Constitution is an inference from absence. In the weeks before the 
House debated the Bank, Madison spent considerable time preparing to de-
bate the Bank bill.129 And to the best of my knowledge, there is no indication 
that his preparations included the development of any arguments appealing 
to the written Constitution.130
Instead, Madison immersed himself in the literature on banking, intend-
ing to be an expert on the subject by the time the House took up Hamilton’s 
proposal.131 He read about the Bank of England, about the Banks of Amster-
dam and Rotterdam and Hamburg, and about banks in Florence and Venice 
and Genoa and Padua going back to the twelfth century.132 By the end of 
January, he had compiled several pages of notes based on his reading.133 By 
all indications, he was equipping himself to argue against the Bank from a 
position of great knowledge. The ground of argument for which all this read-
ing would prepare him would be the merits and evils of banking, not the 
enumerated powers of Congress—and indeed when Madison rose in opposi-
tion on February 2, he spoke for a while about banking before ever mention-
ing an objection tied to the written Constitution.134 If Madison spent any 
time before February preparing to make an argument about the enumerated 
powers of Congress, he seems to have left behind no evidence. 
Similarly, Madison’s correspondence during the seven weeks between 
Hamilton’s proposal and the House debate gives no indication that Madison 
was thinking about the Bank in terms of anything specified in the written 
Constitution. One should not overread this evidence, both because the ab-
129. See Feldman, supra note 46, at 316–17.
130. Once again, I will be grateful to readers who bring documents I may have missed to 
my attention.
131. Feldman, supra note 46, at 316–17.
132. James Madison, Notes on Banks, in 13 The Papers of James Madison 364 (Charles 
F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1981).
133. Id.; James Madison, Notes on the Bank of England, in 13 The Papers of James 
Madison, supra note 132, at 367.
134. 2 Annals of Cong. 1894–96 (1791).
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sence of a subject from correspondence cannot prove that a topic was not on 
a writer’s mind and because Madison seems not to have written much about 
the Bank at all during that period. Only in two surviving letters, one to his 
father and one to Edmund Pendleton, did Madison write about the Bank is-
sue, and to his father he merely wrote that he expected the Bank bill to occa-
sion a serious fight in the House.135 The letter to Pendleton, however, may be 
more revealing. 
Madison’s letter to Pendleton opened by addressing a different topic: the 
legal force of a provision of the peace treaty with Britain.136 The question was 
whether a provision should be treated as self-executing—that is, whether the 
treaty had the force of operative law on the point it covered, or whether it 
required further legislation in both the United States and Britain to become 
operative. In giving his view on that question, Madison conducted an overt 
exegesis of the Constitution’s text. He quoted and interpreted the words in 
Article VI that describe treaties as “the supreme law of the land.”137 Over the 
course of six paragraphs, Madison explained why he took that language to 
make the treaty self-executing and also addressed other constitutional ques-
tions arising from the “supreme law” language. Then, immediately after his 
analysis of Article VI was finished, Madison turned to the subject of the 
Bank. The only view he expressed on that subject was as follows: “I augur 
that you will not be in love with some of its features.”138
If Madison believed that the Bank bill was in conflict with the Constitu-
tion, it would have been natural for him to say so in this letter. He was dis-
cussing the Bank, and the letter up until that point had been an exercise in 
interpreting the text of the Constitution. Why switch out of that register and 
say merely that Pendleton might dislike certain features of the Bank? If Mad-
ison believed the Bank flatly unconstitutional, why would he not have said 
so?
One should not make too much of this evidence. The sentence to Pend-
leton is only a sentence, and strictly speaking it says nothing about Madi-
son’s own views. But the contrast with Madison’s discussion of the treaty in 
the same letter is striking. To believe that Madison considered the Bank pro-
posal unconstitutional on enumerated-powers grounds when he wrote to 
Pendleton, one must think that Madison took whatever time was necessary 
to write six longhand paragraphs interpreting a constitutional clause on a 
different issue and then immediately afterwards, when addressing another 
subject presenting a problem under the Constitution, chose to say nothing at 
all suggesting that such an issue was even in play. That seems unlikely. So 
135. Letter from James Madison to James Madison Sr. (Jan. 23, 1791), in 13 The Papers 
of James Madison, supra note 132, at 358.
136. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (1791), in 13 The Papers of 
James Madison, supra note 132, at 342.
137. Id. (citing U.S. Const. art. VI).
138. Id. at 344.
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here is another interpretation, and a straightforward one: Madison discussed 
the treaty question in light of the Constitution’s text because he thought the 
Constitution’s text bore on the question. He said nothing about the Consti-
tution in connection with the Bank because he didn’t think the Bank raised 
any issues of that kind. It was an important matter, surely. Perhaps even a 
constitutional one, in the small-c sense of the word. But it wasn’t an issue to 
be settled by reference to the written Constitution. 
C. The Senate
The Senate took up consideration of the Bank bill in January, ahead of 
the House.139 In 1791, the Senate (unlike the House) met behind closed 
doors, and the Annals of Congress record only a bare-bones procedural ac-
count of the Senate’s business. We accordingly cannot discern from the An-
nals what arguments, if any, particular senators made to their colleagues 
when the Bank bill was before them. What the Annals do reveal is that the 
bill passed in the Senate with relatively little controversy. On controversial 
questions, or on issues where senators on the losing side wanted to be on 
record, the practice in 1791 as now was for senators to ask that the “Yeas and 
Nays” be reported in the journal. Under Article I, Section 5 of the Constitu-
tion, the Yeas and Nays must be printed if at least one-fifth of the Members 
present so request.140 In the short Senate proceedings on the Bank bill that 
preceded the final vote, in which the Senate hashed out specific aspects of the 
Bank’s charter, the Yeas and Nays appear.141 But at the end of the process, 
when the main question was put, the Annals simply record that the bill 
passed, without recorded Yeas and Nays.142 That indicates that less than one-
fifth of the senators thought the final question was even worth being on rec-
ord about.143
139. See 1 DHFFC, supra note 58, at 531–36 (describing Senate action on the Bank bill 
between January 13 and January 20, 1791).
140. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
141. See, e.g., 2 Annals of Cong. 1748 (1791) (recording the Yeas and Nays on the ques-
tion of whether the Bank’s charter should expire in 1801 or in 1811). The reason why the 
length of the charter was especially important is further discussed infra in Section IV.D.
142. 2 Annals of Cong. 1748 (1791).
143. Some commentators have read this evidence to indicate that passage in the Senate 
was unanimous. For an early example, see R.K. Moulton, Legislative and Documentary 
History of the Banks of the United States 13 (photo. reprt. 2008) (New York, G.&C. 
Carvill & Co. 1834) (“The yeas and nays are not given. It is however supposed that the vote was 
unanimous.”). A modern example is Brest et al., supra note 23, at 30. That inference might 
or might not be correct. Maybe the Senate was unanimous, or maybe a few Senators not 
amounting to one-fifth of those present objected. The last recorded vote on January 20 before 
the approval of the Bank bill showed twenty-three Senators on the floor, so as many as four 
could have asked for the Yeas and Nays and been rebuffed. 2 Annals of Cong. 1748 (1791). 
According to the diary of Senator William Maclay, three senators objected to Hamilton’s pro-
posal early in the Senate’s discussions: Butler, Izard, and Monroe. 9 Documentary History 
of the First Federal Congress of the United States of America 359 (Kenneth R. Bowl-
ing & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988) [hereinafter 9 DHFFC] (entry of Jan. 10, 1791). But whether the 
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The most detailed surviving evidence of what transpired among the sen-
ators when the Bank bill was before them comes from the diary of William 
Maclay, then serving as a senator from Pennsylvania. The diary contains 
notes on the Senate’s discussions of the Bank on at least eight different days 
in January 1791.144 According to Maclay’s notes, the Senate discussed the 
terms on which private individuals could buy and hold stock in the Bank,145
the nature and size of a subscription by the United States on behalf of the 
public,146 the appropriate length of the charter,147 and whether Congress 
could repeal the charter once it was enacted.148 The diary contains no sugges-
tion that anyone questioned Congress’s constitutional authority to incorpo-
rate the Bank. 
Maclay was a fastidious republican. He suspected several of his more na-
tionalistic Senate colleagues of aiming to annihilate the state governments 
altogether.149 His diary entries during the Bank debate characterized Hamil-
ton as a “damnable Villain.”150 Indeed, Maclay repeatedly criticized Wash-
ington himself for allegedly antirepublican tendencies, going so far as to wish 
“this same Genl. Washington were in Heaven,” so that Washington’s pres-
tige could not be mobilized as “cover to [the Administration’s] every Uncon-
stitutional and irrepublican Act.”151 Not surprisingly given his general orien-
tation, Maclay was not a fan of banking systems, which he regarded as “Ma-
“Machines for promoting the profits of unproductive Men.”152 He feared 
that the proposed Bank of the United States would serve the interests of a 
small financial elite and neglect the broader public.153 On balance, and per-
haps because he suspected the bill had the votes to pass, Maclay devoted 
himself to cutting the best deal he could for the public rather than trying to
block passage of the bill.154 But given his ideological stance, Maclay would 
hardly have been one to underplay constitutional objections to Congress’s 
power to incorporate the Bank. Given that he recorded none, perhaps there 
were none to record.
bill passed unanimously or merely overwhelmingly, its passage does not seem to have been the 
occasion of significant controversy before the Senate.
144. See 9 DHFFC, supra note 143, at 359–66 (entries of Jan. 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, and 
20, 1791).
145. Id. at 362 (entry of Jan. 18, 1791).
146. Id. at 359, 361–62 (entries of Jan. 11, 14, and 17, 1791).
147. Id. at 361 (entry of Jan. 14, 1791).
148. Id. at 364 (entry of Jan. 19, 1791).
149. Id. at 379 (entry of Feb. 11, 1791).
150. Id. at 362–63 (entry of Jan. 18, 1791).
151. Id. at 342 (entry of Dec. 14, 1790).
152. Id. at 362 (entry of Jan. 17, 1791).
153. Id. at 359, 361–62 (entries of Jan. 11, 14, and 17, 1791).
154. Id. at 355, 361–62, 364 (entries of Jan. 3, 14, 17, and 19, 1791).
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This is not to say that Maclay never considered the possibility that Con-
gress might lack the power to incorporate the Bank. On the contrary, his dia-
ry contains one reference to that possibility. It appears in an entry dated De-
cember 24, 1790, after Hamilton submitted his report but before the matter 
was taken up for discussion in the Senate. In that entry, Maclay wrote about 
Hamilton’s Bank proposal. Much of what he wrote was critical. Banks, he 
wrote, might operate as taxes on the poor in favor of the rich, and by con-
centrating wealth in a few hands, their operation “may be regarded [a]s op-
posed to republicanism.”155 But Maclay did not doubt Congress’s power to 
incorporate a bank if it chose to do so. His discussion of that matter consist-
ed of a single sentence speculating that someone might question Congress’s 
power to grant charters of incorporation, followed immediately by three 
short sentences dismissing the concern.156 In other words, Maclay—who 
feared that his colleagues were seeking to extend congressional power so far 
as to annihilate the state governments, who viewed banks as unrepublican, 
and whose republicanism was fierce enough to wish Washington dead—gave 
rather short shrift to the idea that Congress might lack the authority to in-
corporate the Bank. As far as he could see, there was no serious issue to dis-
cuss.
The only reference I have discovered to the possibility of a constitutional 
objection’s having been mentioned in the Senate appears in a letter from 
Senator Pierce Butler of South Carolina to Representative James Jackson of 
Georgia, and it is just as dismissive. After the Senate passed the Bank bill, but 
before the House took up the matter, Jackson asked Butler to describe the 
Senate’s deliberations on the issue. Butler penned about nine hundred words 
in response, summarizing arguments for and against the bill.157 Toward the 
end of his letter, in less than a full sentence, Butler briefly raised and quickly 
dismissed the possibility that the Bank’s exclusive privilege to do the fiscal 
business of the government would make the proposal unconstitutional.158
The potential constitutional problem to which Butler referred—the 
granting of an exclusive privilege, meaning a corporate charter entitling the 
holder to monopolize the relevant business—might or might not be concep-
tualized as a problem about Congress’s acting beyond its enumerated pow-
ers. If the idea was that Congress was forbidden to create legal monopolies, 
then the relevant constitutional rule might be better understood as an exter-
nal limit on congressional power rather than as an internal one. A rule 
against monopolies is an affirmative prohibition, not something inherent in 
the specification of a delegated power. On the other hand, the idea that Con-
155. Id. at 347 (entry of Dec. 24, 1790).
156. Id. (“The power of incorporating may be inquired into. But the old Congress en-
joyed it. Bank Bills are promisary Notes and of Course not Money. I see no Objection on this 
Quarter.”).
157. Letter from Pierce Butler to James Jackson (Jan. 24, 1791), in 21 Documentary 
History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of America 514 (Charlene 
Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter 21 DHFFC].
158. Id. at 515.
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gress lacked power to create a monopoly might have been rooted in Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8, which authorizes Congress to grant time-limited mo-
nopoly privileges to authors and inventors.159 From a perspective that sees 
the enumeration as a carefully limited set of authorizations and as intended 
overall to limit federal legislative power, one might reason that the affirma-
tive specification of a power to grant time-limited monopolies to authors 
and inventors implies the denial of a more general right to grant monopolies. 
Whether Butler meant to communicate the latter sort of reasoning as 
opposed to imagining a freestanding ban on monopolies is unclear. But ei-
ther way, what is most telling about Butler’s reference is his quick statement 
that the constitutional argument to which he was making reference was un-
worthy of Jackson’s attention. It was not a serious objection. It merited a 
quick mention at the end of a general summary, in less than a sentence, and 
nothing more.160 So even if Butler’s letter is read for all it might be worth, it 
does not begin to suggest that any senators shared the sort of full-dress enu-
merated-powers concern that Madison would raise in the House, according 
to which incorporating the Bank lay beyond the powers of Congress and 
would therefore transgress the essence of the new Constitution. And apart 
from this equivocal reference in Butler’s letter, I have been unable to discov-
er any indication that anyone in the Senate debate contemplated an enumer-
ated-powers objection to the Bank bill. 
Much as it seems unlikely that Hamilton would have failed to anticipate 
an objection to the Bank based on a core tenet of the new Constitution, it 
seems odd that the entire United States Senate would overlook one. The Sen-
ate in 1791 was significantly populated by men who had recently attended 
constitutional conventions. Moreover, every senator in 1791 served as the 
ambassador of a state legislature, so it would be particularly strange for the 
entire Senate to overlook a core constitutional problem sounding in the fed-
eral government’s exceeding its proper authority and intruding on the pre-
rogatives of the state governments. 
Similarly, the Senate’s failure to raise that alarm cannot be explained on 
the grounds that the Senators were all in the tank for Hamilton, because the 
Senate in 1791 included outspoken opponents of extensive congressional 
power. Maclay is a less famous example. A more famous one is Virginia’s 
James Monroe. Monroe was a prominent Antifederalist, and the Virginia 
legislature had sent him to the Senate in preference to Madison precisely be-
159. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
160. As other possible objections to the Bank, Butler mentioned the concern that the 
Bank would “give an undue preponderance to the centre and finally destroy the ballance of 
power among the states.” Letter from Pierce Butler to James Jackson, supra note 157, at 515.
On a certain view of “constitutionality,” those concerns could be regarded as constitutional 
objections to the Bank. But they are not the sort of constitutional objections with which this 
paper is concerned—that is, objections arising from the textual specification of the powers of 
Congress.
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cause Madison was too solicitous of congressional power.161 And although 
Maclay’s diary indicates that Monroe had objections to the Bank when the 
proposal first came before the Senate, there is no indication—not in Maclay’s 
notes, not in Monroe’s own papers, and not anywhere else that I have been 
able to discover—that Monroe doubted Congress’s power to incorporate the 
Bank at any time before Madison pressed that argument in the House.162 It 
would be curious if an obvious objection to Congress’s authority to incorpo-
rate the Bank—an objection serious enough to be championed by the man 
whom Virginia considered too much of a nationalist to represent it in the 
Senate—had not occurred to the reliable Antifederalist whom Virginia sent 
instead.163
D. Other Evidence
To test further the hypothesis that the enumerated-powers objection to 
the Bank was a last-minute development when Madison spoke in the House, 
I have canvassed the surviving writings of all members of both Houses of 
Congress for the seven-week period between December 14, 1790, when 
Hamilton submitted his report, and February 2, 1791, when Madison rose in 
opposition, as well as the surviving letters written to members of Congress 
by other persons during that time period. For the entirety of that time, I have 
161. Cf. Feldman, supra note 46, at 246–47. To be precise, the Virginia Legislature had 
chosen Richard Henry Lee and William Grayson, both Antifederalists, to represent it in the 
First Congress, rather than choosing Madison. Madison then ran for the House of Representa-
tives and won, narrowly defeating Monroe. Id. at 247–56. Grayson died in March 1790, and the 
Virginia Legislature named Monroe, also a reliable Antifederalist, to succeed him. Beverley 
Randolph, Credential for Election to the U.S. Senate, in 2 The Papers of James Monroe 488
(Daniel Preston ed., 2006).
162. Unsurprisingly, Monroe was not to be outdone by Madison in his opposition to 
congressional powers. On February 7, one day after Madison made the second of his two major 
speeches against the Bank in the House, Monroe for the first time (so far as I can tell) wrote 
that he objected to the Bank bill as exceeding the powers of Congress as enumerated in the 
Constitution. But he hedged, writing that he was not certain of the correctness of that view. (In 
the same letter, Monroe also reported that he had been one of six senators who had voted 
against the Bank—a claim that stands in tension with the absence of yeas and nays in the An-
nals. Perhaps Monroe was puffing a bit, retrospectively.) Letter from James Monroe to Nicho-
las Lewis (Feb. 7, 1791), in 21 DHFFC, supra note 157, at 722. After another four days passed, 
Monroe was prepared to go all in, writing in a different letter that the Bank was “absolutely 
unconstitutional” on enumerated-powers grounds, going into noticeably more detail about the 
argument, and seemingly presenting his constitutional objection as if it were a long-held con-
viction. See Letter from James Monroe to Zachariah Johnston (Feb. 11, 1791), in 21 DHFFC,
supra note 157, at 757, 758. Monroe would not be the first politician to jump onto an idea after 
someone else articulated it and later to describe himself as having had the idea all along.
163. Virginia’s other Antifederalist Senator—Lee—was not physically present in the Sen-
ate during the Bank debate; illness seems to have kept him home in Virginia during January 
1791. But he wrote to his colleague Monroe about the subject. In his letter, Lee gave several 
reasons why he thought the Bank proposal was a bad idea. He said not a word about any po-
tential constitutional problem. See Letter from Richard Henry Lee to James Monroe (Jan. 15, 
1791), in 21 DHFFC, supra note 157, at 437.
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discovered, in addition to Butler’s letter to Jackson and Maclay’s diary entry 
of December 24, exactly one document mentioning the possibility that Con-
gress might lack the power to incorporate the Bank.164 That lone document 
is a letter by Theodore Sedgwick, who represented Massachusetts in the 
House.165 Like the references by Maclay and Butler, it does nothing to dispel 
suspicion that Madison came up with his enumerated-powers objection as a 
last-ditch attempt to derail the Bank. On the contrary, it communicates 
Sedgwick’s view that Madison might make just such an attempt, and not in
good faith either.
On January 30, 1791—three days before Madison made his first big 
speech against the Bank—Sedgwick wrote a letter to a friend in New York. In 
the letter, Sedgwick wrote that he expected Madison to come forward with a 
constitutional objection to the Bank bill. Indeed, he specified that Madison 
“will probably deny the constitutional authority of [C]ongress on the sub-
ject.”166 It seems, therefore, that in the final few days before the Bank bill was 
presented to the House for its third and final reading, Madison’s intention to 
press some such argument was known to, or at least suspected by, another 
member of Congress. But Sedgwick also suspected something else: that Mad-
ison’s likely argument about congressional authority, if it materialized, 
would be pretextual. In Sedgwick’s estimation, Madison was strongly com-
mitted to trying to defeat the Bank bill, but for reasons that Madison did not 
want to articulate overtly. So he was going to try to block the bill on the basis 
of some pretend reason. For the purpose, he had chosen an argument about 
the limited authority of Congress.167
Sedgwick might not be a reliable narrator as to Madison’s motives, and 
not only because people often misunderstand other people’s intentions. For 
one thing, Sedgwick supported the Bank bill,168 and the uncharitable inter-
pretation of one’s political opponents’ motives is all too common a phenom-
enon. Moreover, it seems that Madison and Sedgwick had a personal falling 
out sometime in 1790,169 which again raises the possibility that Sedgwick was 
disposed to think worse of Madison than Madison really deserved. But re-
gardless of how accurately Sedgwick diagnosed Madison’s motives, his letter, 
like Butler’s letter and Maclay’s diary entry, mentions a possible constitu-
tional objection to the Bank only to disparage it. None of them reported 
awareness of an enumerated-powers problem worth taking seriously on its 
164. One can never be certain that one has found everything. I will be grateful to readers 
who point me to other relevant sources.
165. Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Peter Van Schaack (Jan. 30, 1791), in 21 DHFFC,
supra note 157, at 608.
166. Id. at 609.
167. Id.
168. See 2 Annals of Cong. 1910–12, 1939 (1791).
169. See Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Pamela Sedgwick (Dec. 26, 1790), in 21
DHFFC, supra note 157, at 237, 238.
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merits. And apart from those three sources, nobody in the First Congress 
seems to have left any record of thinking the Bank bill might be unconstitu-
tional at any time between Hamilton’s proposal in December and the last 
stage of House proceedings in February.
As a final note, consider two essays against the Bank written by the 
pseudonymous author Mercator, who was likely Representative Hugh Wil-
liamson of North Carolina.170 On February 2, the Federal Gazette printed a 
thousand-word essay in which Mercator harshly condemned the Bank pro-
posal on many fronts but said not a word about the Constitution.171 Two 
days later, another Mercator essay appeared—and this one right from the 
start foregrounded the argument that Congress had no power to grant char-
ters of incorporation.172 Why would this fervent opponent of the Bank have 
completely neglected in his first essay the constitutional argument that head-
lined his second? We cannot know for certain. But here is a hypothesis. The 
essay that appeared in print on February 2 was written a day or so before 
February 2, without the benefit of Madison’s February 2 speech. Determined 
opponent of the Bank though he was, Mercator had not hit upon the enu-
merated-powers objection. Only after Madison spoke did enumerated pow-
ers become the framework for Mercator’s opposition.173
E. Summation
The picture, then, looks like this. In December, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, who was one of the Founding generation’s leading expositors of 
the Constitution, wrote fourteen thousand words explaining why Congress 
should incorporate a bank, devoted considerable attention to overcoming 
possible objections, and apparently could not foresee a constitutional chal-
lenge to Congress’s authority to pass the relevant legislation—a constitution-
al challenge purportedly arising from one of the Constitution’s core features. 
Madison worked industriously to formulate arguments against the Bill, but 
he left no record of having considered enumerated-powers objections, or in-
deed any objections arising from the Constitution’s text, at any time during 
that work. Nor did other members of Congress seem to see such a problem. 
The United States Senate, with signers of the Constitution and prominent 
Antifederalists in the room, passed the bill with little fuss. The Bank had im-
170. David Hosack, A Biographical Memoir of Hugh Williamson, reprinted in 6 The In-
vestigator 1, 32 (William Bengo’ Collyer et al. eds., London, Thomas & George Underwood 
1823) (identifying Mercator as Williamson).
171. See Letter from Mercator to Mr. Printer (Feb. 2, 1791), in 21 DHFFC, supra note 
157, at 664.
172. See Letter from Mercator to the American Daily Advertiser (Feb. 4, 1791), in 21 
DHFFC, supra note 157, at 686.
173. Consider also the pseudonymous author Philadelphiensis. On January 26, that writ-
er (who may have been Benjamin Workman) published a long essay in the Federal Gazette,
prosecuting argument after argument against the Bank bill. The essay, which appeared before 
Madison spoke in the House, contained not a word about constitutionality. See Letter from 
Philadelphiensis to Mr. Printer (Jan. 26, 1791), in 21 DHFFC, supra note 157, at 549.
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passioned detractors in the press, but they did not argue that Congress 
lacked the power to incorporate it. The bill was then sent to the House and 
progressed to the very last stage of consideration—whereupon Madison, a 
determined opponent of the bill and one of the most creative constitutional 
thinkers of his age, produced a constitutional argument explaining why 
Congress could not incorporate a bank even if it wanted to. 
All things considered, it seems plausible that Madison’s argument was 
an eleventh-hour invention. To be sure, the evidence is circumstantial. I 
know of no Madisonian diary entry saying that the enumerated-powers ar-
gument had occurred to him only at the last minute. But then again, there 
are apparently no Madisonian diary entries, or other documents, indicating 
that Madison expressed or even thought about an enumerated-powers objec-
tion to the Bank at any time before February, when the bill reached the last 
stage of the legislative process. 
III. In the House, February 1791
Ultimately, of course, Madison argued that the Bank was unconstitu-
tional on enumerated-powers grounds. In this Part, I explain how Madison 
may have used the enumerated-powers framework as a vehicle for articulat-
ing his substantive constitutional concerns about the Bank. The view that 
Congress should not incorporate a bank, or the more general view that Con-
gress should not charter corporations at all, is most naturally expressed as an 
external limit. (“No banks,” or “no corporations.”) But the text of the Consti-
tution offered Madison no foundation for relevant external-limit arguments, 
and Madison eventually discovered that he could try to work the problem 
from the other end. He didn’t persuade his audience: the majority of the 
House took the view that Congress had the power to incorporate a bank. But 
Madison did succeed in establishing a template, and a precedent, for arguing 
against legislation on enumerated-powers grounds.
The other major point I make in this Part, though, is that the central 
premise of Madison’s argument—that Congress was limited to a set of textu-
ally enumerated powers—was not a consensus view in 1791. It was a known 
position: some representatives argued within that framework. But others did 
not. Rather than being a premise that all sides took for granted as part of the 
new constitutional system, the idea that Congress could legislate only on the 
basis of a particular set of enumerated powers was, in the First Congress, a 
contested proposition. And in 1791, the people who most insisted on that 
proposition were the losers. 
A. Madison’s Enumerated-Powers Argument
1. From External Limits to Internal Limits
As explained in the previous Part, Madison and others gave a great deal 
of serious attention to the merits of the Bank proposal before anyone seri-
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ously pursued the thought that the Bank might raise an enumerated-powers 
problem. And it is not hard to see why, once we set aside our normal habit of 
approaching the Bank debate as an obvious enumerated-powers issue.
Madison wanted to impose some limits on Congress: no national bank, 
and no power to grant charters of incorporation. In a constitution, rules like 
those are external limits, straightforwardly expressed as affirmative prohibi-
tions.174 Conceptually, it would be awkward to think of rendering the consti-
tutional principle animating Madison as something like “A power to incor-
porate should not be understood as included in a power to tax, or a power to 
borrow money, or a power to regulate commerce, or a power to make uni-
form rules for naturalization and bankruptcy . . .” and so on for the balance 
of the 1787 Constitution’s twenty-nine clauses specifying congressional 
powers. The idea is much better captured by a direct statement of what Con-
gress may not do, in the manner of the prohibition of the taxation of ex-
ports175 or the adoption of bills of attainder.176 But unlike the prohibitions on 
the taxation of exports and the adoption of bills of attainder, the prohibition 
Madison wanted did not appear in the text of the Constitution. So for a 
while, Madison—like everyone else—did not think to argue that the Consti-
tution’s text disabled Congress from incorporating the Bank.
What happens, though, when a strongly held intuition about a substan-
tively constitutional subject is not straightforwardly embodied in any for-
mally enacted constitutional text? Sometimes people conclude that the intui-
tion in question just isn’t a constitutional proposition. Not surprisingly, 
some people who disliked the idea of a national bank took this view with re-
gard to Hamilton’s bill: one might have all manner of reservations, but it was 
the case for better or worse that Congress had the authority to incorporate 
the Bank.177 But there is also another possibility. When a strongly held intui-
tion on a substantively constitutional subject appears to lack traction in the 
Constitution’s text at Time 1, that intuition sometimes gets articulated 
through some unexpected constitutional text at Time 2, sometimes more 
and sometimes less awkwardly.178 Depending on their intuitions about what 
the text of the Constitution “really” says, different readers here might think 
of the proposition that legislative districting schemes are justiciable under 
the Equal Protection Clause179 or the doctrine that the Fifth Amendment 
174. See supra Section I.A.
175. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
176. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
177. Maclay is a good example. See supra Section II.C.
178. See Richard Primus, Debate, The Constitutional Constant, 102 Cornell L. Rev.
1691, 1692–95 (2017); Primus, supra note 112, at 1098 n.45.
179. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that a question previously consid-
ered as arising under the Guaranty Clause and as nonjusticiable could be cognizable and justi-
ciable under the Equal Protection Clause); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1945), abrogation 
recognized by Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).
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imposes the strictures of equal protection on the federal government.180 The 
fact that the text isn’t understood to house a particular commitment at one 
moment does not mean that some part of the text cannot be reunderstood to 
house the same concern later on.
In 1791, the Constitution articulated no external limit about banks or 
corporations. No clause straightforwardly prohibited Congress from doing 
what Madison thought Congress ought not to do. So naturally enough, Mad-
ison did not initially think in terms of opposing the Bank with an argument 
based on the Constitution’s text. But before he was done, Madison found a 
way to present his argument as grounded in the written Constitution: he 
rearticulated what was in substance a theory of why Congress affirmatively 
should not do certain things in terms of the gaps left by the Constitution’s 
specifications of what Congress was affirmatively authorized to do. He 
would use a theory of internal limits to do the work that could have been 
done most straightforwardly, but had not been done, by the adoption of ex-
ternal ones. The move was not obvious, and it took him a while to get there. 
But Madison was an uncommonly creative constitutional thinker. He got 
there before time ran out. 
2. The Reading
Madison first made his enumerated-powers argument at the very last 
stage of the Bank bill’s legislative process. In 1791, as today, a bill pending 
before the House of Representatives was read three times before it could be 
the subject of a final vote.181 It was standard practice in 1791 for members of 
the House to raise objections to bills, or otherwise enter into substantive dis-
cussion, at the time of any of the three readings.182 But Madison raised no 
objection to the Bank bill until its third reading.183 Indeed, by the time Madi-
son made his first speech against the Bank on February 2, the legislative pro-
180. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); see also Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone,
104 Colum. L. Rev. 975, 982–89 (2004) (describing the judicial transition from insisting that 
the federal government faced no equal-protection requirement to holding that the Fifth 
Amendment, as applicable against the federal government, incorporates the substance of equal 
protection doctrine).
181. See 1 Annals of Cong. 105 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (describing the rules of 
proceeding on bills); see also Karen L. Haas, Rules of the House of Representatives: One 
Hundred Fifteenth Congress Rule XVI, cl. 8, at 30 (2017).
182. See, e.g., 1 Annals of Cong. 891, 895–98 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (debating, 
on second reading, the bill to establish the seat of government); id. at 894, 899–903 (debating, 
on second reading, a bill setting the salaries of federal judges); 3 Annals of Cong. 300 (1791) 
(debating, on second reading, a bill to extend the time for settling the accounts of the United 
States with individual states); id. at 415–416 (1792) (debating, on second reading, a bill to ap-
portion representatives among the states); see also 1 Annals of Cong. 101 (1789) (Joseph 
Gales ed., 1834) (stating, as a rule of procedure, that opposition could be raised at the first 
reading of a bill).
183. 2 Annals of Cong. 1886 (1791).
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cess had officially moved from considering the bill in the Committee of the 
Whole to considering it before the House itself—the final stage before pas-
sage.184 Only then, for the first time, did Madison argue that Congress lacked 
the authority to incorporate a bank.185
184. Id. at 1891–93.
185. Madison may not have been the first Member of the House to raise an enumerated-
powers objection to the bill. One day before Madison spoke, Jackson argued on the floor of the 
House that the Bank bill was unconstitutional because it called for the creation of “a monopo-
ly . . . [that] contravenes the spirit of the Constitution; a monopoly of a very extraordinary na-
ture; a monopoly of the public moneys for the benefit of the corporation to be created.” Id. at 
1891. On its face, an argument about an unconstitutional monopoly seems like an external-
limit argument. But it seems plausible that Jackson also raised an internal-limits argument. 
According to the Annals, Jackson also “read several passages from the Federalist, which he said 
were directly contrary to the assumption of the power proposed by the bill.” Id. The Annals for 
February 1 do not indicate what passages Jackson read from The Federalist, and, given the in-
numerable constitutional arguments one can support from those eighty-five essays, it would 
not be possible, in the absence of other evidence, to make responsible guesses about what Jack-
son was getting at by adducing The Federalist. But on February 4, in a portion of a speech iden-
tified as a reply to Jackson, Elias Boudinot read aloud from Federalist 44’s treatment of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. at 1926. If Boudinot’s remarks accurately tracked Jackson’s 
speech of February 1, then Jackson on February 1 may have offered an internal-limits argu-
ment against the Bank. There are uncertain inferences in this chain of reasoning, of course. 
Even if Boudinot was responding to an argument based on the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
that argument would only have been an enumerated-powers argument if it took that clause to 
give Congress the power to make laws necessary and proper to execute enumerated powers, 
rather than the power to make laws necessary and proper for executing nonenumerated pow-
ers vested in the federal government. See John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 
Geo. L.J. 1045, 1050 (2014) (explaining that the clause is best read to refer to unenumerated 
powers as well as enumerated ones). Maybe Boudinot’s remarks did not accurately track Jack-
son’s speech of February 1, either because Boudinot did not remember quite what Jackson had 
argued three days earlier or, perhaps, because Boudinot was in fact responding not to Jackson’s 
remarks of February 1 but to a speech that Jackson made on February 4, immediately before 
Boudinot’s rebuttal reading of Federalist 44. 2 Annals of Cong. 1916–19 (1791). (The Annals
do not record Jackson’s relying on Federalist 44 in his February 4 speech, but as always one 
must remember that the Annals were not a verbatim transcript. Whether it is more likely that 
the Annals failed to record part of Jackson’s remarks on February 4 or that Boudinot meant to 
respond not to the speech that immediately preceded his own but rather to a speech made by 
that same speaker three days earlier is a question on which readers will need to make their own 
reasonable guesses.)
Madison made his first constitutional argument against the Bank on February 2, the day 
after Jackson’s first constitutional objection. Assuming that Jackson did make an internal-
limits argument on February 1, the relationship if any between his having made that argument 
and Madison’s development of his own argument is, again, a matter on which we can only 
speculate. One possibility is that the two men came independently to the enumerated-powers 
argument—and that both of them did so only with time running out. Another possibility is 
that Jackson had picked up the gist of Madison’s planned argument and beat him to it by a day 
in the House’s official proceedings. Madison seems to have determined to oppose the Bank on 
enumerated-powers grounds no later than January 30, because on that day Sedgwick wrote in a 
letter that Madison was likely to come forward with such an objection. Letter from Theodore 
Sedgwick to Peter Van Schaack (Jan. 30, 1791), supra note 165, at 609. Sedgwick and Madison 
were not close in January 1791, so Sedgwick is more likely to have learned of Madison’s inten-
tion second- or third-hand than from Madison directly. See supra note 169 and accompanying 
text. If so, it seems likely that word of Madison’s plan was getting around the House member-
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Madison’s first long speech in opposition to the bill began by objecting 
to the Bank on grounds having no apparent connection to the Constitu-
tion.186 After all, his preparations for the previous several weeks had involved 
the history and business of banking, not the nature of Congress’s constitu-
tional powers. Then, after making his arguments about the dangers of na-
tional banking, Madison turned to the constitutional argument for which the 
debate is famous.187 A law incorporating the Bank, Madison urged, would be 
invalid because it was authorized by no power or set of powers that the Con-
stitution enumerated as belonging to Congress. Six days later, Madison 
spoke again, repeating parts of his argument and in some respects develop-
ing his points further.188
Considered schematically, Madison’s enumerated-powers argument 
went like this: it is a fundamental principle that the Constitution confers on 
Congress not general legislative power but only particular powers. Varying 
his formula slightly as he went—or perhaps the variations are merely the re-
sult of the Annals’ nonstenographic reporting—Madison called that proposi-
tion “the very characteristic of the Government,” “[t]he essential characteris-
tic of the Government,” and “the main characteristic of the Constitution.”189
Next, and now endorsing the Federalist 84 argument from which he had kept 
his distance during most of the ratification process, Madison argued that the 
justification for the Convention’s having omitted a Bill of Rights rested on 
the understanding that the powers of Congress were specified and “not to be 
extended by remote implications.”190 Any construction of Congress’s powers 
that would in effect give Congress plenary legislative jurisdiction was accord-
ingly inadmissible.191 A power to grant charters of incorporation was not 
among the enumerated powers of Congress. Indeed, offering his personal 
testimony on the matter, Madison told his fellow representatives—half a 
dozen of whom had also attended the Philadelphia Convention—that the 
Convention had rejected a proposal to enumerate a congressional power to 
ship in the last two or three days of January. Jackson’s correspondence with Butler indicates 
that Jackson was in the business of collecting arguments against the Bank; perhaps he collected 
this one as well. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. But again, it is also possible, based 
on the available evidence, that the two men reasoned independently—or even, perhaps, that 
Jackson hit first upon the idea and Madison picked it up from him. Once again, readers may 
have different intuitions as to the plausibility of these different scenarios. And regardless of 
which of these scenarios is closest to the truth, it remains the case that no enumerated-powers 
objection to the Bank was offered until the Bank’s opponents found themselves in their last 
ditch.
186. 2 Annals of Cong. 1894–96.
187. Id. at 1896–1902.
188. Id. at 1956–59.
189. Id. at 1896, 1898, 1902.
190. Id. at 1901.
191. Id. at 1896.
December 2018] Enumerated Powers and the Bank of the United States 459
grant charters of incorporation.192 And no congressional power enumerated 
in the Constitution authorized Congress to incorporate the Bank.193
At different times in his two speeches, Madison addressed specific con-
stitutional clauses that might be thought to confer a power to incorporate the 
Bank and explained why, in his view, none of them did. The first clause of 
Article I, Section 8 would not do the trick because its language describing the 
power to provide for the “general welfare of the United States” merely de-
scribed the purposes for which Congress could exercise its power to tax, and 
the Bank bill was not a law imposing taxes.194 The second clause of Section 8 
could not authorize the Bank bill as a bill to borrow money, because the bill 
would borrow no money.195 The third clause—the Commerce Clause—
would not suffice because the bill did not regulate trade.196 Nor, in Madison’s 
view, was the Bank bill authorized as a rule “respecting . . . Property belong-
ing to the United States” under Article IV, Section 3.197 That Clause, Madi-
son argued, referred only to the process of disposing of the property the gov-
ernment held at the end of the war for independence and did not reach 
issues of general government finance.198
The only other potentially relevant clause, Madison submitted, was the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.199 Madison asserted three important principles 
for interpreting that Clause. First, any argument that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause justified an exercise of congressional legislation would have to 
show why the legislation at issue was necessary and proper for the execution 
of some other specifically enumerated congressional power. A more general 
claim that a law was necessary and proper for advancing the purposes of the 
government or the Union was inadmissible.200 Second, the Necessary and 
192. Id. He did not mention that he had voted in favor of enumerating such a power at 
the Convention. See 2 Records, supra note 18, at 615–16.
193. 2 Annals of Cong. 1896–1901 (1791).
194. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; 2 Annals of Cong. 1897 (1791).
195. 2 Annals of Cong. 1897 (1791).
196. Id. at 1957.
197. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
198. 2 Annals of Cong. 1958 (1791).
199. Id. at 1896, 1898.
200. Id. at 1900. Madison’s view that the Necessary and Proper Clause must be used in 
conjunction with some other enumerated power is conventional today, but it is probably not 
justified on a close reading of the constitutional text. Strictly speaking, what we call the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause has three separate clauses, only the first of which ties the power granted 
to Congress’s enumerated powers. The other two clauses give Congress the power to make all 
laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution “all other Powers vested by this Consti-
tution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. If the Constitution vests certain powers in the government of the 
United States inherently or implicitly rather than by enumeration, as some Members of the 
First Congress thought, see infra Sections III.C.2, III.C.3, then these words give Congress the 
power to make laws for carrying those nonenumerated powers into execution. And as John 
Mikhail has pointed out, it is very hard to give content to that language without positing that 
the text recognizes the existence of powers not given by enumeration. After all, it is hard to 
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Proper Clause did not give Congress more power than Congress would have 
had in the absence of that Clause. Instead, the Clause merely confirmed the 
commonsense proposition that Congress had the authority to do those 
things that might be necessary for executing those other powers.201 Last, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause must not be interpreted in a way that would in 
practice undermine the essential principle that Congress had only particular 
legislative powers.202 A construction of that Clause that would justify incor-
porating the Bank as necessary and proper to the execution of any of Con-
gress’s enumerated powers, Madison warned, would be so permissive that 
Congress would be able to justify any legislation at all, because any legisla-
tion could be connected to one of the enumerated powers if one were willing 
to indulge connections as attenuated as the one between the Bank and, say, 
collecting taxes or borrowing money.203
It was not his view, Madison noted, that Congress could do only what 
was specified in haec verba in the Constitution. Congress could also do
things that were in fact necessary for carrying out its specified powers.204 But 
the undoubted good sense of reading Section 8 to give Congress the means 
needed for executing its enumerated powers should not be used as a pretext, 
Madison warned, for letting Congress wield powers that would have been 
affirmatively specified if Congress were supposed to be able to exercise 
them.205 A power to grant corporate charters, Madison argued, would be a 
big deal, and the Constitution would not have left it to mere implication.206
B. The Enumerated-Power Responses
Several members of Congress believed that Madison’s understanding of 
Congress’s enumerated powers was unduly narrow. In their view, legislation 
incorporating the Bank was—or was necessary and proper for executing—
legislation pursuant to one or more enumerated powers of Congress: collect-
identify any enumerated power that the Constitution vests in “the Government of the United 
States” rather than in a “Department or Officer thereof.” Mikhail argues that such powers 
clearly exist: examples include the power of the government of the United States to hold prop-
erty and to sue in court. See generally Mikhail, supra note 185.
201. 2 Annals of Cong. 1898 (1791).
202. Id. at 1898–99.
203. Id. at 1899–1902. Madison knew, of course, that he was fighting a potential reading 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause that had seemed only too natural to many readers in 1787–
1788. During the ratification process, any number of the Constitution’s opponents had argued 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause would give Congress enormously expansive powers—
enough even to let the general government swallow the states completely. See, e.g., Brutus, To 
the People of the State of New York (Dec. 13, 1787), in 14 The Documentary History of 
the Ratification of the Constitution 422, 423 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1983).
204. 2 Annals of Cong. 1896, 1898 (1791).
205. Id. at 1899–1900.
206. Id. at 1899–1900, 1956.
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ing taxes,207 borrowing money,208 regulating commerce,209 supporting ar-
mies,210 regulating and disposing of its own property,211 and others as well.212
Several representatives also pushed back against Madison’s narrow construc-
tion of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Yes, some of them acknowledged, 
one could elect to take a stingy view of that clause. But what was the point of 
replacing the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution, they asked, if 
not to take a more generous attitude toward national legislative power?213
Moreover, several representatives argued, Congress had already established a 
clear practice of legislating as if the Necessary and Proper power were broad-
er than Madison allowed, or more generally as if the enumerated powers 
should be read as giving substantial permission for the exercise of powers 
inferred by implication. As Elias Boudinot of New Jersey put the point, most 
of what Congress had actually done in its first two years of business involved 
the exercise of powers only implicitly connected to, rather than expressly 
stated in, constitutional clauses specifying congressional powers.214 Or, in 
Sedgwick’s somewhat sharper formulation: if the Necessary and Proper 
Clause were as miserly as Madison claimed, pretty much everything Con-
gress had already done must be unconstitutional.215
Later that month, Hamilton’s memorandum to President Washington 
defending the constitutionality of the Bank bill took the same approach. It 
accepted Madison’s premise that Congress could incorporate a bank only if 
the enumerated powers authorized it to do so, and then it argued for broader 
readings of those powers than Madison had offered.216 So if one takes Madi-
son and Hamilton to define the opposite sides of the controversy, the ques-
tion of Congress’s power to incorporate the Bank looks like it conforms to 
the paradigm of enumerated-powers analysis that modern constitutional 
207. Id. at 1922 (statement of Rep. Boudinot).
208. Id. at 1892 (statement of Rep. Laurance); id. at 1909 (statement of Rep. Ames); id. at 
1948 (statement of Rep. Gerry).
209. Id. at 1909 (statement of Rep. Ames).
210. Id. at 1922 (statement of Rep. Boudinot).
211. Id. at 1908 (statement of Rep. Ames).
212. E.g., id. at 1922 (statement of Rep. Boudinot) (paying debts); id. at 1909 (statement 
of Rep. Ames) (power to govern the ten miles square and other places of exclusive congres-
sional jurisdiction).
213. Id. at 1909 (statement of Rep. Ames).
214. Id. at 1924–25.
215. Id. at 1911.
216. Alexander Hamilton, supra note 27, at 99–102, 119–20, 132. It is reasonable to won-
der whether Hamilton took this tack because he believed that Congress could only legislate 
based on specifically enumerated powers or because he calculated that an argument not disput-
ing Madison’s premise was more likely to sway Washington than a bolder argument would be. 
Given Hamilton’s general enthusiasm for central power, it might be counterintuitive for him to 
have held a more restrictive view of congressional authority than a large contingent of mem-
bers of Congress. And as this Part documents, many representatives took the view that Con-
gress could legislate even without specifically enumerated powers. But none of that proves 
whether Hamilton was in fact trimming; the matter remains one for speculation.
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lawyers know. Within that paradigm, disagreements about the extent of con-
gressional power are disagreements about how to read the Constitution’s af-
firmative grants of power to Congress. Everyone agrees that Congress enjoys 
less than general legislative jurisdiction, and everyone agrees that Congress 
can legislate only on the basis of its enumerated powers.
C. Beyond Enumerated Powers
If one looks more comprehensively, however, it becomes clear that the 
Bank debate did not conform to that paradigm. Several representatives who 
spoke in support of the Bank rejected the premise that Congress could legis-
late only on the basis of some express specification of its powers in the Con-
stitution. And even some representatives who did not reject that premise 
read the Constitution to give Congress the practical equivalent of general 
legislative power.
In what follows, I canvas the ideas of representatives who did not share 
Madison’s framework for assessing the scope of Congress’s legislative au-
thority. Roughly speaking, I begin with conceptions of congressional power 
that are relatively close to Madison’s framework and then work progressively 
toward ideas that are more and more unlike it. That progression begins with 
representatives who accepted the idea that Congress could do only what the 
Constitution affirmatively authorizes but rejected the related idea that the 
sum total of what the Constitution authorizes must be less than general legis-
lative authority. It then moves to representatives who rejected the idea that 
Congress could act only the basis of enumerated powers and then to repre-
sentatives who rejected even the idea that congressional legislation should in 
any way be thought of as less favored, or harder to justify, than state legisla-
tion. 
Two caveats are appropriate here. First, the representatives whose argu-
ments I discuss below—Boudinot and Sedgwick, along with William Smith 
(South Carolina), John Vining (Delaware), John Laurance (New York), and 
Elbridge Gerry and Fisher Ames (both Massachusetts)—were not necessarily 
better guides to the Constitution than Madison was. Like Madison’s views, 
the views of these representatives were contestable (and contested). Like 
Madison, these representatives had political and economic interests that in-
formed their constitutional visions—and, like Madison’s, their constitutional 
visions likely also reflected sincere intuitions about what was best for the 
American polity and about how the written Constitution should be read. So 
the point of noticing their various ways of rejecting Madison’s enumerated-
powers framework is not to suggest that their approaches reflected an objec-
tive meaning of the Constitution, from which Madison had strayed. It is to 
show that at the time of the First Congress, the enumeration principle was a 
contested proposition among well-informed participants in the constitution-
al discourse. Their views do not demonstrate that Madison was mistaken 
about the Constitution—and Madison’s views do not demonstrate that his 
opponents were mistaken about the Constitution either.
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Second, when I describe representatives as having rejected the premise 
that Congress could legislate only on the basis of enumerated powers, I am 
not saying that these representatives never made enumerated-power argu-
ments in favor of the Bank. On the contrary, some took a both-and position. 
On that view, Congress had the authority to incorporate a bank irrespective 
of its enumerated powers, and Congress also had enumerated powers suffi-
cient for incorporating a bank.217 To argue that Congress has an enumerated 
power authorizing it to incorporate a bank is, of course, in no way to con-
cede that Congress could incorporate a bank only if some enumerated power 
authorized it to do so—especially if the person making the argument has 
made clear that he thinks Congress can exercise powers on bases other than 
textual enumeration. For present purposes, what is important is that several 
Members of the First Congress believed that enumerated powers were not 
necessary conditions for the exercise of congressional authority. 
1. The Preamble as a Grant of Powers
According to some representatives who agreed with Madison that Con-
gress could only do those things the Constitution affirmatively specified, 
Madison’s argument against the Bank indefensibly ignored the Constitu-
tion’s greatest affirmative specification of powers: the Preamble.218 Modern 
lawyers do not generally regard the Preamble as having distinctive legal 
force, and Madison denied that the Preamble conferred powers on Con-
gress.219 But others disagreed. Boudinot, for example, read the list of consti-
tutional purposes specified in the Preamble as an enumeration of the pur-
poses for which Congress could legislate. In his view, a law aimed at further 
perfecting the Union, establishing justice, ensuring domestic tranquility, 
providing for the common defense, promoting the general welfare, or secur-
ing the blessings of liberty qualified as a law expressly authorized by the 
Constitution.220 Laurance similarly spoke of “The great objects of this Gov-
ernment . . . contained in the context [that is, the Preamble221] of the Consti-
217. For example, Ames argued that the power to create a bank was inherent in Con-
gress, 2 Annals of Cong. 1905–06 (1791), and he also argued that Congress could create a 
bank on the basis of its enumerated power to make needful rules for the property of the United 
States, id. at 1908–09, or its enumerated powers to borrow money and regulate trade, id. at 
1909.
218. Id. at 1921 (statement of Rep. Boudinot).
219. Id. at 1957.
220. See id. at 1921.
221. The inference that Laurance used the word “context” to refer to the Preamble is 
worth unpacking. The Annals of Congress, which as noted earlier are not a verbatim transcript, 
record him as follows: “The great objects of this Government are contained in the context of 
the Constitution. He recapitulated these objects, and inferred that every power necessary to 
secure these must necessarily follow . . . .” Id. at 1914–15. It seems more than plausible that 
Laurance’s “recapitulation” of the Constitution’s objects was a reading of the purposes stated in 
the Preamble, and if so, the Preamble is what Laurance (or the editor of the Annals) meant by 
the Constitution’s “context.” Note, however, that if Laurance did not mean to refer to the Pre-
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tution” and argued that the federal government’s power relative to those ob-
jects was “as full and complete in all its parts as any system that could be de-
vised.”222
The idea that the Preamble vests power in the federal government is 
formally compatible with the idea that Congress is limited to a set of affirma-
tively specified powers. But it is not hard to see that reading the Preamble’s 
list of purposes as a list of purposes for which Congress can legislate would 
make Congress, in practice, a legislature of general jurisdiction.223 It is diffi-
cult to think of a law that Congress might want to pass which could not rea-
sonably be classified as a law aimed at promoting one or more of the purpos-
es specified in the Preamble. More than one representative responding to 
Boudinot made this point plainly.224 But there is no indication that Boudinot 
was bothered by that implication. The Constitution had been established for 
those purposes, and in his view, Congress could legislate to pursue them. 
2. Inherent Authority Checked by External Limits
In a different vein, some representatives rejected the enumerated-
powers paradigm altogether and denied that exercises of congressional au-
thority needed to be grounded in specific textual warrants within the new 
Constitution. John Vining of Delaware, for example, made the simple argu-
ment that the United States, on becoming an independent nation, assumed 
all the powers that independent nations could exercise, including the power 
to incorporate a bank.225 That was it—no fretting about powers enumerated 
in this or that bit of constitutional text. Congress was the legislature of an in-
dependent country, and as such it could do things, this thing included.
amble, he was endorsing the yet more government-friendly proposition that the Constitution 
had purposes, and the government had power to pursue those purposes, without reference to 
any text in the Constitution—not even the Preamble. On that understanding, talk of the Con-
stitution and its objects might have been historical rather than textual: perhaps Laurance was 
recapitulating the story of the conditions that had made the Constitution necessary and the 
Framers’ determination to create a government sufficient for solving the problem. This strong-
er reading might or might not be supported by the fact that the next paragraph of Laurance’s 
remarks, as given in the Annals, is a capsule summary of those historical events. Id. at 1915.
222. Id. at 1914–15.
223. In terms I have developed elsewhere, a reading of the Constitution on which Con-
gress could act only on the basis of its enumerated powers, and on which the Preamble stated 
enumerated powers, such that Congress would in fact have an enumerated power sufficient for 
authorizing any legislation, would be a reading that respected the enumeration principle but 
rejected the internal-limits canon. See Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 12, at 
593–94. Or, put in other words, it would contemplate a federal legislature of enumerated pow-
ers, but not a federal legislature limited by its enumerated powers.
224. 2 Annals of Cong. 1939 (1791) (statement of Rep. Giles); id. at 1931 (statement of 
Rep. Stone) (asking rhetorically whether there is “any power under Heaven which could not be 
exercised within the extensive limits of this preamble?”).
225. Id. at 1955.
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Fisher Ames of Massachusetts also took the view that the government of 
the United States had inherent powers, independent of the Constitution’s 
text, simply by virtue of its being the government of the United States. In 
support of this position, Ames noted that corporations have certain inherent 
powers simply by virtue of being corporations, and he then argued that 
“Government is itself the highest kind of corporation.”226 It followed, he said, 
that “from the instant of [the government’s] formation, it has tacitly annexed 
to its being, various powers . . . essential to its effecting the purposes for 
which it was framed.”227 Congress could obviously lend money, and buy 
back its own debt on the market, and ransom American sailors held captive 
by the Barbary States, even though no such powers were expressly given.228
What’s more, in Ames’s view the inherent powers of Congress were not con-
fined to minor matters. They could be powers of the highest importance. If 
the Constitution had not enumerated a congressional power to raise armies, 
Ames reasoned, Congress would still obviously have that power, because na-
tional governments raise armies, and because the purposes of the Constitu-
tion require armies to be raised.229
Ames did not take the view that Congress had the authority to do any-
thing it wanted. Like everyone else in the debate, he believed that Congress 
needed to operate within constitutional limits.230 But he thought it fallacious 
to imagine that those limits would come from an enumeration of congres-
sional powers. A full enumeration of things the government could do, Ames 
declared, would be impossible.231 The better way to think about limiting 
Congress was to think in terms of particular things it was forbidden to do.232
If the power to make a law were expressly denied to Congress in the Consti-
tution, Ames explained, then such a law would be invalid. The same would 
be true if a law violated natural rights, or if making a law required exercising 
a power that only the states could exercise.233 But so long as Congress did not 
transgress those limits, it could make whatever laws were necessary for pur-
suing the purposes for which the Constitution was adopted. In short, Ames 
thought that Congress should be understood to be limited by external consti-
tutional limits, not internal ones. As such, he was disagreeing sharply with 
Madison’s insistence that the Constitution limited Congress to a set of enu-
merated powers. 




230. Id. at 1906–07.
231. Id. at 1905–06.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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3. Collective Action
Vining and William Smith of South Carolina both argued that Congress 
must have the power to create the Bank because no state acting alone could 
establish such an institution.234 Their remarks highlighted two different rea-
sons why the states alone could not answer the purpose. Vining thought that 
no state bank could create a currency that would circulate throughout all 
parts of the union, because its legal warrant would stop at the state line.235
Smith seems to have had in mind that no state acting alone could confer on a 
bank the privileges that the Bank of the United States would enjoy, meaning 
especially the exclusive privilege of doing financial business with and for the 
United States Government.236 On either rationale, these representatives be-
lieved that the states’ inability to establish a national bank established Con-
gress’s authority to act. And on either rationale, no part of Vining’s or 
Smith’s argument relied on any constitutional provision affirmatively speci-
fying a congressional power.237
4. No Difference in Defaults
Measured by the official conventions of twenty-first-century constitu-
tional discourse, all of the foregoing arguments for recognizing congression-
al powers beyond those enumerated in the Constitution’s text are radically 
nationalistic. But in the Bank debate, several representatives offered argu-
ments that were yet more solicitous of national legislative power. In particu-
lar, several arguments rejected the idea that the federal and state govern-
234. Id. at 1955 (statement of Rep. Vining); id. at 1929 (statement of Rep. Smith).
235. Id. at 1955.
236. Id. at 1929.
237. Readers who assume that all members of Congress would have agreed that Congress 
could act only on the basis of enumerated powers might misread Smith as endorsing that 
proposition in a different set of remarks that Smith made during the debate. Responding later 
to the charge that his views would empower Congress to do “whatever the Legislature thought 
expedient,” Smith explained that he believed nothing of the kind. Id. at 1937. Congress could 
not, for example, pass a law “prohibited by any part of the Constitution” or one that would be 
“a violation of the rights of any State or individual.” Id. But if those external limits were not 
transgressed, Congress could make laws “necessary and proper to carry into operation certain 
essential powers of the Government.” Id. It would then fall to the courts, Smith continued, to 
annul a law that the judge “deemed not to result by fair construction from the powers vested by 
the Constitution.” Id. at 1937. Modern readers accustomed to assuming that “the powers vest-
ed by the Constitution” means powers enumerated in the text of the Constitution might take 
these remarks to show that Smith actually did subscribe to the enumeration principle. But that 
reading of Smith follows only if one assumes the thing to be proved: that the Constitution vests 
powers only through the mechanism of enumeration. If the Constitution also vests other, non-
enumerated powers in the federal government, then Smith’s remarks do not imply an en-
dorsement of the enumeration principle. (The necessary and proper power is itself enumerat-
ed, of course, but invoking that power as a warrant to make laws in aid of the execution of a 
nonenumerated power is a rejection of the enumeration principle as usually understood. Cf.
Mikhail, supra note 185.)
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ments face different default positions for justifying legislation—that is, that 
state governments may act for any reason not prohibited, but that the federal 
government may act only when some affirmative reason warrants federal ac-
tion.238 In modern constitutional law, this idea about different default posi-
tions is orthodox. But in 1791, several members of Congress exhibited no 
sense that federal legislation must be justified against a standard any more 
demanding than the one applicable to state legislation.
The various arguments described so far for congressional authority be-
yond the enumerated powers might still in principle be compatible with the 
idea of different default positions for state and federal legislation. Consider 
the idea that the general government has the power to do things that no state 
could do alone. That view would justify many congressional actions that 
would not be justified if Congress could only act on the basis of its enumer-
ated powers. But it could still be the case that in order to legislate, Congress 
would have to make an affirmative showing of a sort that state legislatures 
were not required to make (i.e., that someone else couldn’t get the job done). 
Similarly, the idea that the federal government has certain inherent powers 
as the legislature of an independent nation or as a corporation could be 
compatible with the different-defaults approach. No, the thinking would 
run, Congress isn’t restricted to the list of enumerated powers. But it is still 
the case that for Congress to be able to do something, there must be an af-
firmative reason justifying congressional action. The inherent-powers ap-
proach might merely add a set of unenumerated subject headings—the spe-
cific powers inherent in national legislatures, or in the corporate form—to
the list of acceptable affirmative reasons.
In the Bank debate, however, some representatives not only rejected the 
idea that the federal government needed specific textual warrants in order to 
act but also showed no sense that federal legislation requires some special 
kind of justification that state legislation does not. On the contrary, they 
seem to have assumed that the principles determining what legislative pow-
ers the federal government could exercise were the same as those applicable 
to states. Sedgwick, for example, argued that Congress had implicit powers 
by pointing out that the state legislatures have such implicit powers.239 A
lawyer whose thinking is shaped by later orthodoxy would know never to 
make such an argument: to the modern lawyer, the fact that state legislatures 
are not limited to enumerated powers has no bearing on what Congress can 
do. But in 1791, Sedgwick—a delegate at the Massachusetts ratifying conven-
tion, a Member of the First Congress, and later both Speaker of the House 
238. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 848 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, & Scalia, JJ.) (“The Federal Government and 
the States thus face different default rules: Where the Constitution is silent about the exercise 
of a particular power—that is, where the Constitution does not speak either expressly or by 
necessary implication—the Federal Government lacks that power and the States enjoy it.”).
239. 2 Annals of Cong. 1910 (1791).
468 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:415
and President Pro Tempore of the Senate240—was willing to assert that if 
state legislatures could exercise nonenumerated powers, Congress must be 
able to do so as well.
The analogous idea that federal legislation is supposed to be exceptional 
or disfavored—also familiar in modern constitutional law241—was similarly 
rejected. Ames, for example, argued explicitly against putting a thumb on the 
scale against federal legislation, contending that denying Congress a power 
that Congress should have would be just as bad as letting Congress exercise a 
power that Congress should not have.242 Or consider Gerry, who at the Con-
stitutional Convention had been famously skeptical of extensive national 
power.243 Responding to opponents of the Bank who asked where the outer
limit of congressional power could be drawn if the Bank were deemed legit-
imate, Gerry asked where the line marking the minimum that Congress was 
clearly authorized to do could be drawn if the power to create the Bank were 
denied.244 Gerry’s argument here, like that of Ames, seems at odds with the 
presumption that the Constitution regards federal legislation as generally 
disfavored. That presumption would seem to argue for erring on the side of 
less congressional power.
Consider also Boudinot, who took a view almost directly opposite the 
idea that the Constitution would not leave important congressional powers 
to mere implication. Some people, Boudinot said, seemed to be of the view 
that incorporating a national bank would involve the exercise of a particular-
ly important power.245 He disagreed: in Boudinot’s view, the power to grant 
charters of incorporation was, within the world of governmental powers, 
nothing special. But if he were wrong and the power at issue were in fact of 
great significance, Boudinot continued, that would only strengthen the case 
for letting Congress exercise it. After all, Boudinot reasoned, who better than 
the nation’s legislative body to exercise a hugely significant power?246
The point here is not that Boudinot’s celebratory posture toward nation-
al legislative authority correctly stated the meaning of the Constitution, ei-
ther in 1791 or today. Nor is the point that Boudinot’s arguments and those 
240. Sedgwick, Theodore, U.S. House of Representatives: Hist., Art & Archives,
http://history.house.gov/People/Detail/21411 [https://perma.cc/9K6X-GDFL].
241. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law 52 
(1961).
242. 2 Annals of Cong. 1905 (1791).
243. Gerry was one of three delegates present at the end of the Constitutional Conven-
tion who declined to sign the finished product. His objections chiefly sounded in the Constitu-
tion’s giving too much power to Congress. See 2 Records, supra note 18, at 631–33, 648–49.
244. 2 Annals of Cong. 1950 (1791).
245. Id. at 1925–26. In the Annals of Congress, Boudinot is recorded as having used the 
term “high act of power.” Id. But the Annals are not verbatim transcripts—they were compiled 
by shorthand notetakers—so we should not be too confident about the particular choice of 
words he used.
246. Id.
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of the other representatives described here were superior to those of others 
who argued within the enumerated-powers paradigm. The point, rather, is 
that all of these ideas were thinkable, and publicly articulable, by well-
informed participants in the constitutional system in the very first years after 
ratification. Over and over, they argued about the powers of Congress in 
ways incompatible with the orthodox proposition that Congress may act on-
ly on the basis of textually enumerated powers. They may not even have sub-
scribed to the more general sense of federal legislation as exceptional and 
presumptively disfavored that helps make the orthodox proposition about 
enumerated powers seem rational. 
D. The Shadow of Removal
All of the foregoing evidence still understates the degree to which the 
Members of the First Congress did not subscribe to modern orthodoxies 
about enumerated congressional powers. To see more clearly how far they 
were from sharing a set of views that modern constitutional lawyers general-
ly believe were fundamental from ratification forward, it is necessary to look 
beyond the Bank debate itself. In particular, it is helpful to look at a relation-
ship between the Bank debate, which occurred at the end of the First Con-
gress, and a great constitutional debate that occurred at the beginning of that 
Congress: the debate over the president’s power to remove Senate-confirmed 
executive officers. 
Modern constitutional lawyers remember both the Bank debate and the 
removal debate. But usually we do not connect the two, perhaps because one 
sounds in federalism and the other in the separation of powers. During the 
Bank debate, though, many representatives thought that the removal debate 
furnished an important bit of background. And nobody really contested the 
point. 
1. A Legislative Precedent
In May and June of 1789, while considering the legislation that would 
establish the first cabinet departments, the House of Representatives con-
fronted a disagreement about whether the president would have the power 
to dismiss the heads of those departments on his own unilateral authority.247
Some representatives thought the president would need the concurrence of 
the Senate in order to dismiss officers.248 Others maintained that senatorially 
confirmed officers could be removed only through impeachment and con-
viction.249 After considerable debate, the House adopted the view that the 
president had the power to remove such officers unilaterally.250
247. See 1 Annals of Cong. 370–83, 455–585 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
248. See, e.g., id. at 371–73.
249. See, e.g., id. at 373–74.
250. Id. at 383.
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The representatives who argued for the majority position offered a range 
of arguments, most of which modern constitutional theory would call “struc-
tural.” Structural reasoning, in a nutshell, is reasoning that proceeds from 
the nature of the offices and institutions of the constitutional system, and the 
relationships among them, rather than from judicial doctrine, enacted text, 
original meanings, or other potential sources of constitutional authority.251
In the removal debate, the leading structural argument was that staffing the 
offices of the federal government is, in its nature, an executive function, so it 
belongs to the executive branch.252 As a prima facie matter, both appoint-
ment and removal should be up to the president. Given that the Constitu-
tion’s text expressly qualified the president’s appointment power by adding 
the requirement of Senate confirmation,253 the prima facie arrangement was 
modified, and the president could not exercise the appointment power uni-
laterally. But no textual specification qualified the removal power. So, the ar-
gument went, the president should be understood to enjoy the unilateral 
power to remove federal officers.254
Other representatives were unpersuaded. Some doubted that the ap-
pointment power was by nature executive,255 or even that it made sense to 
think in terms of powers being “naturally” executive at all.256 More to the 
point for present purposes, several representatives raised enumerated-
powers objections. Federal authorities, they contended, could exercise no 
powers other than those affirmatively enumerated in the Constitution. 257
The president could appoint officers, subject to Senate confirmation, not for 
general structural reasons but because the Constitution expressly authorized 
him to do so. But nowhere did the Constitution give the president a power to 
remove officers. It followed, the argument ran, that the president had no 
power to remove officers.258
After extensive debate, the argument from enumerated powers failed to 
persuade the House: the majority adopted the view that the president could 
unilaterally remove confirmed officers.259 So in the Bank debate less than 
two years later, proponents of the Bank cited the removal debate to rebut the 
argument that Congress could only legislate on the basis of specifically enu-
251. See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and Relationship in Constitu-
tional Law (photo. reprt. 1985) (1969).
252. See, e.g., 1 Annals of Cong. 463–64 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of 
Rep. Madison).
253. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
254. See, e.g., 1 Annals of Cong. 463–64 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of 
Rep. Madison).
255. See, e.g., id. at 471 (statement of Rep. Smith); id. at 472 (statement of Rep. Gerry).
256. See, e.g., id. at 567 (statement of Rep. Stone) (“My conception may be dull; but tell-
ing me that this is an Executive power, raises no complete idea in my mind.”).
257. See, e.g., id. at 466–67.
258. See, e.g., id.
259. Id. at 383.
December 2018] Enumerated Powers and the Bank of the United States 471
merated powers.260 If it was appropriate in 1789 to recognize a power not 
specified by any constitutional clause, they reasoned, why couldn’t they do 
the same in 1791? Surely the removal debate reflected the House’s prior 
judgment that federal decisionmakers had such powers as were fairly in-
ferred from the existence and structure of the government, whether or not 
those powers arose from specific power-granting clauses of the written Con-
stitution. 
Modern constitutional lawyers can easily find ways to distinguish these 
two debates, such that the House’s decision to recognize a unilateral presi-
dential removal power would not undermine the idea that Congress could 
only legislate on the basis of specifically enumerated powers. Most obviously, 
one could distinguish between Congress and the president, arguing that the 
enumerated-powers principle applies to the former but not the latter. That 
distinction overlaps with, but is not reducible to, a second distinction based 
on a difference between the Vesting Clauses of Articles I and II. Article I 
does not speak of vesting a general legislative power in Congress,261 but Arti-
cle II does purport to vest “the executive power” in the president.262 So per-
haps the president’s executive power is general, rather than being composed 
of separately delegated executive powers, taken one by one. Or, in a different 
formulation, perhaps the Vesting Clause of Article II counts as the enumera-
tion of a power encompassing all executive power, such that the president 
isn’t exempt from the enumeration principle but is within his enumerated 
powers whenever he undertakes executive action. As a third option, one 
could argue that the enumeration principle is about federalism and the re-
moval question is about the separation of powers. The crux of this third dis-
tinction would be that the federal government is confined to affirmatively 
enumerated powers when legislating in ways that compete with or override 
state governments, but questions about the interactions among the federal 
branches, or the internal organization of the federal government, do not 
raise the concern that grounds the enumeration principle in the first place.263
260. See, e.g., 2 Annals of Cong. 1910 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick); id. at 1925 
(statement of Rep. Boudinot); id. at 1929 (statement of Rep. Smith); id. at 1955 (statement of 
Rep. Vining).
261. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States of America.”).
262. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1 (“The executive power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States.”).
263. This is a proposition about the way that modern lawyers generally understand the 
function of the Constitution’s enumeration of congressional powers, not a proposition about 
why the Constitutional Convention enumerated the powers of Congress as it did. As a histori-
cal matter, most of the text of Article I, Section 8 seems to have been written with an eye on the 
separation of powers between Congress and the president, not the division of authority be-
tween the federal government and the states. See 1 William Winslow Crosskey, Politics 
and the Constitution: In the History of the United States 412–29 (1953); Michael W. 
McConnell, The President Who Would Not Be King (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
the Michigan Law Review); Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests Executive Power, Not the 
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These distinctions are intro-level stuff for the modern constitutional lawyer; 
in all likelihood, readers of this Article thought of all three without having to 
read this paragraph. 
But in the First Congress, nobody seems to have hit upon any of these 
solutions. Whatever the merits of the foregoing distinctions to a modern au-
dience, and no matter how obvious or intuitive they now seem, it appears 
that none of them occurred to any of the players in 1791. To be sure, one 
should be careful about any claim to prove a negative. The records of eight-
eenth-century congressional debates are not verbatim transcripts, and it is 
always possible that some argument was made and not properly recorded. 
But as far as the available documentation reveals, nobody opposing the Bank 
tried to rebut the other side’s use of the removal debate by saying, “That was 
about the separation of powers, and this is about federalism” or “That was 
the president and this is Congress.” 
On the contrary, more than one of the Bank’s prominent opponents 
conceded the parallel. Consider Maryland’s Michael Jenifer Stone. In the 
Bank debate, Stone argued vigorously against Ames, Smith, and others 
whose approach, he warned, would vest Congress with plenary power.264 In 
Stone’s view, the idea that Congress had implicit as well as express enumer-
ated powers would destroy a core constitutional principle.265 But he 
acknowledged that the House’s resolution of the removal issue two years ear-
lier reflected an acceptance of implicit powers as well as enumerated ones.266
Stone accordingly regarded the removal decision as mistaken: when speaking 
against the Bank, he reminded his colleagues that he had voted against rec-
ognizing a removal power in the president.267 That reminder helped Stone 
claim a consistent view as he argued against the Bank. But it did nothing to 
weaken the other side’s argument that insisting Congress could legislate only 
on the basis of enumerated powers was hard to square with what the House 
had already decided in a different full-dress constitutional debate. 
In much the same vein, consider Attorney General Randolph’s letter to 
Washington arguing against the constitutionality of the Bank bill.268 Like 
Madison, Randolph argued that Congress could act only on the basis of its 
enumerated powers.269 And like Stone, Randolph candidly acknowledged 
that this enumerated-powers approach was probably incompatible with rec-
ognizing a unilateral removal power in the president on the basis of general 
Royal Prerogative (Aug. 26, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Michigan Law 
Review).
264. 2 Annals of Cong. 1932 (1791).
265. Id. at 1931.
266. Id. at 1934.
267. Id.
268. Randolph’s Opinion, supra note 26.
269. Id. at 122–23.
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ideas about executive authority, as the House had done two years earlier.270
So it might be, Randolph concluded, that the House had erred on the remov-
al power.271
In other words, the Attorney General squarely faced the challenge that 
the removal debate posed for opponents of the Bank bill and did not distin-
guish the cases by reference to the distinction between federalism and the 
separation of powers, or the distinction between Congress and the president, 
or the different textual formulations of the Article I and Article II Vesting 
Clauses. Nor does it seem that anyone in the House offered those distinc-
tions. Instead, the Bank’s opponents accepted that the proposition that the 
federal government could act only on the basis of powers affirmatively enu-
merated in the Constitution applied across the board, such that it must stand 
or fall together across these contexts. 
In Randolph’s and Stone’s views, it did not follow that Congress could 
legislate without an enumerated power. In their opinion the removal deci-
sion either was,272 or perhaps was,273 a constitutional mistake. That conces-
sion seems like a pretty good indication that the friends of the Bank were 
making sense, by the lights of their contemporaries, in asserting that the re-
moval decision contradicted the idea that Congress could act only on the ba-
sis of powers enumerated in specific constitutional texts. To be sure, nothing 
in this analysis proves who was right in either the removal controversy or the 
Bank debate. But it does seem that the representatives who rejected the idea 
that Congress could legislate only on the basis of affirmatively enumerated 
powers were making, at the very least, a perfectly cogent and mainstream ar-
gument—indeed, one that aligned better with a salient aspect of the First 
Congress’s constitutional deliberations than the argument on the other side.
2. Madison’s Predicament
The charge that the removal debate demonstrated the House’s prior re-
jection of the idea that the federal government could exercise only enumer-
ated powers was a particular problem for Madison. After all, when the First 
Congress debated the removal power, Madison was a central player and a 
leading proponent—maybe the leading proponent—of the view that the 
president had the power to dismiss Senate-confirmed cabinet secretaries uni-
laterally.274 He had successfully held to that view in the face of objections 
from people who pointed out that the president had no enumerated power 
to remove officers. So in the Bank debate, when Madison was the one insist-
270. Id. at 129.
271. Id.
272. 2 Annals of Cong. 1934 (1791).
273. Randolph’s Opinion, supra note 26, at 129.
274. See 1 Annals of Cong. 371–75, 462–64, 495–501 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
Madison also seems to have experimented briefly with, but then clearly rejected, the view that 
Congress could decide whether the president should be able to exercise that power. See id. at 
461 (experimenting); id. at 547, 581 (rejecting).
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ing on enumerated powers, several representatives explicitly charged Madi-
son with changing his interpretive principles to suit the occasion.275 And 
Madison offered no defense of his apparently contradictory behavior. 
Madison offered two main arguments in the removal debate, both of 
them structural. First, he argued that the president must be accountable for 
the conduct of the cabinet officers, and only if he had the power to dismiss 
them could he be responsible for their actions.276 Later, Madison was the 
principal architect and articulator of the argument that the power to remove 
officers was by nature executive277 and therefore belonged to the person in 
whom executive power was vested.278 But Madison acknowledged that he 
could not rest his argument at that point, because the Constitution vested 
some powers that he and many others considered “executive” in deci-
sionmakers other than the president. The Senate’s power to confirm appoin-
tees was one example. In Madison’s view, that power was in its nature execu-
tive but was properly exercised by the Senate in light of the text of Article II, 
Section 2.279 But the only deviations from the general principle that executive 
powers were for the president, Madison maintained, were those affirmatively 
specified by the text. All executive power other than what the Constitution 
expressly vested elsewhere resided with the president.280 Given that the Con-
stitution was silent on the removal power, Madison concluded, that power 
must lie with the president exclusively.281
After Madison’s first articulation of this position, his fellow Virginian 
Alexander White objected directly to Madison’s reasoning, and he did so on 
enumerated-powers grounds.282 In White’s view, the president, just like 
Congress, was limited to a set of textually enumerated powers. The Vesting 
Clause of Article I was not a general grant of power of a certain kind. In-
stead, White maintained, the executive powers the president was entitled to 
authorize were those the Constitution specifically enumerated.283 Nothing in 
the Constitution specifically authorized the president to remove officers, so 
the president did not have that authority.284 Other representatives echoed 
275. See 2 Annals of Cong. 1910 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick); id. at 1929 
(statement of Rep. Smith); id. at 1951 (statement of Rep. Gerry).
276. 1 Annals of Cong. 371–72, 499 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
277. Id. at 463–64. Some representatives disputed the proposition that removal was by 
nature executive. See, e.g., id. at 471, 545 (statements of Rep. Smith); id. at 472, 504 (statements 
of Rep. Gerry); id. at 494, 567 (statements of Rep. Stone).
278. The first representative to offer this argument seems to have been Vining. See id. at 
373. Madison picked it up later and elaborated it further. See id. at 463–64, 496–97.
279. Id. at 463–64.
280. Id. at 463–64, 496–97.
281. Id. at 463–64.
282. Id. at 466–67.
283. Id.
284. Id. Later, White added that to go with Madison and say that the president has all 
executive power other than what the Constitution expressly excepts is to imply that Congress 
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this argument, insisting with White and against Madison that the president 
had only a set of specifically enumerated powers and therefore could not ex-
ercise the removal power, which was not textually specified.285
In short, Madison’s opponents in the removal debate made their case in 
clear enumerated-powers terms. Madison did not rebut them by arguing that 
in fact the president did have some enumerated power to remove officers.286
Instead, he returned to his overall structural argument about executive pow-
er287 and to his argument that the president needed a removal power in order 
to exercise the kind of control that would let him be responsible for the ac-
tions of the officers around him.288
One of Madison’s leading allies in this debate against an opposition in-
sistent on a strict understanding of enumerated powers was Ames, who 
would later be among Madison’s principal antagonists on the Bank. During 
the removal debate, Ames and Madison both read the Vesting Clause of Ar-
ticle II to mean that the President enjoyed all executive power not specifical-
ly placed elsewhere.289 That position made lots of sense to Ames, who did 
not believe that exercises of power under the Constitution had to be traced 
to specific power-conferring clauses.290 He was comfortable with the idea 
that the federal government was an entity—a corporation, or a govern-
ment—of a sort that exercised certain powers simply because of the sort of 
beast it was.291 Given that approach, and given that the president was an ex-
ecutive sort of beast, it made sense to Ames to credit the structural argument 
Madison was offering about removal. In other words, Madison’s argument 
made sense to Ames as part of Ames’s more general rubric for thinking 
has all legislative power other than what the Constitution expressly excepts, and that’s not 
right: each branch has enumerated powers only. Id. at 514.
285. See, e.g., id. at 486 (statement of Rep. Laurance) (insisting that Madison’s position 
was untenable under a Constitution delegating only enumerated powers); id. at 510 (statement 
of Rep. Smith) (arguing that the President had only those powers affirmatively specified and 
that the Vesting Clause did not implicitly confer general executive power).
286. The closest he came was to say, at one point in the debate, that the president’s re-
sponsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully executed implied a power of removal as a 
necessary means to the end. Id. at 496. To a modern reader accustomed to thinking of the Take 
Care Clause as a source of presidential power, that might seem like the assertion of an enumer-
ated presidential power of removal. But there is reason to doubt that Madison understood 
himself to be adducing the sort of enumerated-power proof that White and those who followed 
him demanded. Madison’s reference to the Take Care Clause was made only once, and briefly, 
in between larger arguments, and he did not say that it supplied what the enumerated-power 
critics were seeking. He spoke of the president’s law-enforcement responsibility only as a factor 
that supported his general structural argument about residual executive power lying with the 
president. Id.
287. Id. at 496–97.
288. Id. at 499.
289. Id. at 463–64 (statement of Rep. Madison); id. at 539 (statement of Rep. Ames).
290. See 2 Annals of Cong. 1904–06 (1791).
291. Id. at 1905.
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about the government’s powers—an approach that had no need, or use, for 
an enumerated-powers paradigm. 
Moreover, both Ames and Madison in the removal debate entertained 
the idea of attributing unenumerated powers not just to the president but 
also to Congress. Both Ames and Madison took the view that the removal 
power belonged to the president without a specific textual enumeration. 
Speaking in the alternative, they both suggested that if the Constitution had 
not vested the removal power anywhere in particular, the power would be-
long to Congress, again without respect to any particular enumerated power. 
More particularly, they held that the power might belong to Congress simply 
because it was sensible to think (1) that someone in the federal government 
had the removal power, and (2) that federal powers not vested anywhere in 
particular belong residually to Congress.292 In other words, not just Ames 
but also Madison contemplated a category of powers belonging inherently to 
the federal government and deemed Congress the natural repository of those 
powers. 
Small wonder, then, that when Madison attacked the Bank on enumer-
ated-powers grounds, several colleagues called him out for abandoning his 
prior approach to constitutional interpretation.293 They had heard him go 
one way on the enumeration issue in a major debate before, and they were 
not about to let him take the other side when it served his purposes against 
their own. The assault must have stung: over and over, Members of the 
House accused Madison of changing his position on a central constitutional 
issue in order to get the results he wanted in particular cases.294
292. 1 Annals of Cong. 461 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madi-
son); id. at 538–39 (statement of Rep. Ames). Note that Madison’s view on this score was not 
that Congress would enjoy the power on the basis of the enumerated necessary and proper 
power. It was about the role that Congress, as the legislature, played within the constitutional 
system. See id. at 461 (“If the power naturally belongs to the Government, and the Constitution 
is undecided as to the body which is to exercise it, it is likely that it is submitted to the discre-
tion of the Legislature, and the question will depend upon its own merits.”). For a recent de-
velopment of a similar idea, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of the Legislature, 110 
Colum. L. Rev. 452 (2010).
293. See 2 Annals of Cong. 1910 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick); id. at 1929 
(statement of Rep. Smith); id. at 1951 (statement of Rep. Gerry).
294. In all likelihood, Madison’s shift from supporting an unenumerated unilateral pres-
idential removal power in 1789 to his insistence on construing the enumerated powers of Con-
gress narrowly in 1791 was not a matter of ad hoc convenience on those two issues but a part 
of Madison’s more general movement away from nationalism, and his increasing discomfort 
with executive power, in those years. That shift, which Feldman describes as the transition 
from Madison’s first political life to his second, was likely propelled by Madison’s unhappy 
experience with the way the federal government was exercising its power under the Washing-
ton Administration—an experience that caused him to rethink much of his 1780s constitution-
al theory. See Feldman, supra note 46, at 338–41; see also Hills, supra note 118 (manuscript ch. 
3, at 7–8). Madison’s change of mind in this direction seems to have been sincere, such that it 
disserves him to think the contradiction between his 1791 position on the Bank and his 1789 
position on removal was simply unprincipled. But “I’ve decided that I was wrong about a lot of 
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The most telling thing about these accusations, therefore, is the response 
they provoked—or failed to provoke. Madison did not answer the charge of 
interpretive duplicity. He did not say that his colleagues did not properly 
understand or remember what his views had been a year and a half earlier. 
And he offered no principle that would explain why the enumerated-powers 
rule applied in the Bank controversy but not to the question of the removal 
power.
Madison’s failure to offer such a principle is especially telling because 
modern constitutional lawyers can effortlessly supply arguments that would 
have completely defended Madison against the charge of interpretive incon-
sistency. As noted above, it is elementary to justify insisting on an enumerat-
ed power in the Bank debate but not in the removal debate by pointing to the 
difference between congressional powers and presidential powers, or to the 
difference between federalism (at issue in the Bank debate) and the separa-
tion of powers among the federal branches (at issue with respect to the re-
moval power).295 But Madison offered neither of these distinctions, despite 
being hammered repeatedly with the charge that he was playing fast and 
loose with the requirement of enumeration. Why not?
The best answer, I suspect, is as straightforward based on the historical 
evidence as it is counterintuitive if approached through the lens of modern 
doctrine. Madison did not defend himself with those obvious responses be-
cause those responses were not obvious to Madison in 1791. Nor were they 
obvious to his opponents in the debate. If the charge that Madison was being 
flagrantly inconsistent could be so easily answered by pointing to the differ-
ence between Congress and the president, it seems unlikely that Sedgwick296
and Gerry297 and Vining298 and Smith299 would have attacked Madison as 
they did. A competent legislator does not publicly accuse a colleague of bad 
faith when he knows that the colleague can quickly refute the charge, thus 
making the accuser seem unfair and impolite. But they all did pursue this at-
tack. Madison offered nothing in response, and the easiest explanation for 
his failing to defend himself is that he could not think of anything good to 
say. The twenty-first-century reader can rescue Madison easily from the 
charge of interpretive duplicity because the twenty-first-century reader has 
ready access to a set of principles that, though orthodox today, were not part 
of the toolkit that Madison and his adversaries had at their disposal. When 
the First Congress sat, ideas about enumerated powers were at the time un-
certain and unsettled. Not everyone agreed that the federal government was 
limited to a set of enumerated powers. And even among those who agreed 
the ideas that I propounded when persuading people to adopt the Constitution” was apparent-
ly not an argument that Madison wished to make in the House in 1791.
295. See supra Section III.D.1.
296. 2 Annals of Cong. 1910 (1791).
297. Id. at 1951.
298. Id. at 1955.
299. Id. at 1929.
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with that principle, further specifications of the idea that many modern law-
yers take for granted had not yet taken shape. 
One further inference is worth pursuing here. Madison was a skilled and 
experienced debater, and he worked hard in advance of important debates to 
be ready for the event. As noted earlier, he spent a lot of time in the weeks 
before the Bank debate absorbing centuries’ worth of information and ideas 
about banking.300 How could a person of his intelligence, and with his—
his!—level of familiarity with the Constitution, commit so great a debater’s 
blunder as to open himself up to a charge of fundamental inconsistency and 
have nothing to say in response? The removal issue and the Bank controver-
sy were two great constitutional debates bookending the First Congress. 
How could Madison have thought, in his preparation for the second of those 
debates, that the people in the room would not remember the prominent 
role he took in the first one? And if he knew that they would remember, how 
could he not have prepared an answer to the attack they would make? 
The available evidence cannot support a conclusive answer to that ques-
tion. But here is a plausible speculation. Madison had not, in fact, prepared 
his constitutional argument thoughtfully and in advance. The idea of using 
the enumerated-powers framework to defeat the Bank bill had come to him 
at something close to the last minute. He was fiercely opposed to the Bank. 
He had sometimes articulated, but had not been particularly invested in, the 
idea that the enumeration of congressional powers was an important mech-
anism for limiting federal legislation. As the moment of decision ap-
proached, he realized that if he took the limiting-enumeration idea rather 
seriously, he could make it the basis for an argument against the Bank. So 
with the process in its final stage, he ran with that idea. And as sometimes 
happens when people run with last-minute ideas, he hadn’t thought through 
all of the problems that might come up. 
Madison is hardly the only legislator in American history to have taken 
inconsistent constitutional positions at different times. And the point of no-
ticing what Madison’s adversaries noticed is neither to impugn his character 
nor to argue that at least one of his positions must have been wrong. It is to 
realize that Madison in the Bank debate was not simply cranking the handle 
on the same well-specified theory of enumerated powers that is familiar to 
constitutional lawyers today. Nor, in all likelihood, was he making an argu-
ment that he had carefully thought through, proceeding on the basis of his 
own well-settled constitutional views. He was making arguments in unset-
tled terrain, and he was improvising. 
IV. The Seat of Government
That Madison failed to persuade a majority of the House is well known. 
But to leave matters there would be to understate his colleagues’ skepticism. 
300. See supra Section II.B.2 (citing Feldman, supra note 46, at 316–17).
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Some of them didn’t just disagree: they found it hard to take Madison’s 
enumerated-powers argument against the Bank seriously. In a letter to a 
friend, Sedgwick archly described Madison’s speech as displaying “scholastic 
ingenuity.”301 Others were less circumspect. On the floor of the House, Ger-
ry—who would one day serve as Madison’s vice president—openly accused 
his future running mate of interpreting the enumerated powers with a set of 
rules formulated for the specific purpose of blocking the Bank.302 Ames 
chose not to make such a pointed allegation publicly, saying in open debate 
only that he thought Madison’s argument surprising.303 He was more candid 
in his private correspondence. In one letter written while physically in the 
House and listening to the debate, Ames described Madison’s argument as 
“full of casuistry and sophistry”304 and asserted that Madison’s articulated 
view was not the actual ground of his position.305 And if Ames’s report to a 
friend is to be credited, it was not only the Bank’s supporters who under-
stood Madison’s conduct that way. According to Ames, Madison’s argument 
made “little impression . . . . Many of the minority [i.e., the Bank’s oppo-
nents] laughed at the objection deduced from the Constitution.”306
That Ames told a friend that even Madison’s allies laughed at his enu-
merated-powers argument does not prove that things really happened that 
way. Certainly it would not be fair to Madison to assume the accuracy of a 
report by one of his chief antagonists. Maybe Ames was telling tall tales, or at 
least exaggerating his opponent’s plight. But there is also another possibility. 
Maybe Ames was telling it straight. Or even if Ames engaged in a little hy-
perbole, maybe his report was accurate enough to be illuminating. (Instead 
of laughing at Madison, did Members of the House merely snicker? Or 
smile?) 
Perhaps it is hard for a modern audience to think of one of Madison’s 
most famous and archetypical constitutional arguments as having been re-
garded by Members of the First Congress as fundamentally unserious. And 
perhaps the representatives who dismissed Madison’s argument that way 
were too hasty. Even if Madison had come to the argument only at the elev-
enth hour (which he had), and even if the argument was hard to reconcile 
with positions he had previously taken (which it was), it would not follow 
that the argument must be devoid of merit. Maybe the heat of conflict made 
other Members of the House judge Madison too harshly—and readers more 
301. Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Ephraim Williams (Feb. 23, 1791), in 21 DHFFC,
supra note 157, at 923.
302. 2 Annals of Cong. 1946 (1791).
303. See id. at 1904.
304. Letter from Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight (Feb. 7, 1791), in 1 Works of Fisher 
Ames 94, 94 (Seth Ames ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 2d ed. 1854) (1809).
305. Id. at 94–95 (“Mr. Madison discovers an intention to speak again . . . . We sit impa-
tiently to hear arguments which guide, or at least change, no man’s vote.”).
306. Letter from Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot (Feb. 17, 1791), in 1 Works of 
Fisher Ames, supra note 304, at 95.
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than two centuries later are free to come to their own conclusions about the 
quality of Madison’s argument.
But to be fair to Madison’s critics, it should also be noted that they had a 
richer contextual understanding of Madison and his arguments than we
might intuit. So before this Article concludes, I will bring forward one other 
largely forgotten piece of background against which the Bank debate should 
be seen. It regards something that I touched upon briefly in Part II: the rela-
tionship between the Bank bill and the permanent location of the nation’s 
seat of government. 
A. Desperately Fighting Susquehanna
When the First Congress convened, New York City functioned as a 
temporary seat of government.307 Madison badly wanted to locate the per-
manent capital in or close to Virginia, and more was at stake in that prefer-
ence than a shorter commute.308 In 1789, the new system had officially been 
adopted, but its stability and success were not guaranteed, and Madison 
knew it. He had, after all, lived through two changes in constitutional re-
gimes in the prior thirteen years. Moreover, the ratification process had been 
bitterly contested, and the Constitution’s opponents had not simply convert-
ed or disappeared. A lot of powerful people were not happy about the new 
system.309 For the federal government to succeed, it would have to transform 
its doubters into willing participants and ultimately into supporters. 
Many of the powerful doubters were Virginians.310 That’s why Madison 
was stuck in the House of Representatives, after all: his state legislature had 
no interest in sending a nationalist like Madison to represent it in the Sen-
307. See Feldman, supra note 46, at 277.
308. See id.; Madison at the First Session of the First Federal Congress: 8 April–29 Septem-
ber 1789; Editorial Note, in 12 The Papers of James Madison 52, 61–62 (Charles F. Hobson 
& Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979).
309. See Hills, supra note 118; see also John Marshall, 5 The Life of George Wash-
ington 297–98 (Philadelphia, C.P. Wayne 1807) (describing the continuing political strength, 
after ratification, of people who had opposed the Constitution, and asserting that “[t]he old 
line of division was still as strongly marked as ever”).
310. In September 1789, Virginia’s two United States Senators—Lee and Grayson—sent a 
letter to the Virginia Legislature, commenting on the proposed constitutional amendments 
that Madison had gotten Congress to approve and send to the states for ratification. They 
wrote with a dire warning: “It is impossible for us not to see the necessary tendency to consoli-
dated empire in the natural operation of the Constitution, if no further amended than as now 
proposed.” Letter from Richard Henry Lee & William Grayson to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives in Virginia (Sept. 28, 1789), in 5 Documentary History of the Constitu-
tion of the United States of America 217, 217–18 (photo. reprt. 1999) (1905). Madison 
obtained a copy and transmitted it to Washington, describing the letter as “well calculated to 
keep alive the disaffection to the Government, and . . . accordingly applied to that use by the 
violent partizans.” Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789), in 5
Documentary History of the Constitution of the United States, supra at 221.
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ate.311 Madison was keenly concerned with bringing Virginia’s political class 
to a more favorable view of the new system. Virginia was both Madison’s 
home state and the most powerful state in the Union—the state that more 
than any other could strengthen the new Constitution by being fully invested 
or undermine it by acting recalcitrantly. 
Madison suspected, perhaps wisely, that a national capital in Virginia’s 
orbit would help move marginal Virginians into the new system’s camp.312
After all, a Virginian’s attitude toward a national government located in Vir-
ginia’s own shadow might be predictably less hostile than a Virginian’s atti-
tude toward a national government in New York or Philadelphia. A national 
government in New York or Philadelphia would be an alien entity, from a 
Virginian point of view.313 A national government in an essentially Virginian 
location would be our thing. In short, a capital on the Potomac could make 
Virginia root for the national government’s success rather than wishing to 
see its failure. And as described earlier, Madison also liked the idea of a cen-
trally located capital and a capital away from the urban centers of finance.314
Madison was accordingly deeply invested in bringing the seat of government 
to the Potomac.
Famously, Madison in 1790 reached a deal with Hamilton whereby 
Madison would get his Potomac capital and Hamilton would win approval 
for his plan for the national government to assume state debts.315 But almost 
311. See supra Section II.C (describing Virginia’s selection of Antifederalists as senators).
312. See Feldman, supra note 46, at 309.
313. Consider, as one crucial element of this dynamic, the hostility to slavery that Virgin-
ians serving in federal office would encounter while residing in a northern capital city. New
York enacted a statute in 1781 freeing slaves who had fought on the American side during the 
war against Britain, and by the end of the decade there was a considerable free black popula-
tion there. Act of Mar. 20, 1781, ch. 32, § 6, 1781 N.Y. Laws 40, 42. Pennsylvania enacted a 
gradual abolition law in 1780, and in 1788 it enacted further legislation specifically designed to 
make it difficult for slaveholders from other states to keep slaves while temporarily residing in 
Pennsylvania. See Act of Mar. 29, 1788, ch. 1334, 1788 Pa. Laws 443; Act of Mar. 1, 1780, ch. 
870, 1780 Pa. Laws 492. See generally Edward Raymond Turner, The Abolition of Slavery in 
Pennsylvania, 36 Pa. Mag. Hist. & Biography 129, 137–38 (1912). Pennsylvania’s scheme 
created an exception for members of Congress, but Virginians serving in the federal executive 
branch were not exempt: Attorney General Randolph actually had his slaves freed by Pennsyl-
vania law while he served in the Washington Administration. Act of Mar. 1, 1780, ch. 870, 
§ 10, 1780 Pa. Laws 492, 495; see Letter from Tobias Lear to George Washington (Apr. 24, 
1791), in 8 The Papers of George Washington: Presidential Series 129, 130–32 (Mark A. 
Mastromarino ed., 1999).
314. See supra Section II.B.1.
315. See, e.g., Lin-Manuel Miranda et al., The Room Where It Happens, on Hamilton
(Atlantic Records 2015). Understanding that Madison’s motive for locating the capital along 
the Potomac was in significant part about shoring up Virginian support for the new govern-
ment helps explain that this “Compromise” of 1790 was not simply a quid pro quo arrange-
ment in which each side was willing to tolerate a sacrifice in order to win something that it val-
ued more. It was an arrangement in which Hamilton and Madison pursued a common end by 
two different means. Madison’s project of getting approval for a Potomac capital and Hamil-
ton’s project of getting the national government to assume the debts of state governments were 
both aimed at getting key constituencies to see their interests as aligned with those of the new 
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a year before, Madison nearly lost his chance to secure the capital for Virgin-
ia, because a group of northern representatives beat him to the issue. In Sep-
tember 1789, Representative Benjamin Goodhue of Massachusetts intro-
duced a resolution calling for the permanent seat of government to be placed 
in Pennsylvania, somewhere along the Susquehanna River.316 Madison was 
vexed. He seems to have suspected, perhaps correctly, that representatives 
from New England and New York had cut a deal to support a Pennsylvania 
location for the capital, figuring that Pennsylvania was as far north as a ma-
jority of Congress could conceivably agree to.317 Unexpectedly, Madison saw 
the possibility of a Potomac capital, which he had not yet acted upon, slip-
ping away.
The day after Goodhue introduced his resolution, Madison rose in the 
House and made a battery of arguments against the proposed Pennsylvania 
location. It wasn’t sufficiently central geographically.318 It wasn’t sufficiently 
central relative to the American population.319 The rivers leading to the place 
were not sufficiently navigable.320 Its proximity to stagnant water would 
make it a place with a relatively high incidence of disease.321 It was as if Mad-
ison had left Congress the day before and gone straight to the library, seek-
ing all possible data that could be marshaled to argue against the Pennsylva-
nia site. But to no avail. The House approved the resolution, thus triggering
the next step of the legislative process: the drafting of an actual bill to fix the 
seat of government in Pennsylvania, along the Susquehanna River.322
Two weeks later, that bill was before the House, and Madison raised a 
different sort of objection. This time, he did not argue about location or 
population or navigation or disease. He argued that the proposal was uncon-
stitutional. To fix the permanent seat of government by law, Madison con-
tended, would violate the Constitution.323
Madison reasoned as follows: under Article I, Section 5, Clause 4, “Nei-
ther House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the 
other, adjourn . . . to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall 
be sitting.”324 By implication, the two Houses of Congress acting concurrent-
ly could decide to adjourn to some other place. Congress’s authority to 
change the location of its meetings was thus immune from interference by 
national government. For Hamilton, the key constituency was the financial class. For Madison, 
it was Virginia, where ratification had been only narrowly approved.
316. 1 Annals of Cong. 867–68 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
317. See id. at 912.
318. Id. at 894–99.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 899–900.
321. Id. at 901.
322. Id. at 917–20.
323. Id. at 905–06.
324. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 4.
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the president: where to meet was a decision for the legislature alone. Indeed, 
Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 expressly exempted questions of adjournment 
from the normal requirement that Congress’s work product be presented for 
presidential approval.325
Any attempt to specify by statute where Congress would meet, Madison 
argued, would therefore be invalid.326 Such a statute would purport to bind 
Congress to meet in a certain location unless Congress repealed that statute, 
and repeal would require either the concurrence of the president or a two-
thirds supermajority in each House. The net result of such a statute, there-
fore, would be to deprive Congress of its Article I right to decide where to 
adjourn on the strength of the concurrence of majorities in the two Houses 
alone, without any need for supermajorities or presidential approval.327 Like 
it or not, Madison concluded, the bill to fix the permanent seat of govern-
ment at a location in Pennsylvania could not be constitutionally enacted. 
To say that Madison did not persuade his colleagues on this point would 
be to put the matter gently. The recorded reaction of—who else?—Fisher 
Ames may capture the moment better:
Mr. Ames . . . admired the abilities of the honorable gentleman [i.e. Madi-
son], and doubted not but the Constitution was the better in consequence 
of those abilities having been employed in its formation; but he was not 
disposed to pay implicit deference to that gentleman’s expositions of that 
instrument.328
In other words, Ames tipped his hat to Madison’s ingenuity and did not for a 
moment think that Madison’s argument made any sense at all. As a Massa-
chusetts man happy to have the capital as far north as possible, Ames favored 
the bill that Madison was opposing, so perhaps he was not the most sympa-
thetic judge of Madison’s argument. But even some southerners who shared 
Madison’s opposition to putting the seat of government in Pennsylvania 
were dismissive of this reading of Article I.329
The narrative, then, seems to run as follows: Madison was deeply invest-
ed, in good faith and for public-regarding reasons, in securing a location in 
or near Virginia for the permanent seat of government. When confronted 
with legislation that threatened the outcome he sought, he marshaled as 
many arguments as time and effort permitted. In the first instance, none of 
those arguments rested on the text of the Constitution, probably because 
nothing in the text of the Constitution seemed to speak to the issue. But 
none of his arguments worked. So in due course, he came forth with a differ-
325. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
326. 1 Annals of Cong. 905 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 908–09.
329. See id. at 909 (Smith, of South Carolina, saying that of course the site of the seat of 
government could be fixed by law, with presidential participation); id. at 910 (Jackson, of 
Georgia, somewhat more gently describing Madison’s constitutional point as “not well found-
ed”).
484 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:415
ent kind of argument—an argument involving a reading of the Constitu-
tion’s text—that he probably thought up in the meantime. It was a clever ar-
gument. But it was also a tendentious argument, and Madison’s fellow repre-
sentatives didn’t buy it. They understood perfectly well that Madison’s 
purported theory explaining why a bill he opposed on the merits was not just 
undesirable but actually unconstitutional had been cooked up ad hoc. They 
brushed him aside.
The bill for a Pennsylvania capital was approved on September 22, with 
Madison voting against it.330 But Madison did not give up. He seems later on 
to have instigated a disagreement about exactly where along the Susquehan-
na the seat of government would be located, and the resulting impasse 
opened the door for his deal with Hamilton the following summer and the 
plan to move the capital to the Potomac.331 When that deal came before 
Congress in the form of a bill to locate the seat of government on the Poto-
mac, Madison gave what seemed like pretty good proof of the insincerity of 
his constitutional objection the year before. Not only did Madison now vote 
in favor of fixing the seat of government by statute, but he advised Washing-
ton in a written opinion that, as a matter of constitutional law, the seat of 
government must be fixed by statute—exactly the opposite of what he said a 
year earlier.332 Contemporary commentators skewered Madison for the self-
contradiction.333 In short, it was widely understood that Madison was willing 
to manufacture an unreliable constitutional argument at the last minute and 
to insist on it in the House of Representatives.
B. The Cow in the Stable
When President Washington signed the legislation that embodied the 
Compromise of 1790, Madison’s desire for a Potomac capital took one long 
step toward realization. Indeed, it would be easy to think that the question of 
where the capital would be located was settled at that moment. But the mat-
ter was not that simple, because agreements to undertake grand plans in the 
future do not always make those plans come true. As many Americans rec-
ognized at the time, getting Congress in 1790 to vote in favor of a Potomac 
330. Id. at 946.
331. See id. at 926; Feldman, supra note 46, at 277; Madison at the First Session of the 
First Federal Congress: 8 April–29 September 1789; Editorial Note, supra note 308, at 61.
332. See James Madison, James Madison’s Concurring Opinion (July 14, 1790), in 17 The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson 199 (Julian P. Boyd. ed, 1965).
333. See One of the Gallery, One of the Gallery on the Conduct of Madison, Page, and 
Carroll, N.Y. Daily Advertiser (July 15 1790), reprinted in 17 The Papers of Thomas Jef-
ferson, supra note 332, at 200–01 (“What is become of another person’s oath which stuck in 
his throat last session, and prevented his voting for the Susquehannah? Has he swallowed it 
since that time? Or is it so long since he took it that he has forgot it? Or have the waters of the 
Patowmac the virtue of the Lethe, that those who drink of them may lose their memory?”).
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capital was one thing, and actually moving the government there ten years 
later would be another.334
According to the relevant legislation, Congress was to leave New York at 
the end of 1790, spend ten years in Philadelphia, and then move to the Po-
tomac.335 But ten years is long enough for an operation to put down roots, 
and temporary arrangements sometimes have a way of making themselves 
permanent. Philadelphia was America’s largest city. 336 The Potomac alterna-
tive was an undeveloped swamp and, perhaps, not the most fashionable of 
destinations. (Gerry had published remarks saying that people might just as 
easily believe that Congress was serious about relocating to Mississippi or 
Detroit.337) Was Congress really going to pick up and move there, leaving 
behind the quarters and routines that it would have become accustomed to 
during ten years of residence in the metropolis? 
Apparently, many influential Pennsylvanians thought they still had a 
shot at keeping the capital for themselves. Upon his arrival in Philadelphia at 
the start of Congress’s residence there, Sedgwick wrote to his wife reporting 
rumors that the Pennsylvania delegation in Congress “do not hesitate to de-
clare that they never intended to aid in a removal from hence to the Po-
towmack, and this declaration has awakened the jealousy of the southern 
members to a great degree.”338 Indeed, the fact that Pennsylvania was not 
reconciled to being merely a temporary home for Congress seems to have 
been apparent to the general public, or at least to those parts of the public 
334. See, e.g., Editorial Note, in 17 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, supra note 332, at 
452–53 (collecting opinions doubting that the planned Potomac move could be achieved).
335. See Act of July 16, 1790, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 130.
336. U.S. Census Bureau, 1790 Census 37, 45 (J. Phillips 1790), 
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1790/number_of_persons/1790a-
02.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6UW-KWZS] (showing that the whole number of persons in Phila-
delphia was 41,580, as opposed to New York’s 33,131).
337. Editorial Note, supra note 334, at 453–54 (quoting Debates of 6 July, N.Y. Daily 
Advertiser (July 10, 1790)) (“Enquiries will be made, where in the name of common sense is 
Connogocheque [(i.e., the Maryland creek, flowing into the Potomac, designated as the north-
ern limit for the site of the capital)], and I do not believe that one person in a thousand in the 
United States knows that there is such a place on earth. If the second class of American nobili-
ty, the Society of St. Tammany . . . had passed a vote to celebrate their festival in their wigwam 
at Connogocheque, I should have thought that there was some propriety, some stile in the 
measure; but for the grave council of the United States, to pass a bill that the seat of govern-
ment should be removed to that place, is a measure too ridiculous to be credited. Few will sup-
pose that Congress are serious. . . . You might as well induce a belief that you are in earnest by 
inserting Mississippi, Detroit, or Winnipipiocket Pond, as Connogocheque. . . . Can it be con-
ceived that after ten years residence, Congress will remove from the city of Philadelphia?”).
338. Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Pamela Sedgwick (Dec. 26, 1790), supra note 169,
at 237; see also Letter from William Few to Catherine Few (Jan. 31, 1791), in 21 DHFFC, supra
note 157, at 624 (reporting that “a Yankee [in Congress] has threatened . . . [to] move for a re-
peal” of the Act settling the seat of government on the Potomac); Letter from William Symmes 
to George Thatcher (Feb. 10, 1791), in 21 DHFFC, supra note 157, at 746 (observing that, given 
the unpleasantness of Philadelphia’s weather, the Pennsylvanians would need to treat Congress 
nicely if they expected Congress to stay permanently in Philadelphia, and thus reflecting 
awareness that Pennsylvanians so intended).
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that were paying attention. In January 1791, an anonymous wag writing in a 
New York literary magazine published a thirty-six line poem about a cow 
(yes, a cow), recently resident on the Hudson River (as Congress had been in 
New York), who had relocated to “the banks of the Delaware” (that is, to 
Philadelphia).339 The poet explained that “proud stuffy Dons” of Virginia 
had helped establish the cow in her new home and believed that soon she 
would move farther south.340 But the Virginians were in for a rude shock, the 
poem continued:
But hear now the sly, plotting sons of old [William] Penn—
“The cow’s in our stable—there she must remain.
Talk now of agreements, and bargains your fill,
Our scheme is effected—the grist’s at our mill.”
. . . And swore by the city, white men should turn sable,
Before the cow stir’d one foot’s length from their stable.341
To be comprehensible, allegorical satire of this kind needs a readership 
that already knows the substance of the matter being lampooned. So unless 
this satirist had a runaway imagination, it is safe to infer that people knew of, 
or at least suspected, a Pennsylvanian design to keep the capital where it was. 
As it happens, it seems that neither the satirist nor the audience was imagin-
ing things. In April 1791, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives passed 
a bill to appropriate twenty-five years of funds for the construction of build-
ings to house the federal government in Philadelphia.342 This was not Con-
gress appropriating funds to rent temporary space. It was Pennsylvania ap-
propriating funds to build permanent structures, with the design of enticing 
the government to stay where it was, rather than decamping for some unde-
veloped swamp.343
339. A New-York Farmer to the New-York Magazine, Gazette U.S. (Feb. 9, 1791), re-
printed in 21 DHFFC, supra note 157, at 640.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. See Journal of the First Session of the House of Representatives in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 300, 350–52 (Hall and Sellers 1790), microformed at Ear-
ly American Imprints, Series 1, no. 23675, bit.ly/PAHouse1791 [https://perma.cc/A4VF-
7LXL].
343. Washington, who was as invested as Madison in the Potomac location, responded to 
a report of the Pennsylvania House’s agenda by urging the commissioners responsible for de-
veloping the Potomac site to proceed as quickly as possible, presumably in order to demon-
strate that the Potomac project was alive and proceeding. Letter from George Washington to 
William Deakins, Jr. & Benjamin Stoddert (Apr. 1, 1791) in 8 The Papers of George Wash-
ington: Presidential Series, supra note 313, at 34. If that project’s momentum flagged, it 
would be all the easier for Pennsylvania to gain the advantage. On April 24, while Washington 
was traveling in the Deep South, his personal secretary wrote to him from Philadelphia to re-
port that:
Mr Ellicott has returned to this City from surveying the federal territory, and the flatter-
ing account which he gives of the spot and the prospect of things in that quarter, added 
to other information of the same kind which has been received, have created a serious, 
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C. The Bank as Anchor
Hamilton’s proposal to create a national bank reached Congress exactly 
at the moment when Congress took up its ostensibly temporary residence in 
Philadelphia—that is, in December 1790. And there was a widely understood 
practical connection between the possible creation of a bank and the hopes 
that Pennsylvanians maintained for keeping the nation’s capital. Everyone 
knew that if Congress created a Bank of the United States, the institution 
would be located in Philadelphia, where the government was working and 
where there was a capital market with which to do business.344 To create the 
Bank was accordingly to deepen the government’s ties to its existing Phila-
delphia location. And every increase in the government’s footprint in Phila-
delphia during the 1790s would make it harder to pick up and move in 1800. 
It is easier to relocate an operation that consists of fewer than two hundred 
people—as the whole federal apparatus in Philadelphia did in 1790345—than 
to move a larger enterprise. The Bank proposal thus threatened both to in-
crease the new government’s ballast of its own force and to set a precedent 
for other expansions of the federal footprint, making a move ten years later 
even more difficult. 
Many members of Congress had this dynamic on their minds as Con-
gress considered the Bank bill. Between December 1790 and February 1791, 
members of Congress from at least nine different states, spread evenly from 
North to South, wrote, mostly privately but occasionally for public con-
sumption, that creation of the Bank would make it hard for the government 
to leave Philadelphia346 or, alternatively, that southern and especially Virgin-
ian opposition to the Bank was largely rooted in a fear of losing the Potomac 
and to many an alarming expectation, that the law for establishing the permanent seat 
of Government will be carried fully into effect. This idea has heretofore been treated 
very lightly by people in general here.
Letter from Tobias Lear to George Washington (April 24, 1791), supra note 313, at 132 (foot-
note omitted). According to Lear’s letter, support for the proposed construction of permanent 
federal buildings in Philadelphia flagged accordingly, in part because Western Pennsylvanians, 
now more persuaded that the Potomac site was plausible, were coming to think that they 
would prefer a national capital on the Potomac than one in eastern Pennsylvania. Id.
344. See, e.g., Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (Feb. 2, 1791), in 21
DHFFC, supra note 157, at 660; Letter from Joseph Jones to James Monroe (Jan. 27, 1791), in
21 DHFFC, supra note 157, at 557. Philadelphia was also home to the Bank of North America, 
to which a Bank of the United States would be a de facto and perhaps also a de jure successor. 
See Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (Feb. 2, 1791), supra at 660.
345. See Leonard White, The Federalists (1956). When Jefferson became the first 
president to begin a term in the District of Columbia in 1801, the total number of federal em-
ployees (excluding the members of Congress themselves) was 153. Brian Balogh, A Gov-
ernment Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century 
America 112 (2009).
346. See, e.g., Letter from Daniel Carroll to the Delegates of Frederick, Washington, & 
Allegany Counties, Maryland (Dec. 30, 1790), in 21 DHFFC, supra note 157, at 267.
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capital.347 Monroe got a letter from a Virginian constituent warning that a 
national bank in Philadelphia “will I think effectually establish the perma-
nent seat in that place”;348 Representative George Thatcher of Massachusetts 
wrote that some southern representatives “look upon a national bank estab-
lished at Philadelphia as throwing a monstrous sheet anchor in that Har-
bour, which no future Congress will ever be able to weigh.”349
D. The Senate: The Length of the Charter
Proceedings in the Senate give further proof, if more cryptically, of the 
perceived connection between the Bank bill and the lingering question about 
the seat of government. As discussed earlier, the Senate approved the Bank 
bill without recorded dissent.350 But what contentious discussion there was 
in the Senate may have occurred in direct contemplation of the Potomac 
problem. The evidence for that proposition is not merely the private writings 
of senators.351 It is also visible in the published Senate Journal, scant though 
that record is, if the Journal is read in light of the concern about whether the 
government would actually leave Philadelphia. 
Before voting overwhelmingly to approve the Bank, the Senate held 
three divisive votes on the subsidiary question of how long the Bank’s corpo-
rate charter should be valid. In the first vote, taken on January 13, the Senate 
considered and approved a twenty-four year charter, valid until 1815.352 The 
vote was close and also sectional. Senators from states north of Maryland 
and Virginia overwhelmingly supported the measure, and every vote from 
Maryland and Virginia southward was cast against it.353 A week later, the 
347. See Letter from Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot (Feb. 17, 1791), supra note 
306; Letter from Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight (Jan. 24, 1791), in 21 DHFFC, supra note 157,
at 509; Letter from Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight (Jan. 2, 1791), in 21 DHFFC, supra note 
157, at 295; Letter from Benjamin Bourne to Zephaniah Andrews (Feb. 3, 1791), in 21 DHFFC,
supra note 157, at 668; Letter from Benjamin Huntington to Samuel Huntington (Feb. 3, 1791), 
in 21 DHFFC, supra note 157, at 674; Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Pamela Sedgwick 
(Dec. 26, 1791), supra note 169, at 237–38; Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Peter Van 
Schaack (Jan. 30, 1791), supra note 165, at 609; Letter from George Thatcher to William Sym-
mes (Jan. 26, 1791), in 21 DHFFC, supra note 157, at 546; Letter from Hugh Williamson to 
Alexander Martin (Feb. 7, 1791), in 21 DHFFC, supra note 157, at 723; Letter from Paine Win-
gate to Nathaniel Peabody (Feb. 4, 1791), in 21 DHFFC, supra note 157, at 684.
348. Letter from Joseph Jones to James Monroe (Jan. 27, 1791), in 21 DHFFC, supra note 
157, at 557, 558.
349. Letter from George Thatcher to Jeremiah Hill (Jan. 24, 1791), 21 DHFFC, supra note 
157, at 524, 525.
350. See supra Section II.C.
351. Though that exists too. On January 19, 1791, Maclay wrote in his diary that “The 
Potowmack interest seemed to regard [the Bank] as a Machine Which in the hands of the Phil-
adelphians, might retard the removal of Congress. the Destruction of it of Course was their 
Object.” 9 DHFFC, supra note 143, at 364 (entry of Jan. 19, 1791).
352. 1 DHFFC, supra note 58, at 531–32.
353. Id. at xxiii–xxiv, 531–32.
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Senate considered an amendment that would have limited the charter to ten 
years—meaning that it would expire within a few months of the govern-
ment’s scheduled move to the Potomac. That amendment failed, entirely on 
sectional lines.354 Another amendment was then attempted, this one to delete 
the clause that gave the Bank the exclusive privilege of doing the federal gov-
ernment’s financial business. That failed too, and again the vote was split ge-
ographically.355 These three votes were the only issues on which the Senate is 
recorded as having taken votes on the Bank bill.
Why, of all possible aspects of the Bank plan, were these issues the con-
tentious ones? Here’s a hypothesis: because of the threat that a national bank 
in Philadelphia would prevent the government’s move to the Potomac. A 
bank with a charter running until 1815 would be a going concern in Phila-
delphia when the appointed moving day came. But if the charter could be 
made to expire in ten years, Congress would have to reauthorize the Bank at 
the time of the move, and Congress could then recharter the Bank on the 
condition that it move to the Potomac. Or it could charter a different bank 
on the Potomac, or no bank at all. The proposal to strike the Bank’s exclusive 
privilege was to the same effect. It would have let Congress charter a differ-
ent Bank on the Potomac at the time of the move, rather than requiring 
Congress to continue doing business with a Philadelphia institution and 
therefore adding to the inconvenience of relocating. To be sure, Senators 
skeptical of monopoly privileges or overly powerful corporations might have 
supported a short charter or a nonexclusive bank for reasons independent of 
the Potomac issue. But if Senators in January 1791 were concerned about the 
impact of the Bank bill on the Potomac plan—and we know that some 
were—then it makes all the sense in the world for them to have proposed ex-
actly the two options that the Senate considered in the final phases of its pro-
cess: either make the charter expire in the year of the proposed move, or en-
able the government to do business with someone other than the Philadelph-
Philadelphia-based bank. 
E. Randolph’s Proviso: The Ten Miles Square
The background concern with the seat of government left a similarly 
subtle fingerprint on the Attorney General’s written opinion about the con-
stitutionality of the Bank bill. Randolph’s memo to Washington mostly 
tracked Madison’s argument in the House. The question, he wrote, was 
whether Congress had the power to charter corporations.356 Randolph then 
reasoned that neither the taxing power, nor the money-borrowing power, 
nor the power to regulate commerce, nor the power to dispose of the gov-
ernment’s property should be understood to encompass the power to create 
354. Id. at 535.
355. Id. at 535–36.
356. Randolph’s Opinion, supra note 26, at 122.
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a bank.357 Nor could the Necessary and Proper Clause reasonably be con-
strued in a way that would bring a power to incorporate within its scope.358
Toward the end of his opinion, however, Randolph noted one other pos-
sibility. It concerned Article I, Section 8, Clause 17, which gives Congress the 
power to legislate “in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding 
ten miles square) as may . . . become the Seat of the Government of the Unit-
ed States.”359 In Randolph’s view, Clause 17 gave Congress the authority to 
create a bank within the ten miles square that would be the seat of govern-
ment.360 That makes sense, of course. If Congress could do anything it chose 
in that space, or at least anything that a state legislature could do and that the 
Constitution did not expressly forbid, then it could incorporate a bank, just 
as a state government could within its own jurisdiction. But, Randolph 
wrote, Congress’s power under Clause 17 could not justify the pending Bank 
bill, because that bill was not an exercise of Congress’s power to govern the 
ten miles square.361 If Congress wanted to wait until it had taken up resi-
dence at its permanent seat and then use Clause 17 to incorporate a bank 
there, it could validly do so. But it could not create a bank in some other lo-
cation.362
So in the view of the Attorney General—recently the Governor of Vir-
ginia—creating a National Bank was not unconstitutional after all. It would 
just be unconstitutional if that Bank were located somewhere other than on 
the Potomac site that was to become the seat of government. 
F. Madison Himself
And what of Madison?
As far as I can tell, Madison never commented publicly on the relation-
ship between the Bank and the seat of government. But he came close. In 
1792, William Smith363 published an anonymous screed attacking Madison 
and Jefferson for all manner of political perfidy.364 With respect to the Bank, 
Smith charged that nobody genuinely thought the proposal unconstitutional, 
but that “Virginia” worried that the Bank’s presence in Philadelphia would 
357. Id. at 126.
358. Id. at 127.
359. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
360. See Randolph’s Opinion, supra note 26, at 130 (“It has been also asserted that Con-
gress have an exclusive legislation at the seat of government. This will not be true until they go 
to the place of the permanent residence.”).
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. That is, the South Carolina representative who had argued that Congress could cre-
ate the Bank because no state could do it. See supra Section III.C.3.
364. Willam Smith, The Politicks and Views of a Certain Party, Displayed, October 1792,
reprinted in 22 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress of the United 
States of America 1082 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter 22 DHFFC].
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jeopardize the move to the Potomac, and that Madison’s constitutional ar-
gument against the Bank was a bad-faith pretext aimed at solving that prob-
lem.365 Madison did not respond publicly to Smith’s attack. But in a surviv-
ing set of notes that he prepared for such a response,366 Madison 
acknowledged that the Potomac angle had played at least some role in his 
thinking. 
We cannot know just how Madison would have articulated these ideas 
had he made them public. In his notes, Madison wrote that he never worried 
that the Bank would actually prevent the government from leaving Philadel-
phia for the Potomac—but that he had “great apprehensions” that chartering 
the Bank in Philadelphia could make other people think that removal to the 
Potomac was less likely, that such doubts could “be used as an engine for 
turning the fears & hopes of . . . particular States” against the national pro-
ject, and that the prospect of such a development might have figured in his 
approach to the Bank debate.367 In particular, Madison wrote that concern 
about the seat of government might have figured in his decision to oppose 
giving the Bank a twenty-year charter.368 A bank with only a ten-year charter 
might go out of business just before the scheduled moving date and therefore 
be less of an anchor in Philadelphia. If the government still wanted a bank at 
the time of the move, it could charter a new one on the Potomac River.
Some of Madison’s adversaries—not just Smith—would have regarded
that explanation as less than the whole truth. Like Smith, they characterized 
Madison’s interest in the Potomac plan as the driving force behind his entire 
opposition to the Bank bill. For example, when Sedgwick wrote at the end of 
January that he expected Madison to make a pretextual constitutional argu-
ment against the Bank, it was Madison’s stake in the Potomac plan that 
Sedgwick took to be Madison’s true motivation.369 And the day after Madi-
son articulated his enumerated-powers objection to the House, Rhode Is-
land’s Benjamin Bourne wrote as follows: 
Mr. Maddison [sic] spoke yesterday an hour & an half on the Subject. 
he Combats it both on the grounds of inconstitutionality and inexpedience. 
But I am persuaded we should not have heard any thing of either, did not 
the Gentlemen from the southward View the measure, as adverse to the 
removal of Congress, ten years hence, to the Potowmack.370
The representatives who took this reductionist view likely underestimat-
ed Madison’s other reasons for opposing the Bank. Whether or not the 
365. See id. at 1082, 1090–91.
366. James Madison, Notes on Politicks and Views, [4 November 1792], in 22 DHFFC,
supra note 364, at 1098 (date assigned by the editors of The Papers of James Madison).
367. Id. at 1101.
368. See id.
369. Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Peter Van Schaack (Jan. 30, 1791), supra note 
165, at 609.
370. Letter from Benjamin Bourne to Zephaniah Andrews (Feb. 3, 1791), supra note 347,
at 668.
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Compromise of 1790 was threatened, Madison distrusted the financial class 
that would control the Bank, feared that debt would undermine republican 
independence, and wanted the spoils-politics of corporations and monopo-
lies to occur at the state level, where the citizen-gentry stood a better chance 
of resisting the forces of financial corruption. Those seem like sufficient rea-
sons for Madison to have opposed the Bank. But just as it seems unwise to 
believe that Madison’s enumerated-powers argument was motivated solely 
by his desire to protect the Potomac plan, it might be unwise to take Madi-
son at his word and conclude that Madison’s concern for the seat of gov-
ernment figured to no greater extent than he described in his notes for the 
response to Smith.371 Truth might lie at one of those poles, but it seems at 
least as likely that it lies somewhere in between, and it’s impossible to say just 
where. 
Whatever the best resolution of that uncertainty, bringing the Bank de-
bate’s connection to the seat of government into view should help us better 
understand how the participants understood their controversy. Even if Mad-
ison was in perfectly good faith when he argued against the Bank, his critics 
had reason to be skeptical. Only a year and a half earlier, when the Susque-
hanna proposal threatened Madison’s hopes for a Potomac capital, they had 
heard him come forward at the last minute with an implausible constitution-
al argument, and his subsequent flip-flop on the issue when Congress agreed 
to the Potomac site probably confirmed his critics in their view that Madison 
had tried to dupe them into accepting an odd reading of Article I.372 So a 
year and a half later, when once again the House was considering a bill that 
might prevent the seat of government from moving to the Potomac and 
Madison at the last moment again produced an unexpected constitutional 
argument in opposition, his colleagues in the House had reason to be suspi-
cious. Maybe even to laugh. 
To be sure, Madison’s enumerated-powers argument against the Bank 
was not as idiosyncratic as his argument against fixing the seat of govern-
ment by statute. The idea that the federal government was limited to a set of 
enumerated powers was a known part of constitutional discourse, albeit a 
contested one. Madison had not been particularly invested in that idea be-
fore the Bank debate, but he had articulated it from time to time. What’s 
more, Madison did not later repudiate the enumerated-powers framework, 
371. If the Potomac problem had in fact been part of Madison’s motivation for making 
his enumerated-powers argument, it would have been hard for him to say so publicly in a re-
sponse to Smith. It would be hard, after all, to explain why a concern about the seat of govern-
ment would be relevant to the question of whether Congress had an enumerated power to in-
corporate a bank (leaving aside possibilities arising from the enumerated power to govern the 
ten miles square). Put another way, to say “I worried about the Potomac, so I argued that for 
enumerated-powers reasons the Bank would be unconstitutional” would be tantamount to say-
ing “. . . so I made a pretextual argument about the Constitution.” People rarely say such 
things.
372. See supra Section IV.A.
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as he had repudiated his argument against fixing the capital’s location by 
statute. On the contrary, the idea of a limiting enumeration became an im-
portant part of the general constitutional vision that Madison would develop 
and hold, sincerely, for the next long phase of his career.373 As I’ve noted be-
fore, the pressure of concrete problems sometimes provokes people to fur-
ther develop their ideas, and there need be nothing untoward about that dy-
namic: necessity is a mother of invention in legal theory as surely as 
elsewhere, and inventions are often good. But in 1791, Madison’s audience 
could not know that he was articulating an idea to which he would adhere 
authentically going forward. What they could know, and did, is that he was 
saying something unexpected, and something in tension with his prior ideas. 
And that many of them disagreed with his basic premise.
Conclusion
I have argued elsewhere that constitutional law’s prevailing wisdom on 
the subject of congressional powers makes some important mistakes.374 For 
one, it conflates two propositions about enumerated powers, of which one at 
most is true. The first proposition—the enumeration principle—is that Con-
gress is entitled to legislate only on the basis of constitutionally enumerated 
powers. The second proposition—the internal-limits canon—provides that 
the sum total of what Congress can do on the basis of its enumerated powers 
must be less than what Congress could do with a grant of general legislative 
jurisdiction. As I have explained, the first proposition does not entail the 
second one.375 Put another way, even if it is true that Congress can legislate 
only on the basis of its enumerated powers, it need not follow that Congress 
must be limited by those enumerated powers. To be sure, it is crucially im-
portant that Congress be limited. But as Madison told Wallace in 1785, ex-
ternal limits are better tools for limiting legislatures than internal limits 
are.376 In practice, Congress has long been limited not by internal limits but 
by a combination of external limits and the process limits that are built into 
the structure of the Constitution.377 And as I see it, the idea that Congress 
must be limited by the particular strategy of internal limits—that is, by the 
operation of its enumerated powers—is not required by fidelity to the 
373. Though not so dogmatically as to refuse to sign the bill creating the second Bank of 
the United States in 1816.
374. See Primus, supra note 9; Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 12; Primus, 
Why Enumeration Matters, supra note 12.
375. See Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 12, at 593–94.
376. See supra Section I.B.
377. See Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, supra note 12, at 3–4. Prior scholarship gen-
erally (and, I think, correctly) regards Madison in the 1780s as having considered process lim-
its the most important kind. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 68, at 1515–20; see also The Feder-
alist, supra note 16, Nos. 10, 46, 51 (James Madison).
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Founders,378 not necessary or even helpful in the maintenance of American 
federalism,379 and not ordained by the text of the Constitution.380
Nothing I have shown about the Bank debate demonstrates that twenty-
first-century constitutional lawyers need abandon either the enumeration 
principle or the internal-limits canon. The Members of the First Congress 
who did not think in now-orthodox ways about the powers of Congress 
might have been wrong in their own time, and even if they were not wrong 
in their own time, the best understanding of constitutional law in 1791 
might not be the best understanding in 2018. Similarly, even if Madison’s 
harshest 1791 critics were correct—even if Madison knowingly made a lousy 
constitutional argument against the Bank—it would not follow that the 
enumeration principle or the internal-limits canon was thereby poisoned. 
One could come to believe in the enumeration principle and the internal-
limits canon for reasons having nothing to do with Madison or the Bank. 
And even if one has doubts about the textual, structural, and historical ac-
counts that are usually taken to support modern orthodoxies related to 
enumeration and internal limits, there is now a good deal of constitutional 
tradition building the enumeration principle into constitutional law. The 
opinions of the courts, and the broader discourse of the legal profession, 
have made the enumeration principle part of modern constitutional law no 
matter what might have been true in 1791. 
Nonetheless, it matters that the enumeration principle was not a consen-
sus proposition in the First Congress. It matters too whether we remember 
the Bank debate as a set piece in which the rival parties argued within a sta-
ble framework or as a moment of argumentative innovation. In part it mat-
ters simply because, other things being equal, it is better to get the story 
straight than not to. But it also matters for other reasons.
Madison’s argument against the Bank offers a model for how enumerat-
ed-powers arguments can carry the content of important commitments—
including small-c constitutional commitments—that are not otherwise re-
flected in the written Constitution’s text. In 1791, Madison was concerned 
about banks, corporations, monopolies, debts, and other things that weighed 
heavily within traditional country-party ideology. His constitutional theory
was significantly shaped by that frame. Had the written Constitution better 
conformed to his small-c constitutional intuitions at that time, it would 
probably have contained an express prohibition blocking Hamilton’s Bank 
proposal—say, a clause prohibiting Congress from chartering corporations, 
or monopoly corporations, or banks in particular. As it happened, there 
were no such clauses, because the constituencies supporting these kinds of 
external limits had lacked the political strength necessary for getting relevant 
378. See Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 12, at 613–28.
379. See id. at 595–613.
380. See id. at 628–42.
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amendments adopted.381 In the absence of such external limits in the Consti-
tution’s text, it took Madison a while to discover a way to articulate his ob-
jections to the Bank in terms of the written Constitution. 
When he did discover one, it was less than compelling. The First Con-
gress disagreed, and so did the Court in McCulloch.382 And perhaps part of 
the weakness of Madison’s move lay in the fact that he was using the enu-
meration for something that it wasn’t clearly built to achieve. Absent a sub-
stantive skepticism of banks or the financial class or federally chartered cor-
porations, Hamilton’s arguments reading the enumerated powers as 
sufficient for chartering a Bank seem pretty straightforward.383 The real force 
of Madison’s argument, such as it was, lay not in its cogency as a reading of 
the enumerated powers but in its channeling a set of small-c constitutional 
commitments that to him, and to many other Americans, was deeply im-
portant.
Madison’s move was not the last of its kind. Once we recognize that sub-
stantive constitutional commitments that would be best captured by external 
limits can sometimes also be advanced with innovative readings of internal 
limits, we should be primed to ask whether the same phenomenon is at work 
in other arguments from enumerated powers. When the idea of a limiting 
enumeration has seemed to do work—in the Civil Rights Cases,384 say, or in 
Dagenhart385 or Schechter386 or Butler387 or Lopez388 or Morrison389 or 
NFIB390—might a proffered reading of Congress’s enumerated powers be an-
imated less by an intuition about the scope of those powers on their own 
terms than by an intuition more naturally expressed as an external limit, but 
which the written Constitution happens not to contain? (Like “Congress 
should not make agricultural policy,”391 or “Congress should not interfere 
with family law”?392) Opinions will vary, from lawyer to lawyer and from 
case to case. But the question should be one that we are ready to ask. 
381. See supra Section I.A.
382. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819) (holding that Congress had 
the power to charter a bank).
383. As do Marshall’s, even if Marshall did less to nail down the particulars of his analy-
sis. See David S. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1, 57–58 
(2015).
384. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
385. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
386. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
387. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
388. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
389. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
390. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J., in part).
391. See Butler, 297 U.S. at 68 (holding that the Agricultural Adjustment Act “invades the 
reserved rights of the states. It is a statutory plan to regulate and control agricultural produc-
tion, a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal government”).
392. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615–16.
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The modern lawyer’s sense that Congress must be meaningfully limited 
by the Constitution’s enumeration of its powers draws support from many 
different sources. It rests partly on readings of constitutional text, including 
principally Article I and the Tenth Amendment. It rests partly on ideas 
about federalism. And it rests partly on a set of ideas about, or images drawn 
from, the history of the early Republic. These include the story of the Fram-
ers’ having considered the limiting enumeration so fundamental that it justi-
fied their omission of a Bill of Rights from the original constitution, a certain 
reading of ratification-era documents like Federalist 45, an understanding of 
the Bank debate, and a presentation of Chief Justice Marshall’s dictum that 
“[t]he enumeration presupposes something not enumerated”393 as a state-
ment that the Constitution’s text precludes letting Congress exercise the 
practical equivalent of plenary legislative authority. These historical pieces 
matter not only in official ways (say, as evidence of original meaning, or of 
longstanding practice, among people who attribute authority to such things) 
but also in unofficial ways. Successful constitutional arguments must usually 
be reconcilable with the audience’s intuitive sense of the national constitu-
tional story. So the content of the story often matters simply at the level of 
intuition.
This Article is part of a larger effort to challenge prevailing intuitions 
about enumerated powers. Elsewhere, I have explained that the text of the 
Constitution does not require that Congress be limited by the enumeration 
of its powers;394 that a limiting enumeration is neither necessary nor helpful 
for maintaining American federalism;395 that the system in practice behaves, 
and has long behaved, as if the enumeration does no meaningful limiting 
work;396 that the Framers did not omit a Bill of Rights because they trusted 
the enumeration to do the work of limiting Congress;397 and that Marshall’s 
dictum about enumeration, read attentively, says nothing about the overall 
scope of congressional power.398 This Article is intended to call into question 
yet another of the traditional supports for enumerated-power orthodoxies—
the idea that the Bank debate reflects a Founding consensus about the enu-
merated-powers framework as the rubric for assessing federal legislation. 
Madison’s claim that the limiting enumeration was essential to the Constitu-
tion is not one that he would have made in 1787; the enumeration principle 
was not a consensus proposition in the First Congress. And the more we be-
come aware of the weaknesses in each particular element that seems to sup-
port mainstream thinking about enumerated powers, the more we may find 
393. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 195 (1824).
394. Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 12, at 628–42.
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ourselves open to wondering whether the other purported elements of that 
idea are really as solid as they are traditionally thought to be.
